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Foreword
Growth and development are primarily a matter of mobility. Mobility of people 
for access to employment, education, and health; mobility of goods to supply the 
world markets that ensure the dynamism of economic activity. In our globalized 
economy, it is the infrastructure and transport services that underpin trade, link-
ing production centers to consumption areas, integrating territories beyond 
administrative boundaries, and thus offering everyone the opportunity to con-
tribute to value creation, as well as to enjoy its benefits.
So mobility has value. So much value, actually, that when looking into options 
on how to set the transport sector on a low carbon path, those cutting down on 
mobility can hardly be entertained, such is the risk that they would significantly 
undermine development. In other words, stop moving, emit less, is not an option.
Then the challenge becomes: how to progress toward low-carbon mobility? 
And how do we finance such a transformation in transport patterns, so as to make 
it sustainable? And what will the role of technology be in helping along this route?
Those are some of the key questions this report seeks to answer. Or when the 
answer is not that straightforward, at least to provide some fertile avenues for 
further analysis and better understanding of the mechanisms through which 
transport may help make sustainable and inclusive green growth possible.
Transport is too often taken for granted. Without a deliberate policy agenda to 
steer the sector toward a sustainable future where mobility is provided to people 
and freight while simultaneously protecting the planet from increased congestion 
and ineluctable asphyxia, this evolution is unlikely to happen by itself. Or mobil-
ity will be curbed, under pressure from emerging crisis conditions, with develop-
ment and growth being among the first casualties. And as is so often the case in 
these situations, the poor are likely to suffer the most, with social inclusion giving 
way to survival of the fittest.
So now is the time to think through those issues and propose clear policy 
choices, which will hopefully help chart a way toward the future we—and our 
children—aspire to live in.
Jose Luis Irigoyen
Director
Transport, Water, and Information and
Communication Technologies
The World Bank
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Affordable transport services are crucial for development. They connect rural areas 
to sales opportunities and inputs, and nations to export markets and  foreign tech-
nologies. Affordability refers not just to consumer prices but also to all costs to 
society: the time losses due to congestion, the sometimes dramatic consequences 
of accidents, the health costs of local pollution, and the damage that severe  climate 
events inflict on the population. Transport decisions, particularly those for infra-
structure investments, will determine these costs for decades to come, offering 
opportunities to countries whose transport systems are not yet mature.
Recognition of climate implications in transport, unlike other sectors, has had 
a slow start. One reason is that the transition to a low-carbon context appears to 
be more costly than in other sectors. But broadening the policy agenda to shift 
behavior changes the cost picture completely, especially measures to reduce 
congestion, local air pollution, safety risks, and energy imports.
Policies to guide demand to low-emission modes and technologies must be 
part of investment programs and projects. Such policies can reduce transport 
demand in the longer run by changing the economic geography of cities and 
countries. But that will take close coordination of transport, environmental, and 
health policies. This report’s main messages are these:
•	 Climate policies should not compromise transport’s contribution to 
development.
•	 If past trends continue, transport greenhouse gas emissions will increase 
dramatically.
•	 Innovations in engine technologies will not produce deep cuts in emissions.
•	 To avoid a vicious lock-in, cutting emissions urgently requires a new modal 
composition for infrastructure and transport services.
•	 Reducing transport’s vulnerability to climate change starts with better mainte-
nance and management of infrastructure.
o v e r v i e w
Transport Efficiency Promotes 
Development and Protects the 
Environment
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•	 Climate change widens financing gaps in transport.
•	 Current carbon finance is inadequate to address transport’s needs.
•	 Benefits to transport from broad sector reforms would reduce the cost of 
 climate policies.
•	 Integrating supply and demand actions requires institutional change and 
coordination.
climate policies, transport, and Development
Lower transport costs drive urbanization and growth. High local demand leads 
to higher productivity because unit costs for larger firms are lower and access to 
specialized inputs is easier. Lower transport costs increase competition in smaller 
cities and regions, further concentrating production and increasing productivity. 
Movement of workers to larger cities puts pressure on wages, leading to a new 
virtuous cycle of larger local markets, greater production scale, and higher real 
incomes (Krugman 1991). Putting development first, therefore, climate policies 
for transport should not come at the expense of mobility (World Bank 2008a).
the Direction of transport Greenhouse Gas emissions
Because development and the demand for mobility go hand in hand, energy use 
in transport increases with per capita income. The main driver of increased fuel 
use is the expansion of roads, but high levels of national development are  possible 
with very large differences in transport energy consumption. The  high-income 
Asian economies, which developed rapidly after World War II, define the lower 
bound of per capita energy consumption (figure O.1). Numerous European 
countries have low per capita energy consumption for road transport relative 
Figure o.1 road transport energy consumption and per capita income
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to income, and Canada, the United States, and some oil-producing countries have 
very high consumption. Some of the differences can be explained by geography, 
but others are due to energy demand policies and technology differences.
Motorization has driven the expansion of roads and the increase in energy use. 
It accelerates in most countries at per capita incomes of $5,000–$10,000 
( figure O.2). There is no direct link between motorization and development; 
small countries with high per capita incomes, in particular, have large differences 
in motorization.
Projecting patterns of motorization and energy use into the future, the trans-
port sector would eventually become the main consumer of oil (figure O.3). 
Absolute oil consumption would increase dramatically until 2030, and alternative 
sources of energy would have minor impact. Longer-term scenarios suggest that 
the trend would continue until the century ends. Deep cuts in transport green-
house gas emissions through fuel substitution are expected to be possible with 
the emergence of new biofuel feedstocks that do not compete with food produc-
tion and require less water—or as fuel cell cars become economically viable.
If today’s developing countries repeat what has happened in developed 
 countries, almost all the increase in transport oil demand would come from non– 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
China, India, and the Middle East would see the largest increase (figure O.4). 
Progress in engine technologies would reduce fossil fuel consumption in some 
parts of the OECD, but such savings in non-OECD  countries would be far 
exceeded by the rise in motorization.
the effect of technology innovation on emissions
Unlike other sectors, where mitigation is mainly about replacing the fuel-using 
technologies of a small number of users whose reactions are highly predictable, 
Figure o.2 motorization and income 
Source: World Bank 2010d.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
Ukraine
China
Russian
Federation
South Africa
Turkey
Korea, Rep.
Mexico
Taiwan, China
Australia
New Zealand
Germany
Singapore
Denmark
Iceland
United States
Norway
Switzerland
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000
GDP per capita (2000 US$)
M
ot
or
 v
eh
ic
le
s 
pe
r 1
,0
00
 p
eo
pl
e,
 2
00
5
4 Transport Efficiency Promotes Development and Protects the Environment
Turning the Right Corner • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9835-7
Figure o.3 transport consumption of oil long-term
Source: OECD/IEA 2009b, figure 1.4, p. 79.
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mitigating greenhouse gases in transport is a matter of changing the behavior of 
an enormous number of people. Billions of consumers make separate decisions 
about whether to use a car, which type of car to use, which type of fuel to use, 
and which length of trip to take. Reducing emissions in transport thus involves 
shifting a large number of consumers toward cleaner technologies.
Transport Efficiency Promotes Development and Protects the Environment 5
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Because climate change is a global policy problem, climate policies require 
global agreement. To achieve the 2°C cap on average global temperature increase 
over preindustrial times, by 2100 carbon prices will have to increase to $700 a 
ton (Clarke and others 2007a). The more a country invests in roads, the more the 
carbon price will affect the price of a passenger-km or a ton-km. And the less a 
country has done to reduce transport greenhouse gas emissions, the more painful 
the transition to a low-carbon regime will be.
Differences in European and North American auto technologies illustrate this 
point. North America consumes four to six times more gasoline per head in 
 transport than Europe. Why? Because Europe unilaterally implemented higher 
fuel prices. If all OECD countries had the low fuel prices of the United States, 
fuel use would have been 30 percent higher throughout the OECD. Conversely, 
if all countries had the high gas prices of Italy, the United Kingdom, or the 
Netherlands, OECD gasoline consumption would have been 44 percent lower, for 
an annual savings of 8.5 billion tons of carbon dioxide (CO2). If all countries had 
U.S. fuel prices, the OECD would have used more than twice as much gasoline 
(133  percent more) than if all countries had Dutch prices (Sterner 2007).
How much will the transport sector be able to cut greenhouse gas emissions? 
Global scenarios vary, mainly because of differing expectations for progress in 
engine technologies. To some extent the answers depend on how much technical 
progress will be possible in other sectors, particularly power. They do not assume 
that there will be less use of transport or a significant change in means of trans-
port. Technology optimists and pessimists do differ, however, in their assump-
tions about how to bring about a transition in the sector.
The optimists expect substantial technical progress in all countries, leading by 
2030 to emission cuts of 30 percent compared to business as usual. But not even 
the optimists believe that emissions can be reduced from current levels in 
Figure o.4 transport oil Demand, oecD and non-oecD countries, 2007–30
Source: OECD/IEA 2009b, figure 1.6, p. 82.
Note: Mt = metric ton, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
a. Includes residential, services, agriculture, and other energy sectors.
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coming decades (figure O.5). The optimists assume that transport emission 
cuts will be achieved by internationally agreed emission standards for vehicles. 
Emissions per km of new cars would be reduced through better gasoline and 
diesel internal combustion engines, better lighting and air conditioning, better 
tires, and the rapid growth of plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles (figure O.6). 
Heavy-duty vehicles will benefit from spillovers of technical progress in light-
duty vehicles. The aviation fleet will reduce emissions in accord with interna-
tional efficiency agreements and reduce its average fuel consumption from 4.6 
liters per 100 revenue passenger-km to 2.6 liters in 2030.
Pessimists expect a far slower spread of plug-in vehicles and electric cars and 
see high barriers to adoption of advanced vehicle technologies in developing 
countries (Calvin and others 2009; Clarke and others 2007b). They assume that 
Figure o.5 the optimistic view: transport-related co2 emissions through 2030
Source: OECD/IEA 2009b, figure 6.9, p. 237.
a. Includes rail, pipeline, domestic navigation, international marine bunkers, and other non-specified transport.
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plug-in hybrids will be adopted only in developed countries due, for example, to 
the recycling risks of battery technologies and the high costs of infrastructure for 
alternative fuels. In developing countries, emission reductions must rely on 
advanced internal combustion engine technologies that can achieve 35 miles per 
gallon for gasoline engines and 37 for diesel (Kim and others 2006). In the 
MiniCam model of the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), consum-
ers and firms choose between different vehicles and modes of transport. Choices 
are driven not by technical vehicle standards but by a universal carbon price that 
holds for other sectors as well. The transport sector will, under the pessimistic 
assumptions about progress in vehicle technology, grow into the main emitter, 
even with a carbon price regime that stabilizes greenhouse gas concentrations at 
450 ppm (figure O.7). It takes the lead by 2050, when its emissions will have 
increased by 47 percent over 2005.
Pessimists expect that the prominence of transport as a greenhouse gas emitter 
could be amplified by rapid technical progress in the energy sector. A recent 
PNNL scenario based on the Global Change Assessment Model (GCAM), the 
successor to the MiniCam model, sees much greater potential for biofuel use in 
transport. The GCAM also covers agricultural production and land use, with bio-
fuel production reacting to the carbon price (Luckow, Wise, and Dooley 2010). 
It is the first scenario to take into account how technical developments in 
Figure o.7 the pessimistic view: transport the predominant emitter by 2095, even with 
carbon pricing leading to a Greenhouse Gas concentration of 450 ppm
Source: Clarke and Calvin 2008.
Note: GtC/yr = gigatons of carbon per year; ppm = parts per million.
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different sectors interact through their impact on the carbon price. Even if there 
were large-scale use of biomass, however, transport might remain the main pol-
luter, depending less on technical developments in transport than on the avail-
ability of carbon capture and storage (CCS). Without CCS, a high carbon price 
will lead to massive substitution of biofuels for gasoline and diesel. With CCS, 
much lower carbon prices are needed to get to the 450 ppm stabilization level, 
removing the pressure to find substitutes for fossil fuels (figure O.8)
Figure o.8 the pessimistic view: transport and carbon capture and storage
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Without the rapid emergence and global adoption of low-carbon engine 
 technologies, deep cuts in transport greenhouse gas emissions will depend on 
shifts in mode. Transport emissions can be reduced below the levels envisaged in 
the scenarios by shifting from
•	 road transport to rail and waterborne modes
•	 air transport to rail
•	 Individual car use to urban mass transit.
Transport is less emissions-intensive in economies were the role of roads is 
smaller (figure O.9).1 The Republic of Korea; Singapore; Hong Kong SAR, China; 
and Japan are all at the lower bound. Countries with low-carbon transport dem-
onstrate that a balanced modal structure is not correlated with low growth. In 
fact, the “development miracles” of the late 20th century have fairly low shares 
of road transport and low emissions per passenger-km and ton-km.
Finding alternatives to road transport will be a challenge for rapidly growing 
cities in developing countries. Megacities Singapore; Seoul; Hong Kong SAR, 
China; and Tokyo have all combined accessibility and mobility with low emis-
sions by directing transport toward a balanced modal structure. Thirty years ago 
in Hong Kong SAR, China, car ownership doubled in a decade, and time lost to 
congestion exploded. The integration of road building, a massive expansion of 
mass transit, and demand management halved vehicle ownership by 1985—by 
then 10 percent of the passenger cars were taxis—drastically reducing travel 
times without making the city less attractive for business (Cullinane 2002). 
It ranks second on the infrastructure index of the Global Competitiveness Report 
and second on its goods market efficiency index.
the effect of the modal composition of transport
The durability of transport equipment, the longevity of its infrastructure, and high 
fixed costs mean that current investments lock in the modal structure of transport 
Figure o.9 passenger car Density and income, 2003
Source: World Bank 2010d.
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for decades. The high costs that would result from failing to establish a low-carbon 
transport infrastructure system early on would persist for many years, and the 
inertia of consumer preferences for many transport attributes other than energy 
efficiency exacerbates the infrastructure lock-in. That calls for prompt action 
because of the long time lags between policy implementation and sector changes. 
Slow changes in the modal composition of infrastructure drastically increase the 
costs of mitigation because the capital stock has no alternative use (Lecocq, 
Hourcade, and Ha-Duong 1998). To change travel behavior and the modal 
choices of users of transport systems thus requires long adjustment periods.
Consumers who buy a vehicle incur high fixed costs. A change in fuel costs or 
taxes affects only a small part of total expenditures on the car. With changing fuel 
prices, fuel-inefficient cars lose value on the resale market. The lower price on 
the resale market translates into a capital loss if the car is sold. If that loss cannot 
be recaptured by switching to a more fuel-efficient vehicle, substitutes for 
energy-inefficient transport equipment will be introduced only with the techni-
cal depreciation of polluting vehicles.
Most roads are used for more than 70 years (Haraldsson and Jonsson 2008), 
and the expected lifetime of Dutch bridges is 84 years (Van Noortwijk and 
Klatter 2004). Once investments have been made, the expenditures are sunk. 
Economic analysis of a switch from an existing infrastructure network to a new 
one—say, with a different modal structure—would compare the costs of operat-
ing the current system with the high costs of new networks. If past national poli-
cies have produced heavy car-dependence, modal shifts are very costly in the short 
term. But countries at early stages of development can reduce future transport 
costs substantially by investing in infrastructure that supports low-carbon modes.
The immediate path-dependence of infrastructure induces a secondary path-
dependence in settlement patterns. Reliance on road transport and a high share 
of individual car use favor dispersed settlement, with jobs widely separated from 
residential locations and long commuting distances. This further constrains the 
opportunities to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions of urban transport. 
Changing the modal composition of urban transport then faces the barrier that 
mass transit cannot serve dispersed settlements.
Shalizi and Lecocq (2009) describe the different dimensions of transport 
infrastructure lock-in. The U.S. interstate highway program of the 1960s, for 
instance, determined later investments in state road projects, strengthening road 
sector network effects and pre-empting expansion of other types of infrastruc-
ture like rail. Shalizi and Lecocq see the sprawl of U.S. cities as induced by the 
build-up of the interstate highway system.
The consumption inertia in transport is reflected in a low price elasticity of 
transport demand—for developed countries between 0.23 and 0.27. That is, 
a 10 percent increase in fuel prices would reduce fuel consumption by 
2.3–2.7  percent. The temporary lock-in of consumer decisions for vehicle choice 
is evident in long-term price elasticities that are three to four times higher than 
short-term elasticities. The difference reflects the time required for consumers to 
change their transport equipment, and possibly their residence. The emphasis of 
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U.S. infrastructure policy on roads has reduced transport’s responsiveness to price 
signals, such as the costs of carbon (Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling 2006).
A more flexible modal composition of transport infrastructure increases the 
opportunities to respond to future changes in energy and emission prices. The 
price elasticities for European countries well endowed with public transport are 
20 percent above the global average (Goodwin, Dargay, and Hanly 2004; 
Graham and Glaister 2004). And the more the flexibility, the smaller the future 
adjustment costs and the risk that climate action will increase transport costs.
transport Adaptation needs
Transport is not simply a major emitter of greenhouse gases and contributor to 
climate change. It is also threatened by it. Climate policies for transport have to 
address two risks: the physical risk of transport disruptions due to extreme 
weather events, and the policy risk of an emission-intensive transport sector, with 
limited opportunities to respond to future climate policy imperatives.
Climate change, particularly the higher frequency of extreme weather events, 
will disrupt transport services more often. Storms and floods will damage costly 
infrastructure and interrupt access to villages and cities, sometimes for days. 
Interruptions to commuting and intermediate goods deliveries will lead to pro-
duction losses. Inventories to protect production against climate-induced sup-
plies irregularities will bind up large amounts of capital. With transport services 
less reliable, trade relations will become less attractive, and the benefits of a 
greater division of labor will not materialize. Trucking and other transport- 
intensive sectors might relocate to regions where they will be less exposed to 
extreme weather events. If, then, the transport sector is not made more resilient 
to changing weather conditions, the lower reliability of transport services could 
have huge development costs.
Adaptation will reduce the risk of extended interruptions to transport. 
Adaptation concerns management of infrastructure in the short run, and designs 
and location criteria for infrastructure facilities in the longer run. Threatening the 
reliability of transport are higher average temperatures, fewer very cold days, 
earlier spring thaws, and later autumn freezes. Droughts will become more likely 
in continental areas, while the intensity of rainfall will increase, particularly in 
coastal areas. Accelerated hydrological cycles will further intensify rainfall and 
wind storms.
These climatic and hydrological changes will affect infrastructure operations 
and maintenance. Extreme temperatures can expand and erode surface  pavements 
and buckle rail tracks. Intense rainfall slows road and rail traffic, and flooding 
completely disrupts it. In aviation, climate change requires larger drainage sys-
tems to cope with more intense rainfall, and longer runways and load restrictions 
to respond to the higher heat during liftoff.
Climate change will exacerbate the deficits in infrastructure administration 
common in many countries. In many countries maintenance services are 
underresourced. The value of losses of infrastructure assets often exceeds by 
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far the maintenance spending required to avoid them (Foster and Briceno-
Garmendia 2010). Climate change will increase demand for maintenance 
services to ensure that transport services stay reliable. The follow-on effects of 
increased landslides, flash floods, and erosion of land transport services will 
also require expansion of emergency services to avoid long interruptions. 
Because emergency services are often financed from maintenance budgets, 
more weather-related emergencies would worsen maintenance fiscal deficits 
(World Bank 2010c).
Because the consequences of climate change for transport will vary greatly 
among geoclimatic regions, adaptation must be specific to local conditions. The 
smaller the geographic area, the more uncertain are any predictions related to 
climate change, and fine-tuning current climate models will not entirely elimi-
nate the uncertainty. Recurrent assessments of weather-related risks should gen-
erate as needed new regulatory frameworks, new institutions, and new policies. 
The process should periodically produce an action plan, updated in the light of 
new information on local climate conditions and the consequences for transport 
(Fay, Ebinger, and Block 2010).
The higher demand for maintenance may alter the tradeoff between capital 
investment and maintenance. The higher costs of more resilient new investment 
could bring high future savings in retrofitting or more frequent and costly main-
tenance. Resolving this tradeoff depends on institutional changes to increase 
maintenance capacity.
The longevity of transport infrastructure calls for a long planning horizon and 
a process to update decision rules for investing in infrastructure. A first low-cost 
step is to change the decision rules for locating new facilities. Assessing rising 
risks from changing weather conditions and avoiding high-risk sites is economical 
insurance against climate-related disruptions. But inertia in planning locations 
can have very high costs. Inundations of more than one meter completely destroy 
roads. With its current location decisions, for example, Bangladesh risks losing 
more than 10,000 km of roads (Dasgupta and others 2010).
The biggest challenge for long-term infrastructure planning is to avoid look-
ing only at the past. Because local climates can change abruptly, past changes 
may not inform what might happen. Standard updating procedures—based on 
recording weather events and revising the probabilities of their occurrence—can 
distract from crucial adaptation measures. What is needed are decision tools 
that can incorporate information from forward-looking nonlinear models. 
Robust decision making, a process designed for use when probability distribu-
tions are unknown, gives proper attention to the possibility of high-impact 
events even if there is a very low probability that they will occur (Lempert and 
Collins 2007).
In the longer run, new building codes need to counter short-termism and the 
temptation to save on capital expenditures. Short-termism manifests itself in 
overdiscounting the future costs of retrofitting or replacement. New standards 
can be put in place if new facilities are built and there is progress in predicting 
climate change (Meyer 2008).
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climate change and transport Financing Gaps
Adaptation and mitigation policies will lead to more incremental financial 
demands. Global scenarios suggest that a large part of mitigation is in vehicle 
substitution, a cost borne by private households. Yet most incremental costs for 
adaptation are infrastructure costs. Because the scenarios underrate the modal 
shift in cutting greenhouse gas emissions, they also underestimate the added costs 
of redirecting the sector to less road and more rail, waterway, and nonmotorized 
transport. For interurban transport, the rail infrastructure costs per passenger-km 
for the San Francisco–Los Angeles corridor are more than twice aviation infra-
structure costs, and 15 percent higher than the costs of highways (Levinson, 
Kanafani, and Gillen 1999). Within cities, the costs for light rail infrastructure 
alone are at least three times those for bus systems (Zimmerman n.d.).
Incremental financial needs for transport infrastructure will add to the deficits 
in the sector’s fiscal resources. Many studies have found underinvestment in 
transport infrastructure, independent of the incremental costs of responding to 
climate change (Bougheas, Demetriades, and Mamuneas 2000; Canning and 
Bennathan 2000; Esfahani and Ramirez 2003). And in many countries, chronic 
underinvestment in transport maintenance has reduced infrastructure asset val-
ues by more than the required maintenance would have cost (Foster and 
Briceno-Garmendia 2010).
The incremental costs of adaptation compound these deficits. Funding require-
ments for adaptation are estimated by assessing how much new investment will 
be needed in infrastructure, multiplying that value by the share of infrastructure 
considered vulnerable, and multiplying that result by a mark-up factor for likely 
increases in infrastructure facilities costs (UNFCCC 2007). A median value for 
the transport share in national infrastructure investment is 20 percent. Using that 
assumption, the global incremental financial demands for transport would be 
$1.6–$26 billion a year (the wide range is due to differences in definitions of what 
constitutes infrastructure vulnerability). Another way of identifying the incre-
mental funding requirements is to use cost functions that couple macroeconomic 
data with engineering information on expected infrastructure cost increases for 
infrastructure. A recent World Bank study using this approach arrives at an esti-
mated $10 billion for additional investment and maintenance costs. The incre-
mental annual adaptation investment is estimated to be $7.2 billion a year until 
2030, which is a small share of the baseline investment (World Bank 2010a).
These estimates could underestimate the true incremental costs for two 
reasons:
•	 They neglect the infrastructure gaps of developing countries; closing those 
gaps will increase the additional capital costs. They also neglect the fact that 
capital costs will be higher because investments must reduce future mainte-
nance requirements.
•	 They implicitly assume that current maintenance expenditures are optimal for 
maintaining the value of transport infrastructure. But actual expenditures are 
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far lower than what is needed. Fay and Yepes (2003) estimate that true main-
tenance needs are 3.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in low-income 
countries, 2.5 percent in lower middle-income countries, and 1.4 percent in 
upper middle-income countries (Estache and Fay 2010). With actual mainte-
nance expenditures often below 1 percent of GDP, the true deficit in mainte-
nance expenditures might thus be large.
The estimated incremental costs for mitigation are far higher. The only estimate 
for additional spending to mitigate transport greenhouse gas emissions is that of 
the International Energy Agency (IEA): $100 billion a year between 2010 and 
2020, moving up to $300 billion in 2030. Most of the additional spending is for 
investment in low-emission vehicles. That explains the exponential increase after 
2020, which is the point at which plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles would 
become economically viable (leading to an increment of $52–$159 billion). For 
low-income and middle-income countries, the scenario underestimates the addi-
tional infrastructure investment needed ensure seamless multi-modality of infra-
structure because it assigns only a small role to modal shifts.
the inadequacy of current carbon Finance
Carbon finance covers only a very small share of the additional costs for transport 
adaptation and mitigation activities. Transport does not get much from the Clean 
Development Mechanism, the most important carbon finance mechanism for 
curbing greenhouse gas emissions. Of more than 2,200 registered projects, only 
three are transport projects. The greenhouse gas savings of all three projects add 
up to less than 300,000 tons of CO2-equivalent (CO2 eq), with a mere 0.1  percent 
of investments. Within the accounting and evaluation standards of the Clean 
Development Mechanism and its focus on reducing emissions by technology 
substitution rather than behavioral change, the transport projects look to be less 
effective in reducing emissions than projects of other sectors.
The transport sector fares not much better with the Global Environment 
Facility, which provides grants to innovative projects that benefit the global envi-
ronment; in the past 20 years only 28 transport projects have been approved, for 
a total of $182.4 million (6.4 percent of all resources allotted). Transport figures 
more heavily in the country programs of the Clean Technology Fund (CTF), 
which has a broader multisectoral approach. The CTF provides limited grants, 
concessional loans, and partial risk guarantees to help countries scale up clean 
technology initiatives to transform their development path. In half the CTF 
country plans, transport is a priority, though its share varies considerably 
between countries. Transport receives on average 16.7 percent of CTF funding 
and 23  percent of the total investment, including leveraged government funding, 
multilateral development bank financing, and private investment. Total transport 
investment (CTF and leveraged) is $8.4 billion.
The carbon finance resources now spent on transport are a tiny share of needs. 
If transport policies follow a narrow climate change agenda, the high costs of 
Transport Efficiency Promotes Development and Protects the Environment 15
Turning the Right Corner • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9835-7 
climate action in transport make it unlikely that this will ever change. So far the 
narrow agenda focuses on reducing CO2 by changing the technology. If the ben-
efits of less local air pollution, reduced congestion, and greater transport safety 
are also considered, the prospects for more climate finance will improve. Projects 
confined to the supply side, without demand incentives, risk a mismatch of sup-
ply and demand. They are likely to wastefully underuse transport capacity. 
It would be more effective to incorporate demand measures to induce behavioral 
change—reducing uncertainty about the balance of supply and demand and 
increasing the domain of actions eligible for carbon finance. Thus a broad trans-
port reform agenda that prices in climate, health, and congestion costs would 
better balance supply and demand and reduce emissions.
transport reforms and climate policy costs
Measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will reduce congestion costs, local 
air pollution, and safety risks. Reducing these social impacts of transport will 
also reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Educating users about transport environ-
mental, safety, and congestion costs will reduce its social costs. Without policies 
to do so, transport users have no opportunity to learn about health costs due to 
air pollution and no incentives to change their behavior to reduce them. The 
policy deficit in making such costs felt is enormous. The highest social costs are 
due to
•	 Congestion
•	 Local air pollution
•	 Road accidents
•	 Greenhouse gas emissions
Efforts to reduce these costs do more to reduce greenhouse gas emissions than a 
narrow climate change agenda (Parry 2007). Moreover, reducing them would 
produce revenues to finance the transition to low-carbon transport.
An obvious reform step, one that would reduce the social costs of transport 
and create fiscal opportunities, is to remove subsidies that give the wrong signals. 
Most important are subsidies for gasoline and diesel. The U.S. pump prices for 
gasoline and diesel are a good approximation to tax-free and subsidy-free con-
sumer prices (GTZ 2009). In comparison, many developing countries subsidize 
gasoline and diesel, with substantial consequences for government spending. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran could save $20 billion a year, and Saudi Arabia 
$12  billion, by removing transport fuel subsidies. Poorer countries could also 
have major savings. If it cut its transport fuel subsidies, Myanmar could save more 
than $300 million. The Islamic Republic of Iran and Colombia are now making 
substantial strides toward reducing transport subsidies.
The most direct way to convey the costs of transport related to climate 
change is to price carbon. A gallon of gasoline contains 0.0024 tons of carbon 
(Parry, Walls, and Harrington 2007). Hypothetical carbon prices of $20, $30, 
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or $300 per ton of carbon would translate into an additional 5, 12, or 72 cents 
per gallon of gasoline. The carbon price would thus change consumer prices 
moderately. If there were no changes in travel behavior, the hypothetical 
 carbon charges would bring the United States annual revenues of $10 billion, 
$24  billion, or $145 billion.
The fiscal consequences of charging for local air pollution differ—in some 
cases, as in the United States and European Union, they are very high. For the 
Los Angeles area, containing the health costs of local pollution ranged from 1 to 
8 cents per mile in 2000 (Small and Kazimi 1995). Given the number of vehicle 
miles driven in the area, such charges would produce revenues of $400 million 
to $3.3 billion. The health costs for Beijing were estimated at $3.5 billion in 
2007, equivalent to 3.5 percent of local GDP (Creutzig and He 2009). Similar 
estimates can be made for congestion and accident costs. Signaling the true costs 
of transport to users could open considerable opportunities to address the 
chronic underfinancing of transport and the incremental costs to transport of 
climate policies.
Those measures would also generate substantial income and welfare benefits. 
By maximizing the development gains from limiting greenhouse gas emissions, 
local air pollution, and the costs of congestion and accidents, they produce not 
only revenues but also net benefits for consumers. Rough estimates suggest that 
the revenue potential could even be higher than the additional funding required 
for the transition to a low-carbon regime. If so, making transport more efficient 
would even make it possible to reduce taxes that are harmful to growth and 
welfare. A broad reform agenda to make the sector efficient provides far more 
powerful incentives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions than a narrow climate 
policy program that implicitly assumes that all other inefficiencies have been 
removed. An efficient transport sector thus protects the environment and 
advances development—win, win.
integrating supply and Demand
Climate policies in transport have suffered from a disconnect between infrastruc-
ture and environmental policymaking and implementation. They have focused 
on increasing the capacity of infrastructure for low-emission modes and setting 
regulatory standards. Yet the less the horizontal coordination between supply and 
demand policies, the greater the uncertainty about how emissions can be effec-
tively reduced. The expansion of mass transit in the United States, for example, 
led to higher average emissions per passenger-km in public transport than in 
individual car use due to smaller loads for buses and rail systems (Small and van 
Dender 2007). Isolated subsectoral agendas can thus have unintended negative 
effects. By contrast, London’s congestion charges were accompanied by a massive 
increase in bus capacity, which avoided the mismatch. The broad sector reform 
proposed here requires horizontal coordination not only between different 
aspects of transport policymaking but also between departments as diverse as 
finance, land use regulation, security, and health.
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The different spatial dimensions of the social costs of transport require vertical 
coordination of different jurisdictional levels. Because greenhouse gas emissions 
create global damage, ideally they should be addressed globally. The scenarios of 
the PNNL show how globally agreed carbon prices could lead all emitting sectors 
to lower their emissions to arrive at targeted atmospheric concentrations. The 
local health costs of air pollution can differ greatly by city and region. Policy 
measures to address these costs should thus differ locally. Congestion and trans-
port safety are similarly local.
Competition between countries, regions, and cities requires vertical coordina-
tion to avoid a race to the bottom. Even if there were a collective agreement on 
climate action, it could be difficult for individual governments to commit 
to  climate policies. The difficulty is that they want to benefit from collective 
 climate actions without reducing emissions. To counter this, higher jurisdictions 
must frame and coordinate local policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The 
Indian Sustainable Urban Transport Project is an example of a national strategy 
to avoid a race by cities to the bottom (World Bank 2009a).
Individual projects to reduce the carbon intensity of transport need to be 
combined with programmatic policies. The difficulty of including transport in 
carbon finance mechanisms like the Clean Development Mechanism illustrates 
this point: Uncertainty over whether bus or rail projects will attract car users 
or  minibus users could prompt the conclusion that transport investments 
are less effective than other sectors in reducing emissions. The discussion of 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) recognizes that program-
matic and multisectoral policies can enhance the role of transport in global 
climate policy.
note
 1. This translates into a mirror image in per capita emissions in transport (see 
figure O.1).
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The transport sector is one of the biggest contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, and unless there is a shift to low-carbon transport, technology that 
emits less GHG, and reduced transport use, it will remain so (Parry 2007). 
Whether it can reach emission targets depends on technical opportunities, user 
behavior, and infrastructure investment. Continuing business as usual in the face 
of global climate change could result in higher costs, less mobility, less transport 
support for development, and greater disruption not only of transport services 
but also of production reliant on these services.
So far, policies have failed to recognize the centrality of transport’s role in 
global climate change: Joint Implementation initiatives do not include a single 
transport project; the Clean Development Mechanism has only three transport 
projects out of 2,587; and the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) has only 30 
transport projects out of 2,533. One reason for the lack of new transport projects 
is their high cost. However, accounting for synergies between related efforts in 
the sector to reduce traffic congestion, air pollution, and dependence on fuel 
greatly increases the cost-effectiveness of reducing transport emissions.
the relationship between mobility and Development
Historically, affordable transport has driven development, with dramatic changes 
in transport kicking off rapid economic development (World Bank 2009b). 
Access and mobility make it possible to share facilities, goods and services, and 
knowledge, thus increasing productivity (box 1.1).
•	 Development depends on infrastructure—marketplaces, schools, hospitals, 
and public administration offices, for instance—to provide basic services, 
but infrastructure requires substantial fixed investment. A reliable and 
affordable transport system increases the number of users and thus reduces 
fixed costs.
c h A p t e r  1
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•	 If transport costs are reduced, workers are more likely to commute or migrate 
to jobs in larger cities. The larger the local market, the more efficiently 
 consumer goods and inputs to production are produced. The geographic con-
centration of production made possible by lower transport costs expands 
opportunities to exploit scale economies.
•	 Despite progress in communication technologies, the transfer of knowledge 
and experience still depends on face-to-face communication (for example, 
Box 1.1 characteristics of the transport sector
The transport sector has increasing returns to scale: higher demand reduces its costs. 
Coordinating freight trips and balancing irregular demand for deliveries increase returns for 
the logistics industry (figure A1.1). In the maritime sector, larger container ships reduce 
ton-km costs.
There is a strong positive correlation between passenger-km traveled and average incomes 
(figure A1.2). The United States consumes the most passenger-km by far. Switzerland, where 
the average income is only slightly lower than in the United States, consumes just over a third 
of the U.S. passenger-kms. Some small countries, such as Lithuania, consume a high level of 
passenger-km, whereas some middle-income countries where income has recently surged, 
such as the Republic of Korea, have kept passenger-km remarkably low.
In addition to per capita income, the size of a country, the history of links to former Soviet 
Union countries, and the history of rail infrastructure policies all affect the rail share of freight 
transport (figure A1.3; outliers with very high rail freight transport—Kazakhstan and the 
United States—have been excluded from the figure).
Across countries, differences in rail passenger-km mirror differences in road passenger-km 
(figure A1.4). Switzerland is the prototypical country with a high per capita income and high 
rail passenger-km but low road passenger-km. Compared with other rich countries, the United 
States has low rail passenger-km. Korea has kept rail passenger-km high throughout its rapid 
economic development. Former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance countries that have 
emphasized rail transport still have high rail passenger-km.
Car ownership typically increases dramatically when countries reach an average income of 
$5,000 in 2000 values (figure A1.5). Motorization in Mexico shot up at this per capita income 
point; but Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan, China—which have had high income growth in recent 
decades—have kept motorization low. Some countries, such as Switzerland, that have rela-
tively low road passenger-km in relation to incomes nevertheless have high car ownership.
A similar picture holds for passenger car density (figure A1.6). Some small countries, such as 
Luxembourg and the Baltic states, have a high number of cars, both in absolute terms and rela-
tive to their population and income. The rapidly developing East Asian countries stand out for 
their low passenger car density. India and China have low per capita incomes but a rapidly 
growing middle class whose demand for cars is rising. Brazil and the Russian Federation have 
large populations likely to reach the income level at which car ownership increases dramati-
cally, although their passenger car densities per 1,000 people were still low in 2003, with India 
at 8, China at 10, Brazil at 131, and Russia at 161.
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Leamer 2007). Transport increases productivity by creating more  opportunities 
for sharing technical and organizational knowledge, which is crucial to the 
invention or improvement of products. Ensuring mobility, and thus the oppor-
tunity for direct sharing of knowledge, is a challenge in increasingly congested 
megacities, particularly in developing countries.
climate risks from transport
The transport sector emits the GHGs carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
and methane (CH4). Since N2O and CH4 emissions are small, most GHG 
 emission inventories estimate CO2 emissions only (IPCC/UNEP/OECD/IEA 
1997; IPCC 2000). In 2006 transport accounted for about 14 percent of global 
GHG emissions. This is equivalent to 18 percent of global CO2 emissions and 
24 percent of CO2 emissions from energy-related sources (Baumert, Herzog, 
and Pershing 2005).
Within the sector, road transport accounts for the largest share of emissions 
at 76 percent, followed by air transport at 12 percent and water transport at 
10  percent (figure 1.1). From 1971 to 2006 global transport energy use rose 
steadily at 2–2.5 percent a year, about the same as economic growth 
(World Bank 2009b). 
Figure 1.1 total transport co2 emissions, by transport mode
Source: World Business Council for Sustainable Development 2005 (http://www.wbcsd.org/home.aspx).
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide.
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Behind these figures are drastic differences between countries in absolute and 
per capita energy consumption. Per capita energy use differs by a factor of 40–50, 
and the type of fuel used also differs. These differences hold even among the 
main consumers of fossil fuels—Australia, Europe, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and the 
United States. For example, Europe uses more diesel fuel per capita than North 
America. Many African countries use less than 70 kilotons oil equivalent (ktoe), 
while the United States, Canada, Saudi Arabia, and Australia have per capita 
consumption of 1,200–5,000 ktoe (map 1.1).
Globally, transport energy use has more than doubled since 1971, although its 
distribution across road, rail, aviation, and maritime transport has been fairly 
constant. But regional patterns of transport have changed. The road sector grew 
at the same pace as transport over the last two decades in developed countries, 
but it grew much faster, at 3.3 percent annually leading to a doubling in 20 rather 
than 40 years, in non-OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) countries. An increase in international aviation in the 1990s 
dominated changes in developed countries, a trend interrupted only briefly by 
the downturn of aviation after 9/11.
Much of the difference in per capita fuel consumption stems from differences 
in incomes, but there are also substantial differences between countries with simi-
lar incomes, reflecting differences in transport services consumed per capita and 
types of fuel. International differences in motorization and passenger-car density 
are paralleled in the relationship between per capita incomes and per capita 
energy consumption. Hong Kong SAR, China; Singapore; and Japan are examples 
of economies with low energy intensities that have seen rapid development in 
map 1.1 per capita transport energy Use, 2006
Source: OECD/IEA 2009a, figure 1.2, p. 46.
Note: CNG = compressed natural gas, FSU = former Soviet Union, LPG = liquified petroleum gas, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development. Does not include international shipping.
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recent decades. As for fuel, the transport sector will generally remain heavily 
dependent on oil and will be the largest consumer of energy by 2030, increasing 
its consumption by about 50 percent. Emissions in North America, Europe, and 
Japan are projected to decline as more fuel-efficient cars are  introduced and as 
car ownership reaches saturation. Emissions are expected to increase most in 
China, India, the Middle East, and Latin America (figure 1.2). A comparison of 
per capita emissions again shows large differences between high-income  countries. 
These energy use differences translate directly into emission differences.
Dealing with inertia in infrastructure
Because transport infrastructure must be built to last, early action is needed to 
adapt what is already in place to likely changes in climatic conditions (and tech-
nologies) and to mitigate the kinds of problems aging infrastructure can cause.
Immediate Steps to Adapt
Transport infrastructure has a long lifetime. The effective lifetime of roads is 
25–111 years, and most last more than 70 years (Haraldsson and Jonsson 2008). 
Bridges are expected to last at least 100 years. Since the climate is likely to 
change over that long a time, transport infrastructure must be made resilient to 
such changes.
Climate change threats include increasing mean temperatures, more frequent 
heat waves, more pronounced freeze-thaw cycles, heavier precipitation, stronger 
winds, and greater storm surges and wave heights. High temperatures can cause 
road surfaces and rail tracks to deform, floods and snowfalls can paralyze surface 
Source: OECD/IEA 2009b.
Figure 1.2 Actual and projected transport co2 emissions, 1980–2030
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transport, and droughts can interrupt waterway transport and destabilize  building 
foundations. Storm surges threaten harbor facilities. Rising sea levels may neces-
sitate relocating infrastructure completely.
A major threat to road transport is landslides. In Malaysia, for example, the 
cost of landslides has increased dramatically (figure 1.3). Costs spiked there in 
2003 when a landslide closed the highway at Bukit Lanjan in Selangor, Malaysia, 
precipitating a half-year of traffic congestion, road closures, and diversions in the 
Klang Valley that made this landslide Malaysia’s most costly to date.
Changes in logistics could cushion extreme weather events. Maintaining larger 
inventories and more location choices could avoid irregularity in transport times, 
which drive up distribution costs. The cost of importing goods to the United States, 
for instance, is estimated to be 55 percent of their production value (Anderson and 
van Wincoop 2004). Higher logistics cost would be the equivalent of higher value-
added taxes, which would adversely affect  interregional and international trade.
Transport maintenance is already widely underfinanced and neglected, and 
will become more so with climate change. Better emergency services could save 
considerably on maintenance budgets. For example, clearing roads and railways 
faster after landslides or heavy snowfall could save days of production losses. 
Infrastructure maintenance and emergency services need serious reform.
Some transport agencies have started to systematically collect information on 
how climate affects transport. Transit New Zealand, for example, took climate 
change effects into account as it planned, constructed, and maintained its state 
highway network as mandated by the 2004 Resource Management (Energy and 
Climate Change) Amendment Act (National Research Council of the National 
Academies 2008). A monitoring system tracked how climate weather affected 
bridges, culverts, causeways, coastal roads, pavement surfaces, surface drainage, 
Figure 1.3 malaysia: costs of landslides, 1973–2007
Source: Government of Malaysia 2009.
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and hillside slopes. Of major concern was the threat to highways from a rise in sea 
level, coastal storm surges, and more frequent and more intense rainfall. The data 
allowed Transit New Zealand to assess infrastructure vulnerability to see whether 
retrofitting was needed. The conclusion was that it was less economical to retrofit 
bridges and culverts than to repair them as needed (Kinsella and McGuire 2005).
Historical data may not reliably predict climate change. Many climate models 
warn that weather changes may not be smooth but occur in discrete jumps. To 
protect transport from nonlinear changes, adaptation policies should be 
anticipatory.
The total costs of adaptation are calculated roughly as percentages of gross 
fixed capital formation. The United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) has estimated that gross capital formation will be 
$22.3 trillion in 2030 (UNFCCC 2007), taking into account the following:
•	 Munich Re estimates that 0.7 percent of the gross addition to capital forma-
tion is vulnerable; the Association of British Insurers estimates 2.7 percent.
•	 Of the resulting totals, 5–20 percent are capital costs for adaptation, that is, 
$53–$650 billion. The estimates assume that infrastructure deficits in 
 developing countries will persist and that adaptation money would thus go 
to  developed countries with larger infrastructure endowments (Parry and 
 others 2009). However, if infrastructure capacity in developing countries were 
to expand (Sachs and The UN Millennium Project 2005), the cost of  adaptation 
in Africa would increase from $370 million to $12.3 billion, roughly in line 
with the World Bank estimates of Africa’s infrastructure deficits (Foster and 
Briceno-Garmendia 2010).
•	 Geographic and climatic conditions as well as the local economy’s transport 
intensity will determine the transport share in these investments. The 
UN Millennium Project expects road financial needs to be about 20 percent of 
total infrastructure needs. Global transport adaptation needs, according to the 
UNFCCC estimate, range from $30 to $130 billion. A recent World Bank 
study estimates the annual cost of transport adaptation to be $11 to $18  billion 
(Hughes, Chinowsky, and Strzepek 2010).
Data collection and improvement in maintenance and emergency responses to 
climate events are self-financing, the great uncertainty of future damages not-
withstanding. Improved maintenance brings great benefits to developing coun-
tries independent of climate change (OECD/ECMT Transport Research Centre 
2007). Further adaptation will then use local weather knowledge to inform 
design standards, use of materials, and location decisions.
Early Action and Sector Inertia
While transport is central to mitigating carbon emissions, there are several 
 impediments to making changes. The first is that because of its high sunk costs, 
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infrastructure cannot be changed overnight. The second is the technological 
inertia in both transport mode and infrastructure design. The third is the land 
use nexus: that is, regulations related to construction, land use, urban planning, 
and so on that affect everything from settlement patterns to consumer 
 behavior. Moreover, inconsistent energy pricing policies reinforce inertia that 
resists change.
The intent of transport adaptation is to reduce the negative impact of climate 
change on access and mobility. The Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC 2009) 
expanded the concept of adaptation to include mitigation, with serious conse-
quences for transport. If mitigation leads to higher carbon and vehicle prices, 
demand could shift from one transport mode to another. Some infrastructure 
investment would thus become adaptation investment. Because it is uncertain 
how a local climate will change, current measures are often reactive rather than 
anticipatory and largely directed to reducing maintenance costs. Some countries, 
in fact, use up most of their maintenance budget reacting to weather events. 
Responding to landslides in Morocco, for example, uses 50 percent of the road 
maintenance budget (World Bank 2010a).
The Forces behind Transport Sector Inertia
Infrastructure inertia: Transport infrastructure facilities tend to be large-scale, 
lumpy investments with high fixed costs. Capital stock turnover is low because 
high sunk costs make premature removal of capital costly. That is why inertia is 
usually modeled within integrated assessment models (IAMS) as a cost multi-
plier function of capital turnover increase (Lecocq, Hourcade, and Ha-Duong 
1998). Consequently, changing the modal structure between roads, rail, aviation, 
and waterways depends on solid economic policies, especially appropriate pric-
ing policies, such as subsidies and taxes. Because infrastructure expenditures are 
sunk, the opportunity cost of transport capital stock depends on maintenance. 
The cost of shifting transport services to low-carbon modes thus unfairly 
 compares the marginal costs of reducing emissions within the carbon-intensive 
transport mode to the full (infrastructure plus operations) cost of shifting to an 
innovative, low-emission mode. For instance, power station networks for 
recharging batteries of electrically powered cars require high fixed investment. 
Thus, the cheapest option would appear to be marginal changes to existing 
infrastructure rather than investing in a new low-carbon infrastructure. However, 
climate change uncertainty and inertia argue for early mitigation. Socioeconomic 
inertia increases the cost of accelerating emissions reduction as initial targets 
tighten up (Ha-Duong, Grubb, and Hourcade 1997). At some point expected 
costs exceed the costs of premature capital removal, thus making early, forceful 
mitigation measures profitable. Any sound comparative economic analysis must 
therefore take into account inertia if it is not to omit relevant low-carbon 
investments.
Technological inertia: Incentives to densify the existing grid arise mostly from 
technology lock-in and network effects (Economides 1996) that increase the 
value of existing services when demand for such services grows. For example, 
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the U.S. Interstate Highway Program launched in the 1960s has largely 
 determined later investments in state road projects at the expense of other trans-
port, such as rail (Shalizi and Lecocq 2009). Energy pricing policies that either 
subsidize fossil fuels or do not reflect the true social cost of carbon discourage 
innovation in energy-saving technologies and encourage consumer inertia in 
favor of carbon-intensive transport.
Built-environment inertia: Besides moving people and goods, transport 
 infrastructure fosters economic development and shapes the pattern of a terri-
tory. For example, the sprawling pattern of U.S. cities may be an induced effect 
of the Interstate Highway Program (Shalizi and Lecocq 2009). Thus transport 
infrastructure must be considered as just one aspect of broader public policies 
for land use, regional development, and sustainable development. Changing the 
regulatory framework is a prerequisite to infrastructure change, although the 
difficulty of tracking the complex interactions between development and infra-
structure planning tends to work against radical change. Early action is needed 
to overcome inertia and move the sector gradually to a low-carbon state. Inertia 
toward change stems from three factors: transport services depend on infra-
structure, consumers value certain transport services that are weighted against 
energy  savings and lower emissions, and historic infrastructure and energy-
related transport policies on the demand side determine current differences 
in emissions.
Past Infrastructure Policies and Transport Emissions
Building infrastructure promotes self-reinforcing development. How? 
(1) Investments in transport infrastructure are normally large-scale, lumpy, and 
have high fixed costs. (2) Infrastructure has a long lifetime, extending over gen-
erations if properly maintained, which means long-term forecasting of demand 
for services and of the capacity needed to meet that demand. (3) Expenditures 
for infrastructure are sunk; once infrastructure is in place, it cannot be put to 
another use. Transport infrastructure also creates secondary investments in hous-
ing and other urban infrastructure that make changes in it even more costly.
Policies to change infrastructure capacity or the structure of roads, rail, avia-
tion, and waterways are thus costly. Because infrastructure spending is sunk, the 
opportunity cost of transport infrastructure stock depends on maintenance. 
Any economic analysis of the shifting of transport services to low-carbon 
modes will thus compare the marginal costs of reducing emissions within the 
high-carbon sector to the full (infrastructure plus operations) costs of shifting 
to a low- emission mode.
Transport infrastructure investment also largely determines settlement and 
land use. Prioritizing car use, for example, leads to dispersed settlement 
because low transport costs invite people to move to areas distant from their 
jobs and retail centers where housing is less costly. U.S. household data suggest 
that suburban households drive 31–35 percent more than urban residents 
(Kahn 2006). Dispersed settlements are more difficult to serve by mass 
 transit. In the United States, for example, the share of mass transit passenger 
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miles relative to other modes has been falling steadily for 30 years (Polzin and 
Chu 2005).
How responsive users are to fuel cost changes and carbon taxes is an 
 indicator of transport inertia. There is a vast literature measuring the short-run 
elasticity of gasoline demand. A review of 300 studies for the United States and 
other developed countries found a median short-run price elasticity of −0.23 
(Espey 1998). In other words, a 10 percent increase in fuel price would reduce 
gasoline consumption by 2.3 percent. An even higher estimated −0.27 elasticity 
for European countries reflects a higher share of nonmotorized transport and 
more public transport (Goodwin, Dargay, and Hanly 2004; Graham and 
Glaister 2004). Long-term elasticities are in the range of −0.6 to −1.0, about 
three times higher than those for the short term. The higher long-run elastici-
ties are influenced by consumers moving in the shorter run to cars that con-
sume less fuel or to residential locations that require less vehicle-km travel, and 
in the longer run making residential location decisions that result in shorter 
commuting and retail trips. Notably, transport has become less responsive to 
emission cost changes (Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling 2008; Small and van 
Dender 2007). During two periods that had similarly high prices, 1975–1980 
and 2001–2006, short-run price elasticities went down considerably, ranging 
from −0.21 to −0.34 for 1975–1980 and −0.034 to −0.077 for 2001–2006 
(Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling 2008). This decrease may reflect more depen-
dence on cars as suburban development increases distances between homes and 
job and retail locations.
With few incentives for consumers to reduce energy use and emissions, trans-
port policy must intervene if reduction targets are to be achieved. However, 
sudden and dramatic price increases in equipment and infrastructure, a cap-and-
trade system, or the levying of carbon taxes would in the short term create high 
welfare costs (Gusdorf and Hallegatte 2007). Severe transport cost hikes would 
decrease demand for other goods and have a negative secondary effect on econo-
mies from infrastructure use, trade, and agglomeration.
Changing only supply-side investment could lead to a mismatch of capacity 
and demand without bringing down emissions much. Ideally, incentives to guide 
demand to less polluting modes should be put in place concurrently with the 
transition to low carbon use. This would limit negative secondary effects and 
increase political acceptability (Weyant 1993).
In contrast to what low short-run elasticities suggest, persistent incentives for 
changing demand can significantly influence fuel and emission intensity 
( figure 1.4). Per capita gasoline consumption mirrors price developments for the 
last two decades. A study calculated the hypothetical effect of all OECD coun-
tries adjusting permanently to the fuel tax levels of Italy, the United Kingdom, 
and the Netherlands (Sterner 2007). This would reduce all OECD transport 
carbon emissions by about 40 percent, or 270 million tons of fuel a year; in a 
decade 8.5 billion tons of CO2 would thus be avoided. If all OECD countries 
were taxed at the level of the United States rather than of the Netherlands, 
 however, the increase in emissions would be 133 percent.
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low-carbon transport and Development
Some low- and middle-income countries that have rapidly reached very high per 
capita incomes have kept per capita emissions very low. In the late 1970s, Hong 
Kong SAR, China, resembled metropolitan areas of today: It had real growth 
of about 10 percent a year, an influx of immigrants, and a roaring demand for 
 private cars. Car ownership had more than doubled in a decade. The result was 
both a huge loss of time for passengers and freight and significant health costs 
from air pollution.
The Hong Kong SAR, China, transport department reacted with draconian 
measures (Hau 1990). In 1979 it drastically reformed transport policy, 
increased road capacity, improved mass transit, and introduced demand man-
agement. It trebled the license fee for cars, doubled the first registration fee 
(up to 90 percent of the value of an imported car), and doubled fuel taxes. 
Vehicle ownership plunged; by 1985 it was down to 50 percent of the 1979 
value, of which taxis represented 10 percent. The public transport system 
incorporates an underground metro, a heavy rail line linking Hong Kong 
SAR, China, with mainland China, a light rail system in the northwest New 
Territories, and a tram on the north side of Hong Kong Island. Five private 
Figure 1.4 price Differences and per capita Gasoline consumption, selected countries
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bus companies operate more than 6,000 buses. Minibuses with fixed fares 
and exclusive rights to operate on certain routes provide feeder services to 
the main bus lines. Entry to this submarket is strictly regulated and a maxi-
mum number of minibuses is set for city districts. Transfers from one mode 
of travel to another are synchronized to minimize time loss (Cullinane 
2002).
The opening of the Island Eastern Corridor in 1987 and the Island Route of 
the Mass Transit Railway further reduced congestion. Tolls are levied to improve 
air quality and keep the city attractive. (Although road pricing had been intro-
duced in 1985, after vehicle ownership had already significantly decreased, it 
has been dropped.) In the infrastructure index of the Global Competitiveness 
Report, Hong Kong SAR, China, ranks second, with a score of 6.54 out of 7. In 
goods market efficiency, it scores 5.54, second only to Singapore (World 
Economic Forum 2010). Hong Kong SAR, China, is a prime example of a 
metropolis that has retained a high level of mobility by taking a multimodal 
approach rather than focusing only on roads. Avoiding the congestion that 
plagues other megacities allows both for agglomeration economies and for sus-
tained access and mobility for residents.
Source: Sterner 2007.
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Figure 1A.1 road Freight and Average income, 2006
Source: World Bank 2010b.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
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Annex 1A characteristics of the transport sector
The transport sector has increasing returns to scale: higher demand reduces its 
costs. Coordinating freight trips and balancing irregular demand for deliveries 
increase returns for the logistics industry (figure 1A.1). In the maritime sector, 
larger container ships reduce ton-kilometer costs.
There is a strong positive correlation between passenger-km traveled and aver-
age incomes (figure 1A.2). The United States consumes the most passenger-km 
by far. Switzerland, however, with an average income only slightly lower than 
that of the United States, consumes only just over a third of U.S. passenger-km. 
Some small countries, such as Lithuania, consume a high level of passenger-km, 
whereas some middle-income countries where income has recently surged, such 
as Korea, have kept passenger-km remarkably low.
In addition to per capita income, the size of a country, the integration of 
 former Soviet Union countries, and the history of rail infrastructure policies all 
affect the rail share of freight transport (figure 1A.3; outliers with very high rail 
freight transport—Kazakhstan and the United States—have been excluded from 
the figure).
Across countries, differences in rail passenger-km mirror differences in road 
passenger-km (figure 1A.4). Switzerland is the prototypical country with high 
per capita income and high rail passenger-km but low road passenger-km. 
Compared with other rich countries, the United States has low rail passenger-km. 
Korea has maintained high rail passenger-km throughout its rapid economic 
development. Former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance countries that 
have emphasized rail transport still have high rail passenger-km.
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Figure 1A.3 rail Freight transport and Average income, 2006
Source: World Bank 2010b.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
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Figure 1A.2 road passenger transport and Average income, 2006
Source: World Bank 2010b.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
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Car ownership typically increases dramatically when countries reach an aver-
age income of $5,000 in 2000 values (figure 1A.5). Motorization in Mexico shot 
up at this per capita income point; but Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan, China, 
which have all had high income growth in recent decades, have kept motoriza-
tion low. Some countries, such as Switzerland, that have relatively low road pas-
senger transport in relation to incomes nevertheless have high car ownership.
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Figure 1A.4 rail passenger transport and Average income, 2006
Source: World Bank 2010b.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
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Figure 1A.5 motorization and income, 2005 
Source: World Bank 2010b.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
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A similar picture holds for passenger car density (figure 1A.6). Some small 
countries, such as Luxembourg and the Baltic states, have a high number of cars, 
both in absolute terms and relative to their population and income. The rapidly 
developing East Asian countries stand out for their low passenger car density. 
India and China have low per capita incomes but a rapidly growing middle class 
whose demand for cars is rising. Brazil and Russia have large populations likely 
to reach the income level at which car ownership increases dramatically. 
However, passenger car densities per 1,000 people were still low in 2003, at 8 for 
India, 10 for China, 131 for Brazil, and 161 for Russia.
36 Transport, Mobility, Emissions, and Development
Turning the Right Corner • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9835-7
references
Anderson, J. E., and von Wincoop, E. 2004. “Trade Costs.” Journal of Economic Literature 
42: 691–751.
Baumert, K. A., Herzog, T., and Pershing, J. 2005. Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas 
Data and International Climate Policy. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute.
Cullinane, S. 2002. “The Relationship between Car Ownership and Public Transport 
Provision: A Case Study of Hong Kong.” Transport Policy 9: 29–39.
Economides, N. 1996. “The Economics of Networks.” International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 14 (6): 673–99.
Espey, M. 1998. “Gasoline Demand Revisited: An International Meta-Analysis of 
Elasticities.” Energy Economics 20: 273–90.
Foster, V., and Briceno-Garmendia, C. 2010. Africa’s Infrastructure. A Time for 
Transformation. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Goodwin, P., Dargay, J., and Hanly, M. 2004. “Elasticities of Road Traffic and Fuel 
Consumption with Respect to Price and Income: A Review.” Transport Reviews 
36: 275–95.
Government of Malaysia. 2009. National Slope Master Plan 2009–2023. Kuala Lumpur.
Graham, D., and Glaister, S. 2004. “Road Traffic Demand: A Review.” Transport Reviews 
24: 261–74.
Gusdorf, F., and Hallegatte, S. 2007. “Behaviors and Housing Inertia Are Key Factors in 
Determining the Consequences of a Shock in Transportation Costs.” Energy Policy 
35: 3483–95.
Haraldsson, M., and Jonsson, L. 2008. “Estimating the Economic Lifetime of Roads Using 
Replacement Data.” VTI Working Paper 2008:5, Swedish National Road & Transport 
Research Institute, Solna, Sweden. 
Ha-Duong, M., Grubb, M. J., and Hourcade, J.-C. 1997. “Influence of Socioeconomic 
Inertia and Uncertainty on Optimal CO2 Emission Abatement.” Nature 390: 270–73.
Hau, T. 1990. “Electronic Road Pricing: Developments in Hong Kong 1983–1989.” Journal 
of Transport Economics and Policy 24: 203–14.
Figure 1A.6 passenger car Density and income, 2003
Source: World Bank 2010b.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
Lithuania
Korea, Rep.
Singapore
Hong Kong SAR, China
Switzerland
United States
Japan
Luxembourg
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000
Pa
ss
en
ge
r c
ar
s p
er
  1
,0
00
 p
eo
pl
e 
GDP per capita (2000 US$)
Transport, Mobility, Emissions, and Development 37
Turning the Right Corner • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9835-7 
Hughes, G., Chinowsky, P., and Strzepek, K. 2010. “The Costs of Adapting to Climate 
Change for Infrastructure.” Discussion Paper 2, the World Bank Economics of 
Adaptation to Climate Change Study, Washington, DC.
Hughes, J. E., Knittel, C. R., and Sperling, D. 2008. “Evidence of a Shift in the Short-Run 
Price Elasticity of Gasoline Demand.” Energy Journal 29: 113–34.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change). 2000. Good Practice Guide. Paris: 
IPCC.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)/UNEP (United Nations Environment 
Programme)/OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)/
IEA (International Energy Agency). 1997. Revised 1996 IPCC Guidelines for National 
Greenhouse Gas Inventories. Paris: IPCC.
Kahn, M. 2006. Green Cities: Urban Growth and the Environment. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Kinsella, Y., and McGuire, F. 2005. “Climate Change Uncertainty and the State Highway 
Network: A Moving Target.” Conference paper. Transit New Zealand. 
Leamer, E. 2007. “A Flat World, a Level Playing Field, a Small World after All, or None of 
the Above? A Review of Thomas L. Friedman’s The World Is Flat.” Journal of Economic 
Literature 45: 83–126.
Lecocq, F., Hourcade, J.-C., and Ha-Duong, M. 1998. “Decision Making under Uncertainty 
and Inertia Constraints: Sectoral Implications of the When Flexibility.” Energy 
Economics 20 (5–6): 539–55.
McKinsey & Company. 2009. Pathways to a Low-Carbon Economy. Version 2 of the Global 
Greenhouse Gas Abatement Cost Curve. 
National Research Council of the National Academies. 2008. “Potential Impacts of 
Climate Change on U.S. Transportation.” Transportation Research Board Special 
Report 290, National Research Council of the National Academies, 
Washington DC.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)/ECMT (European 
Conference of Ministers of Transport) Transport Research Centre. 2007. Transport 
Infrastructure Charges and Capacity Choice: Self-financing Road Maintenance and 
Construction. Round Table Report 135. Paris: OECD.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)/IEA 
(International Energy Agency). 2009a. Transport, Energy and CO2. Moving Toward 
Sustainability. Paris.
———. 2009b. World Energy Outlook 2009. Paris: IEA.
Parry, I. W. 2007. “Are the Costs of Reducing Greenhouse Gases from Passenger Vehicles 
Negative?” Journal of Urban Economics 62: 273–93.
Parry, M., Arnell, N., Berry, P., Dodman, D., Fankhauser, S., Hope, C., Kovats, S., Nicholls, 
R., Satterthwaite, D., Tiffin, R., and Wheeler, T. 2009. Assessing the Costs of Adaptation 
to Climate Change: An Assessment of the Estimates of the UNFCCC and Other Recent 
Estimates. London: International Institute for Environment and Development.
Polzin, S. E., and Chu, X. 2005. “A Closer Look at Public Transportation Mode Share 
Trends.” Journal of Transportation and Statistics 8: 41–53.
Sachs, J., and The United Nations Millenium Project. 2005. Investing in Development: A 
Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. London and Sterling: 
Earthscan. 
38 Transport, Mobility, Emissions, and Development
Turning the Right Corner • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9835-7
Shalizi, Z., and F. Lecocq. 2009. “Climate Change and the Economics of Targeted 
Mitigation in Sectors with Long-lived Capital Stock.” Policy Research Working Paper 
5063, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Small, K. A., and van Dender, K. 2007. “Fuel Efficiency and Motor Vehicle Travel: The 
Declining Rebound Effect.” Energy Journal 28: 25–51.
Sterner, T. 2007. “Fuel Taxes: An Important Instrument for Climate Policy.” Energy Policy 
35: 3194–202.
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change). 2007. Investment 
and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change. Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC.
———. 2009. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its fifteenth session, held in 
Copenhagen from December 7–19, 2009. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/
cop15/eng/11a01.pdf. 
Weyant, J. P. 1993. “Costs of Reducing Global Carbon Emissions.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 7: 27–46.
World Bank. 2009a. Development and Climate Change. World Development Report 2010. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
———. 2009b. Reshaping Economic Geography. World Development Report 2009. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
———. 2010a. Royaume du Maroc. Adaptation du secteur du transport au changement 
 climatique. Washington, DC.
———. 2010b. World Development Indicators 2010. Washington, DC: World Bank.
World Economic Forum. 2010. Global Competitiveness Report 2009–2010. Geneva: World 
Economic Forum.
   39 Turning the Right Corner • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9835-7 
Recognizing that transportation is essential to growth and development, 
 governments are increasingly concerned about how to grow or at least maintain 
this sector when emission reduction policies could increase costs and threaten 
services. Transport and climate change professionals have both focused on green-
house gases (GHG), but too often they see their agendas as conflicting. This has 
made it hard for them to communicate about ways to work together to preserve 
and expand the economic benefits of transport services—through adaptation.
In all sectors adaptation to the physical impact of climate change constitutes 
“adjustment in natural or human systems, in response to actual or expected 
 climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderate, harm or exploit beneficial 
opportunities” (World Bank 2010b). Adaptation thus describes all efforts, 
whether by bridge engineers, bus drivers, or urban planning agencies, to increase 
the  resilience and reliability of transport in anticipation of climate change.
This chapter reviews how climate change is likely to affect transport  operations 
and infrastructure, cost-effective measures for minimizing negative effects, and 
policies and decision frameworks in support of these measures. Most analytic 
work on climate change impact and adaptation has been done in high-income 
countries. This chapter takes those analyses, particularly that of the U.S. 
Transportation Research Board (NRC 2008) as a foundation, highlighting  current 
and projected research findings and examples from developing countries.
threats to transport infrastructure and operations
Our climate is already changing (boxes 2.1 and 2.2), but projecting exactly how 
it will continue to change is difficult. Understanding what global climate models 
can and cannot tell us is central to understanding how to estimate and address 
local impacts.
Global and regional models can project broad climate trends over large 
 temporal and geographic scales but cannot predict specific outcomes, especially 
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for shorter periods, such as a decade, or smaller geographic scales, such as a single 
metropolitan area. Further, while there is consensus on basic temperature 
 indicators, it is much harder to estimate such climate features as surface water 
availability and extreme events. Even with finer-scale data or new observations 
from the next few decades, much uncertainty will remain.
Experience from a number of municipalities in high-income countries makes 
a case for looking at broad trends in assessing potential impacts and risks (Ligeti, 
Penney, and Wieditz 2007). Thus the impacts described below comprise a range 
of possibilities for a spectrum of areas. While planners are encouraged to seek 
detailed country-specific information to supplement this material, they should 
recognize that none of the projections are certain (Schneider and Kuntz-Duriseti 
2002). (The end of this chapter addresses how to deal with uncertainty rather 
than shying away from it as an excuse for inaction.) Finally, all climate impacts 
must be considered in terms of other local features and changes.
Climate Changes Likely by Mid-Century
Higher average temperatures will bring more temperature extremes throughout 
the world, with more very hot days and heat waves. The 24-hour temperature 
range will also narrow because nighttime temperatures will increase more than 
daytime temperatures. There will be fewer very cold days. Warming will be 
 greatest at the poles, where permafrost has already begun to melt, and ice 
 covering the polar seas will shrink. Polar warming will be greatest in winter. Even 
in temperate zones, the timing of seasons will shift, with earlier spring thaws, 
later autumn freezes, and the potential for more freeze/thaw cycles. In the 
 tropics, the hottest months will experience the most pronounced warming.
Box 2.1 impact of sea-level rise and cyclones on transport infrastructure in 
Bangladesh
Typically, roads are partially damaged when surge inundation is less than one meter and 
totally destroyed when it exceeds one meter. If road networks are expanded by 25 percent 
growth between 2005 and 2050, geographic overlays of the road network and inundation 
zones indicate that—even without climate change—by 2050 3,998 km will be exposed to an 
inundation depth of less than one meter and 8,972 km to a depth of more than one meter. 
With climate change, these numbers will increase respectively to 10,466 and 10,553 km. Over 
a 10-year period, larger cyclones could add another 3,461 km of partially damaged roads and 
2,205 km of destroyed roads. According to a 2007 damage loss assessment by Sidr, repair costs 
would be Taka 1 million for partial damage and Taka 2 million for partial and total destruction; 
bridge, culvert, and other damage would be 1.13 times the road damage. Combined damage 
costs by 2050 would thus be an additional $239.5 million. (The estimate of damage to roads, 
bridges, culverts, and the like is $173.6 million by 2050 without climate change, $413.1 million 
with climate change.) The estimated additional loss in a changing climate is $52.7 million.
Source: Dasgupta and others 2010.
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Annual precipitation averages will shift. There will be a slight increase in 
global precipitation, but with enormous regional variability. Rainfall will likely 
diminish in continental interiors and increase in coastal areas. Nearly everywhere, 
rainfall will be more intense; that is, a given annual total is more likely to fall 
on fewer days, so that many places may experience both more dry spells and 
Box 2.2 the 1997–98 el niño and transport and reconstruction in Kenya, peru, 
and ecuador
Climate change may already be altering the patterns of El Niño, although research has yet to 
confirm this.a In any case, El Niño weather extremes offer insight into the possible impact of 
severe weather caused by climate change. The particularly severe El Niño of 1997–98, felt 
around the globe, offers an example.
Kenya: The 1997–98 El Niño rains devastated the transportation sector. Floods and 
 landslides destroyed several bridges and an estimated 100,000 km of roads. Damage was 
 estimated at $670 million. Flooding disrupted aviation and shipping. Poor visibility and 
 submerged navigational equipment and runways halted scheduled and chartered flights; 
flooded docks made it impossible to off-load merchandise from ships. Floodwaters, fallen 
trees, and collapsed buildings destroyed electrical equipment, interrupted electricity supplies, 
destroyed communication lines, and severely disabled underground cable channels and 
 telecommunications. The energy sector did experience one positive benefit, however: 
 hydroelectric dams were completely recharged, electricity production was enhanced.
Peru: The 1997–98 El Niño had a direct negative impact on Peru’s highways and roads, 
which extend for 75,000 km (only a third of Peruvian highways are gravel or asphalt). Highways 
and roads carry 80 percent of Peru’s merchandise. Transportation companies and merchants 
were hit hard by the highway system’s vulnerability, but most affected were towns and  villages, 
several of which were isolated by El Niño without adequate food or supplies.
Ecuador: The economic losses associated with the 1997–98 El Niño in Ecuador have been 
estimated at $2.9 billion, or about 15 percent of Ecuador’s 1997 gross domestic product (GDP). 
Sixty percent of Ecuador’s population was affected, with the coastal and southern provinces 
suffering most. Damage to manufacturing represented 53 percent of total damage, and 
 damage to transport 28 percent. Ecuador’s GDP growth rate in 1998 declined about 1.2 percent 
from the projection without El Niño. According to the National Institute for Census and Statistics, 
El Niño had a heavy impact on the country’s coastal and island populations, which together 
make up 50 percent of Ecuador’s inhabitants. Approximately 34 percent of those affected were 
younger than 15. Most of the flooded cities sustained damage to water supply, sewage, and 
infrastructure. Even though the affected urban population was larger, the rural populace 
 suffered more. Flooding not only cut them off from the highways, bridges, and roads that are 
their lifelines to the cities but also destroyed their agricultural products, raising market prices.
Source: Adapted from Glantz 2001; see also CEPAL 1998.
a. Basic information on possible links between El Niño events and climate change is available from the Max Planck Institute 
for Meteorology: http://www.mpimet.mpg.de/en/aktuelles/presse/faq/das-el-nino-southern-oscillation-enso-phaenomen 
/beeinflussung-el-ninos-durch-den-anthropogenen-treibhauseffekt.html. Publications investigating the topic include Collins 
and others (2010); Collins and The CMIP Modelling Groups (2004); Paeth and others (2008); Philip and van Oldenborgh (2006); 
Trenberth and Hoar (1997).
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more floods. In addition to this increase in intra-annual variability, inter-annual 
 variability will also increase—that is, there will be more extremely dry and 
extremely wet years—especially in areas strongly affected by El Niño and La 
Niña. More intense rainfall and more extreme swings between wet and dry, 
 exacerbated by poor building practices, more impermeable paving, and defores-
tation, may increase mudslides and flash floods. And as the number of hot, dry 
spells increases, so too does the risk of wildfires and dust or sand storms.
The warmer atmosphere and accelerated hydrological cycle will bring more 
rain, wind, and snow storms. The intensity and possibly the frequency of tropi-
cal cyclones will increase. As more precipitation falls as rain rather than snow, 
winter replenishment of glaciers will decline and spring and summer melting 
will accelerate, eventually leading to the retreat or even disappearance of some 
glaciers. This will increase flooding during wetter, colder months and reduce 
water availability during drier, hotter months, when glacial melt is normally 
relied on to feed streams and rivers used for irrigation. The ocean will expand 
as it warms; the melting of mountain and polar glaciers will raise the sea 
level—at what rate is uncertain, but conservative estimates are about 
60–80  cm, with more recent estimates at more than 71 or even two meters by 
century’s end.1 Upstream diversion of rivers for irrigation and hydropower, 
declining glaciers, and  insufficient rainfall could reduce river flow, and reduced 
rainfall or population pressure could deplete underground water, both causing 
coastal subsidence. Subsidence combined with higher sea levels and increased 
storm intensity would expose many highly populated coastal areas to destruc-
tive storm surges.
The Effect on Transport in Developing Countries
Such changes in climate and hydrology have serious implications for transporta-
tion infrastructure, operations, and maintenance. This section discusses the 
impact on land transport (road, rail, metro, bridges, and pipelines); maritime 
transport (sea ports and inland rivers); and aviation. In a few cases, climate 
change will actually bring benefits—for example, opening transit routes in Arctic 
waters (although this will endanger sensitive ecosystems). However, most  climate 
change will make it harder to provide safe, reliable transport, both because of its 
direct physical impact and because its uncertainty complicates long-term plan-
ning and daily decision making.
Climate change will also affect sectors linked to transport. Agricultural 
yields will decline in many places but could increase in higher latitudes. 
Dramatic changes in agriculture could accelerate migration from rural areas 
into cities, which, along with altering food trade patterns, would affect trans-
port demand. Climate is a major determinant of tourism; if traditional ski areas 
become too warm, skiing could shift to either higher-latitude mountains or 
different  environments altogether. Such indirect impacts on transport could be 
large at the local level. The discussion below, however, focuses on the direct 
impact of  climate change on provision of transport and, to a lesser extent, 
demand for it.
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Roads, Bridges, Rail, and Tunnels
Higher average temperatures and extreme heat can expand road surfaces and 
bridge joints, soften and deform paved surfaces, and buckle rail tracks (NRC 
2008). Damaged and degraded pavement increases accidents, especially when it 
is rainy or foggy (for example, Huang and others 2008). Higher temperatures 
can interrupt bus, truck, and car use; engines can become overheated and air 
quality or pavement conditions can necessitate temporary limits on vehicle use. 
For example, in the Shymkent and Kyzylorda Oblasts in Kazakhstan, extreme 
heat combined with inadequate infrastructure has led to weight and travel 
restrictions on trucks in summertime when asphalt is softest (Nakat 2008). The 
number of days suitable for construction and maintenance might increase in 
colder areas, but the decrease in suitable days in countries like India or the 
Persian Gulf states could more than offset this.2 During hot spells, individuals 
with the financial means and access may resort to using higher-emitting and 
congestion-causing cars rather than walking, cycling, or using public transit 
(GTZ 2009).
The reduction in very cold days will have a mixed impact. In some places, it 
will reduce the costs for removing snow and ice and create safer road conditions. 
In other places, particularly near seas and lakes, slightly warmer temperatures 
may actually increase the magnitude and thus the cost of snowfalls. Warmer 
 winters will melt permafrost in Alaska, Canada, China, Mongolia, and the 
Russian Federation, as well as in Antarctica and parts of the Andes. Thawing may 
disrupt the settling process under rail lines and buildings, something already 
 evident in some places, and compromise the integrity of oil and gas pipelines, 
threatening local safety and disrupting supplies across larger regions (Ebinger and 
others 2008; Nakat 2008). The ice roads used by the logging and mining 
 industries, which may be the only routes to isolated communities, will become 
impassable for longer stretches. Warmer winters could mean more frequent 
freeze-thaw cycles in temperate areas, creating frost heaves3 and potholes on 
roads and bridges, which in turn may require tighter weight restrictions and 
costly maintenance—more than half the stresses on Canadian roads result from 
freeze-thaw cycles (PIARC 2012).
More intense precipitation, which can trigger flash floods, landslides, ero-
sion, and swollen rivers, will test physical infrastructure and the ability of 
operators to maintain safe and efficient service. When extreme rains punctuate 
long dry spells in places where desiccated soils and vegetation are less able to 
quickly absorb water, these effects are magnified. Intense rainfall also lengthens 
delays for road and rail traffic, limits vehicle speed, increases the risk of acci-
dents per vehicle-km, and reduces mobility. Other risks include the hydraulic 
capacity of bridges being exceeded, destabilization of bridge foundations from 
scouring, and sediment blockage of culverts and other drainage systems. 
Extreme precipitation can also interfere with maintenance and construction, 
even as regular maintenance becomes more important to withstand the stresses 
of heat, freeze-thaw cycles, and standing water wearing down roads, bridges, 
and rail beds.
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Floods are increasing in many places—Mozambique, Morocco, and Argentina, 
for instance—and can often be attributed to nonclimatic factors linked to land 
use, such as deforestation, slope destabilization, and, particularly in rapidly 
 growing cities, expansion of paved areas and reduction of permeable surfaces. 
Without improvements in infrastructure and strategies for managing risk, intensi-
fied precipitation will only become more destructive. In October 2005, near 
Valigonda in Southern India, more than 100 people were killed when a train was 
derailed off bridge tracks that had been swept away by the overflow of water 
from a reservoir filled beyond capacity because of atypically heavy rains.4
Of course, more intense precipitation is a challenge not just to developing 
countries; nor does it always result in large-scale fatalities. The more common 
outcome may be harder-to-measure costs to transit-service users and businesses, 
as when the New York subway flooded in September 2004 and August 2007. 
The intense rains—about 75 mm per hour, or roughly double the quantity that 
the subway system is built to withstand—paralyzed the metropolitan area and 
resulted in at least one death. In the 2007 incident, flooding short-circuited 
essential electrical signals and switches so that none of the subway lines, which 
normally carry 7 million passengers daily, could run at full capacity during the 
morning rush hour.
Even in areas that experience more total precipitation, dry spells and droughts 
could increase and water availability and soil moisture could decline significantly, 
killing the natural or planted vegetation around roads and walkways that  provides 
shade and protects against erosion. The combination of drought and intense heat 
also increases wildfire risk. Wildfires can easily destroy transportation infrastruc-
ture, even as firefighting crews become more dependent on functioning transport 
networks.
Storms that are more frequent, more intense, or both can cause major prob-
lems for road transport. Lack of preparedness for dealing with extreme snowfalls, 
which are likely to become larger or more frequent in some places,5 can be costly. 
In January 2008, unexpectedly intense snowstorms in China paralyzed the train 
system just as migrant workers were trying to return home for the Chinese New 
Year. Millions were stranded. Worse, with the interruption of coal delivery, food 
and power could not reach suffering populations in the southern and central 
provinces (Pew Center on Global Climate Change 2010; World Bank 2010b).
Two years later, extreme snowfall on the east coast of the United States 
entirely shut down the economy of Washington, D.C., first in December 2009 
and again in January 2010. Two such large snowstorms normally occur in the area 
about once every 25 years, not twice in two months.6 Road conditions were so 
bad at one point that snow-plow trucks themselves were barred from driving. 
Estimated losses to private businesses vary widely; closure of the federal govern-
ment cost taxpayers about $71 million a day.7
Tropical storms and cyclones, which according to some evidence are already 
growing more intense, may well become stronger and more frequent. Storms 
regularly set off land- and mudslides in mountainous Central America, devastat-
ing both people and infrastructure. For example, in late May and early June 2010, 
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landslides and gushing rivers associated with tropical storm Agatha washed out 
numerous roads and bridges, impeding rescue efforts for the worst-hit areas. In 
2005 Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans and severely disrupted 
 transport connections: “Key railroad bridges were destroyed, requiring the 
 rerouting of traffic and putting increased strain on other rail segments. Barge 
shipping was halted, as was export grain traffic out of the Port of New Orleans, 
the nation’s largest export grain port. The pipeline network that gathers oil and 
natural gas from the Gulf was shut down, producing shortages of natural gas and 
petroleum products” (Grenzeback and Lukmann 2008).
Even in places that do not experience tropical storms, such as the Mediterranean 
coast of Africa, sea-level rises and storm surges threaten settlements and trans-
port infrastructure. Morocco, for example, already experiences increasingly 
intense heat waves (a 1°–3° C increase since the 1970s) and droughts, as well as 
extreme rainfalls more often. This threatens the country’s road pavement, rail 
tracks, bridges, drainage systems, and embankments, and the damage has already 
been costly. A flash flood in 2006 destroyed 15 km of the 20-km Tounfite-
Agoudim road in the Atlas Mountains—repair costs were equal to half the initial 
investment. Low-lying Bangladesh, already extremely vulnerable to cyclones and 
flooding, is expected to suffer greatly from sea-level rise and more damaging 
storm surges (box 2.1).
Impact on Maritime Transport and Aviation
Maritime transport could be affected by changed water levels, more extreme 
precipitation and storms, higher temperatures, and in particular the opening of 
the Arctic because of ice melt (Gallivan, Bailey, and O’Rourke 2009). Lower 
water levels could plague many inland waterways, requiring stricter cargo weight 
limits, redesigned vessels, and costly and environmentally damaging dredging. 
Higher sea levels could reduce clearances under bridges near coasts, directly 
threatening port infrastructure and road and rail links. The combination of higher 
sea levels and more extreme coastal storms and precipitation is the greatest 
threat to ports from damage to bridges, piers, terminal buildings, ships, and cargo. 
Storms can also cause suspension of operations, reducing reliability and raising 
costs. Harbors may need to be dredged more often because of increased erosion 
and silting. By exceeding the capacity of drainage systems, intense rains and 
storms could cause fuel and industrial contaminants to leech into waterways.
The reduction of Arctic sea ice and the possible opening of new shipping 
routes represent the most dramatic impact of climate change on maritime trans-
portation. Trans-Arctic shipping could reduce the distance traveled between 
northern Europe, northeastern Asia, and the northwest coast of North America 
by as much as 40 percent relative to traditional routes through the Panama or 
Suez Canal (which might see a decline in their share—though not necessarily the 
volume—of global shipping) (TRB 2008). Diminished sea ice, and eventually 
new routes, could create opportunities for new investment—for example, in dif-
ferent ship designs. However, an upsurge in traffic could threaten sensitive 
 ecosystems already undergoing dramatic transformation because of climate 
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change. Higher temperatures will affect paved surfaces at port facilities and 
increase cooling needs for warehousing and transporting goods.
Given its fuel intensity, the aviation sector is sure to be deeply affected by 
climate change mitigation policies. But beyond fuel, climate change has a direct 
effect on airport infrastructure, safety, and operations, particularly losses caused 
by delays. Threats to airport runways, towers, and signaling equipment are quite 
similar to those in ground transportation, especially the vulnerability of paved 
surfaces to heat and precipitation and inadequate drainage. Aviation-specific 
challenges include the impact of higher heat on lift-off, requiring longer runways, 
lighter loads, or better airplanes. Thawing permafrost and sinking runways 
already threaten small airports in isolated communities, although one benefit is 
the possible reduction in ice and snow removal costs. Airports in low-lying 
coastal zones are vulnerable to changes in sea levels. In fact, in Jakarta—where 
subsidence (from urban development and groundwater extraction) will make net 
sea-level rise particularly threatening—the international airport could be under-
water before mid-century; flooding has already submerged the highway to the 
airport numerous times.8
At a colloquium in May 2010, the International Civil Aviation Organization 
warned of the threat of extreme weather to safety, noting that while technical 
standards have continued to rise, they are based on past climate probabilities and 
are not necessarily a guide to the future.9 Sustaining gains in safety, particularly 
in developing countries, is extremely important. Less predictable or more 
extreme weather could increase delays, cancellations, and airport closures, which 
are costly to both operators and passengers. Climate change could affect the 
distribution of tourism and thus demand on certain routes. Travel to snowless ski 
destinations, drought or heat-stricken summer destinations, and places 
 experiencing extreme weather is likely to decline. Dry spells can threaten visibil-
ity and safety by creating conditions ripe for wildfires and dust or sand storms. 
Climate change in the deserts of Iraq, causing die-off of vegetation and lower 
river flow, has produced dust storms that reach further and more intensely than 
usual into the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tajbakhsh, Moradi, and Mohamadi 
2010). This has in many instances—and more often in the past 15 years— 
prevented aircraft from landing at the Ahwaz and Abadan airports. Flights have 
been forced to return to the departure airport or land elsewhere, wasting fuel and 
increasing costs for both airlines and passengers.
The Effect on Supply of—and Demand for—Transport
With more frequent, intense, and variable extreme weather events, the role of 
transport in minimizing disaster loss and enabling recovery becomes even more 
crucial—even as transport infrastructure and services themselves are increasingly 
threatened by climate extremes (box 2.2).
After a disaster, rescue workers and survivors must have a rapidly deployable 
communications network. But disasters in developing countries often occur 
where there is little or no infrastructure, or the disaster may have shut down 
what infrastructure there was. Without network redundancy, the first precious 
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hours must focus on restoring transit routes for affected populations. The func-
tioning (or failure) of transportation networks after a disaster is a strong 
 determinant of total damage, both direct and indirect, and the ultimate cost of 
recovery (box 2.3).
In many developing countries lack of strategic planning undermines infra-
structure resilience—efforts are essentially reactive after a disaster. Perverse in 
road maintenance and construction incentives increase the cost of extreme 
events to taxpayers (Solberg, Hale, and Benavides 2003). Reactive strategies 
 usually lead to the building of similarly inadequate infrastructure that has to be 
significantly refurbished every few years—a process known as the “reconstruction 
of vulnerability.”
Why the Impact of Climate Change Is Different
Engineers, policymakers, and project designers may see nothing new in the 
impacts described. In making decisions that take into account climatic, 
 hydrological, geological, and usage factors, they have always had to consult 
 building and maintenance standards in choosing, for instance, how much 
 clearance to allow below a bridge, how securely to attach a deck to a substructure 
Box 2.3 minimizing the costs of extreme events: the role of transport
Extreme weather can result in both direct and indirect losses. Direct losses consist of the 
 monetary value of physical assets destroyed or damaged, such as housing, infrastructure, 
crops, and plants. Indirect losses are the opportunity costs of reconstruction delays, including 
immobilized productive capacities (both machines and workers) and empty housing. Together 
direct and indirect losses account for actual losses. Poor logistics in developing countries 
 multiply these losses.
One study defines total cost as the sum of direct and indirect losses. Another draws a 
 relationship between direct costs and total costs through the empirical coefficient of the 
 economic amplification ratio (EAR), defined as the ratio of the overall production loss (total 
costs) to the direct costs that are associated with an extreme event. The paper’s non- equilibrium 
modeling shows strong nonlinearity with the capacity to conduct reconstruction after each 
disaster. Given short-term constraints on spending money productively after a disaster, there 
is a bifurcation value of direct losses beyond which total costs increase dramatically. Thus the 
EAR can be significantly higher than unity and it increases with direct costs.
Empirical studies of the aftermath of the 2004 and 2005 Florida hurricanes. suggest that 
the surge in demand for reconstruction and repair along with supply shortages—in qualified 
workers, carrying capacities of reconstruction materials, and so on—pushes up prices for 
reconstruction (up to 60 percent in some regions) after an extreme event.
This all make the case for focusing on restoring transport infrastructure to minimize recon-
struction delay opportunity costs and help production mechanisms return to optimal 
functioning.
Source: Hallegatte 2007, 2009.
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to withstand high winds, how often to repave a surface, or whether to use riprap 
or extensive gabions to protect abutments from scour. They have always weighed 
probabilities and risks against costs and made locally appropriate choices based 
on a combination of physical factors, risk tolerance, and budget constraints. So 
what is all the fuss about? Why should investments not continue to be made as 
they always have been?
First, there is the increase in variability. Variability itself is not new. What is 
new is the projected increase in both intra- and interannual variability in 
 temperature and precipitation. Greater intra-annual variability means that, even 
though total annual rainfall in a location may remain unchanged, rainfall that 
used to be spread out, say, 40/60 percent across two six-month periods may 
instead be clustered with 20 percent in one six-month period and 80 percent in 
the other. Thus, infrastructure and operational procedures will need to deal both 
with drier and with wetter conditions. This will very likely raise costs, for even if 
it were no more or less costly to build, maintain, and operate transport infrastruc-
tures in a dry climate or a wet climate, it is more costly to build, maintain, and 
operate assets to withstand both.
Interannual variability also complicates decision making, since it can be diffi-
cult to distinguish between a change in the mean trend and oscillation about a 
stable mean (Burton and Lim 2005). How can local authorities know if their 
region is really becoming drier on a multidecadal average, or if it is only that the 
variation around a stable mean has increased, with the past few dry years likely 
to be followed by a few wet years? Coming to the wrong conclusions, and relying 
on those conclusions when making investments in infrastructure intended to last 
for many decades, can be extremely costly. Changes in infrastructure mainte-
nance and operations, though not easy to implement, might be achieved on a 
shorter time scale without enormous loss in sunk costs. But rebuilding—or in 
more extreme cases, entirely relocating transport facilities away from coasts vul-
nerable to sea-level rise—before the end of the intended life of the infrastructure 
would be very costly.
Even if transport providers did have the data and tools to analyze probabilities 
and respond accordingly, many private users of transportation do not. For 
 example, variable rainfall might make driving more dangerous than predictable 
rainfall, even if actual average road conditions are unchanged. Car drivers tend to 
drive more slowly and carefully the day after a storm (Eisenberg 2004; Leigh 
2009; Road Research Laboratory 1954). If rain yesterday is not a good predictor 
of rain tomorrow, then people are slowing down unnecessarily. More troubling, 
if clear skies today are an even less reliable predictor of the absence of fog or rain 
tomorrow, drivers will be even less likely to slow down when they should.
Second, climate change also introduces deep uncertainty about future climate, 
making current information and methods inadequate for decisions that have 
long-term implications. Future weather—be it tomorrow’s forecast peak tem-
perature or a seasonal estimate of rainfall—has always been uncertain. But past 
data have, until now, provided a guide to climate-sensitive decisions based on 
probabilities and averages. However, climate change invalidates past averages and 
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probability distributions. And the real challenge is that the new probability 
 distributions are unknown.
Climate has always varied, but in the past the variation has been within a fixed 
envelope, around a fixed mean. Infrastructure design and planning, insurance 
pricing, and numerous private decisions have long been based on stationarity, the 
idea that natural systems fluctuate within an unchanging envelope of variability 
(World Bank 2010b). With climate change, stationarity is dead (Milly and others 
2008). Models of climate change cannot assign probabilities to the projections 
they generate—and certainly not at the fine temporal and geographic scale that 
transportation decision makers require. What was once uncertain but could be 
reasonably predicted with past data is now characterized by deep uncertainty—
the phrase used when no underlying probability is known.
Drivers of Vulnerability and Resilience
The impact of climate change on transport will not be the same everywhere. 
Overall vulnerability is a function of both exposure to climate hazards and 
change and the sensitivities and adaptive capacity of the transport sector, broadly 
defined to include both providers and users (figure 2.1; IPCC 2001). Further, 
there are drivers of vulnerability, other than the climate itself, both within and 
outside the transport sector. There is intense debate and numerous studies on 
how to define and measure components of vulnerability and how to link them 
to related concepts even beyond the area of climate change (for example, disaster 
risk reduction and social protection).10 These debates are beyond the scope of 
this report, which will use the bare-bones Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) framework commonly used by many sources, which is sufficient 
for understanding drivers of vulnerability.
The concept of exposure is straightforward: “it is determined by the type, 
magnitude, timing, and speed of climate events and variation to which a system 
is exposed (for example, changing onset of the rainy season, higher minimum 
winter temperatures, floods, storms, and heat waves)” (Fay, Ebinger, and Block 
2010). However, it is difficult to characterize exposure, either quantitatively 
Figure 2.1 Framework for Defining vulnerability
Source: IPCC 2001; graphic reproduced from Fay, Ebinger, and Block 2010.
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or qualitatively, in a way that is useful to decision makers. Characterizing the 
exposure of a locality or a transport network depends ultimately on local 
 capacity, which is not necessarily constant over time. But in all cases, qualitative 
understanding of current challenges and projected trends, however uncertain, 
will be the first step of several (boxes 2.4 and 2.5).
The sensitivity of a system comprises its structural characteristics. Some 
 characteristics are more sensitive than others—for example, engineered dirt or 
gravel roads are more likely than are paved roads to become impassable during 
heavy rains—and poorly maintained assets of any type are more sensitive than 
better maintained assets. In addition to basic engineering specifications (for 
example, standard versus porous paved surfaces), location also matters. 
Settlements, and thus transport assets, are often concentrated in coastal zones, 
where climate hazards are particularly challenging.
An example of a system’s sensitivity and exposure is a paved two-lane coastal 
road in a mountainous area. It could be exposed to sea-level rise; higher storm 
surges; hotter, longer, and more frequent heat waves; more frequent or more 
intense storms; and alternating dry spells and more intense rainfall. Sensitivity 
could include location on the coast or at the bottom of a slope, nearby slopes that 
are increasingly unstable because of deforestation and unplanned settlement, and 
poorly maintained drainage around the road that impedes the flow of water from 
the hillside to the sea. These variables combine to determine the potential impact 
Box 2.4 starting the Adaptation process: Asking the right Questions
It is recommended that transport officials, national and local, consider the following questions, 
developed by the Transportation Research Board:
•	 Which projected climate changes are most relevant for the region?
•	 How are climate change hazards likely to be manifested (for example, flooding and storm 
surge coupled with a rise in sea level)?
•	 Which transportation assets may be affected?
•	 How severe must a hazard be before action is required? Can thresholds be identified?
•	 How likely is it that a projected hazard will exceed the threshold? When and where?
•	 How much risk can be tolerated? In other words, what infrastructure performance level is 
tolerable?
•	 What level of investment (capital and operating) is needed to maintain different levels of 
service?
•	 Can acceptable performance standards for all modes of transportation be established?
•	 Are there critical levels of service needed to protect health and safety?
•	 Who is empowered to make these judgments and decisions?
•	 What are the risks of adverse impacts or consequences if no action is taken?
•	 If action is necessary, how will investment priorities be determined?
•	 Who will make the necessary investments, and how will they be funded?
Source: Reproduced from NRC 2008.
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of climate change on the road: intense rainfall could destabilize the slope,  provoke 
mudslides, or even wash out the road; hot spells could soften and cause ruts in 
the pavement, making it less safe for drivers; and higher tides and increased buf-
feting by storm surge could greatly weaken the subgrade and destabilize the road.
How potential impacts translate into actual impacts depends not only on 
 climate phenomena and sensitivity but also on the system’s adaptive 
Box 2.5 Advancing the Adaptation process: Assessing risk and Defining a strategy
A qualitative risk assessment requires the following steps:
 1.  Establish context and objectives. Formulate the issue and the scope of the assessment: 
define its objectives and the general context; identify climate scenarios; and define the 
affected geographic region and the stakeholders (government, sector, and community) or 
the targeted audience.
 2.  Inventory assets. Identify the components of the transportation infrastructure and their 
 vulnerabilities, taking into account past challenges, both related and unrelated to climate.
 3.  Identify and analyze hazards. Identify hazards, especially what could happen with  different 
climate scenarios. Structured brainstorming by stakeholders (for example,  policymakers 
and experienced specialists), such as the “Structured What If Technique” (SWIFT), can help 
identify hazards.a Consider each, with any safeguards or controls, including policy and 
management responses, and assess the likelihood of various  consequences given such 
controls. Determine the level of risk.b
 4.  Rank the risks. Screen out minor ones and prioritize major ones for further analysis. 
Describe the uncertainties of each risk and the sensitivity of the analysis to a variety of 
assumptions.
 5.  Identify and appraise options to manage risks. Identify climate conditions that represent 
benchmark levels of risk or thresholds between tolerable and intolerable risk.
 6.  Draft an adaptation plan. Prioritize the action plan based on options identified to manage 
risk, with a review of the costs and associated benefits of each. Discuss the risks of under-, 
over-, or maladaptation. Ensure that plans account for not only changing climate averages 
but also increased variability and extremes.
 7.  Take action. Decide whether to build on and update legal and regulatory frameworks, 
 institutions, policies, strategies, and emergency and disaster management plans or to 
adopt new ones altogether. Determine current institutional capacity and what is needed 
to support implementation. Assess financing needs and sources. Identify data and infor-
mation gaps and how to address them, such as through research and development.
 8.  Evaluate progress on the action plan. Establish monitoring and evaluation—a feedback 
loop—to periodically reevaluate risks and priorities as information becomes available or 
new events occur.
Sources: Fay, Ebinger, and Block 2010; TRB 2008.
a. SWIFT screens hazards by considering deviations from business-as-usual operations, using checklists to support 
brainstorming. It allows for a systematic, team-oriented approach but relies heavily on the quality of the expert team. 
For more details, see http://rmd.anglia.ac.uk/uploads/docs/SWIFT.doc or HSE (2001). 
b. Australian Government (2006); HSE (2001, 2006); New Zealand Climate Change Office (2004); and Willows and Connel 
(2003) provide good examples of risk matrices and their application. 
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capacity—its resources for coping with impacts and mitigating damage. In the 
coastal road example, adaptive capacity could include the extent to which opera-
tors could close the road and reroute traffic with minimal delay; the capacity to 
foresee the need to maintain drainage and pavement surfaces, including the 
power to mobilize funding and ensure that the work gets done; and the ability of 
transport and land-use planning bodies to work together to ensure that new 
infrastructure is not sited in areas exposed to hazards.
As noted, nontransport factors such as poor drainage, deforestation, or bureau-
cratic blunders can increase transport vulnerability. While the adaptation options 
discussed below relate to the transport sector, an overarching recommendation is 
to consider risks and vulnerabilities, as well as opportunities for cooperation, 
beyond the sector so as to increase general economic, social, and transport resilience.
The exposure-sensitivity-adaptive capacity approach can help planners to 
identify combinations of factors that amplify or reduce the impact of climate 
change and to distinguish exogenous factors (exposure) from those amenable to 
local policy action (adaptive capacity—hence, future sensitivity) (Fay, Ebinger, 
and Block 2010). It can be applied to particular regions or cities, of which 
 transport systems are just one component; to sectors; or to particular assets 
within one mode.
preserving resilient and least-cost transport as the climate changes
With the many uncertainties of climate change, technologies, and policy regimes, 
there has been no clear agreement yet on how to adapt transport infrastructure 
to climate change. Priorities differ by country and there are diagnostic tools to 
identify these (boxes 2.4 and 2.5). There are, however, at least four recognized 
adaptation measures:
1. Raising engineering standards: infrastructure should be built more sturdily to 
make it more resilient to severe weather events.
2. Routine road maintenance, often neglected in developing countries ( figure 2.2). 
Higher standards would require countries to invest more in roads and better 
maintain them. Without timely maintenance, road deterioration accelerates 
with time and severe weather.
3. Traffic rules, which should address such issues as speeding and overloading, 
both of which damage road surfaces, particularly under adverse weather 
conditions.
4. Broader adaptation measures in other sectors, such as urban planning, infra-
structure location, creation of redundancy in logistics, accumulation of inven-
tory, and preparation of disaster and emergency systems.
standards and the resilience of transport infrastructure
The nuts-and-bolts, engineering-centered approach to adaptation consists of com-
ponents like building stronger bridges, paving dirt roads, increasing drainage sys-
tem capacity, and building higher sea walls. New technologies and materials are 
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necessary—for example, paving that can withstand extreme heat or allow drain-
age through its surface. Some technologies are still being studied, but advances in 
materials science (including nanotechnologies), sensors, computer processing, and 
communications could significantly alter infrastructure design and operation. 
Many known potentially helpful measures are not yet being applied.
Such proactive engineering measures, however, can be costly when they entail 
nonmarginal modification of infrastructure or result in “maladaptation”— 
measures that increase vulnerability. The greater the uncertainty about local 
 climate, the greater the risk of maladaptation. Vulnerabilities and risks, therefore, 
must be carefully assessed before any building standards are revamped.
Roads with thicker pavements and better drainage are more resilient. Dirt and 
unsealed roads, though cheap, can lose surface to traffic and rainfall. In develop-
ing countries generally, more than half the roads are still unpaved; in Latin 
America, the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa, only 15 percent of roads are 
paved (figure 2.3).
Higher-standard roads can reduce vulnerability and thus increase mobility and 
welfare, particularly in rural and remote areas. In Nepal, rural roads are  operational 
only during the dry season. An estimated one-third of the nation’s 24  million 
people live at least two hours walk from the nearest all-season road that has public 
transport (World Bank 2007). Although costly,11 upgrading  dry-season-only roads 
Figure 2.2 Deterioration of paved roads over time
Source: Based on Harral and Faiz 1988.
Note: IRI = International Roughness Index.
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to meet all-season standards with gravel and Otta seal, a low-cost paving option,12 
would increase both rural mobility and road resilience.13
Advanced technologies that would, for example enable airports, railways, 
and ports to withstand storms and blasts can improve resilience. In the 
Philippines, the number of accidents is closely related to the frequency of 
typhoons. Thousands of people are killed or injured in maritime accidents 
each year (JICA 2007).14 Navigational aid facilities, such as lighthouses 
and lighted buoys, need to be upgraded. A promising technology being devel-
oped for rail systems is a gust prediction system using weather forecasting and 
Doppler radar (Kato and Hono 2009).
Another powerful recipe for increasing resilience is simple: do not build in 
harm’s way. Transport infrastructure should be located based on accurate mapping 
of climate risks and vulnerabilities and incorporated into the broader land-use 
strategy (see below). For example, capacity aside, a culvert should at least be 
located so that “the flood waters are able to easily overtop the road near the cul-
vert and re-enter the stream on the other side of the road causing only local dam-
age to the road fill. Preferably the culvert should be at a low point in the vertical 
profile of the road ensuring all flood water is directed back into the channel and 
not allowed to run down the drainage ditches.”15 In other words, if all other design 
aspects fail, the right location will minimize disruption, destruction, and loss.
Realigning roads from flood-prone areas to high ground is another example. 
In Peru, El Niño caused massive flooding that submerged roads. In response, the 
government rebuilt the highway between the capital and the port city of Piura 
in the northeast on a higher embankment, rerouting it around a lagoon-prone 
area that had been completely submerged by the 1983 El Niño. Similarly,  better 
road design as well as construction management in Ecuador could have 
avoided some of the 1997–98 El Niño damage (box 2.6; Solberg, Hale, and 
Benavides 2003).
Figure 2.3 paved roads by region, 2005
Source: World Bank 2010a. 
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Though efforts to adapt technical standards to climate conditions have been 
slow, they are gaining momentum. Major disasters have prompted civil engineers 
and the construction industry to work to modify building codes and design 
 standards. Although such a reactive strategy takes time, ultimately it should 
enhance infrastructure safety and reliability. Current design standards represent 
tradeoffs between performance and cost (TRB 2008). Some standards have 
already tried to account for the probability of extremely rare events. Building to 
higher standards must be weighed against additional costs—one reason adapta-
tion of standards is slow.
Several high-income countries have already started to adapt standards to new 
climate conditions. Japan has introduced new pavement technology that 
increases resilience to heat waves (box 2.7). In response to increased precipita-
tion Denmark has changed its drainage capacity. Other possible adjustments 
would be connecting bridge decks to deck piers so that storm-surge buoyant 
forces do not lift the decks off their supports or adding a safety margin to existing 
dikes against expected sea-level rise or extreme sea floods.
Upfront investment in higher standards can be cost-effective if the standards 
will reduce maintenance and operating costs. Severe weather may increase 
Box 2.6 Failures and successes in Disaster recoveries
Inadequate technical solutions to infrastructure failures: In Peru, highways cross a multitude of 
riverbeds that are normally dry but that in an El Niño year can channel avalanches of water and 
mud across the highways. In response, highway engineers have built pontoons across the 
 riverbeds, but these still often overflow during an El Niño, eroding the highways. This explains 
television images during an El Niño showing a line of trucks traveling single file over severely 
eroded highways that have become a thin shred of asphalt.
When rebuilding leads to “reconstruction of vulnerabilities”: In Ecuador, a section of 
 highway of about 60 km from Quito to La Virgin Papallacta has often been washed out or 
made impassable. A major landslide in 2000 near Cuyuga closed the road for nearly a 
week. An audit by the Government of Ecuador Controller’s Office found that the 
 reconstruction and rehabilitation funds invested in this roadway over the years could 
easily have financed a high-quality, all-weather road. Problems included low-quality 
engineering, no contract supervision, and a faulty incentive scheme: the same construc-
tion firm fails to do maintenance but gets paid to clean up after the landslides and keep 
the road open.
A notable reconstruction success based on lessons well learned: In Peru, the 50 km stretch of 
highway that joins Piura with the port city of Paitais a triumph of forward thinking. The torren-
tial rains of the 1983 El Niño created a lagoon that had completely submerged it, cutting off 
Piura from its supply route, causing famine and desolation. Later, the highway was rebuilt on a 
high embankment and rerouted around the lagoon-prone area. As a result, the highway 
stayed open during the 1998 El Niño.
Sources: Glantz 2001; Solberg, Hale, and Benavides 2003.
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the recurrent costs of maintaining low-standard bituminous-bound roads, for 
instance, and retrofitting is generally costly.
Maintenance and Operations and Vulnerability to Climate Change
Although higher standards and advanced technologies can increase the resilience 
of transport assets, developing countries must first commit to routine mainte-
nance. In Africa, for instance, an estimated 20 percent of paved roads are in poor 
condition. Worse, an estimated 42 percent of unpaved roads, which are particu-
larly vulnerable to precipitation and other severe weather, are poorly maintained 
(figure 2.4).
All roads deteriorate with time, but potholes or cracks accelerate deterioration 
by allowing water to infiltrate. Periodic maintenance is needed to keep roads 
smooth (figure 2.5). In Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, inadequate maintenance 
led to road loss estimated at $40–$45 billion. Adequate maintenance, in contrast, 
would have cost only $12 billion (Harral and Faiz 1988). In Ecuador, poor 
 maintenance of highways, secondary roads, and bridges, exacerbated by noncom-
pliance with regulations, contribute to El Niño damage. Enforcement of regula-
tions was particularly low during the presidential campaign of 1996 and in the 
following troubled political period in early 1997.
Poor maintenance also undermines road safety. Rutting and potholes increase 
accidents (Huang and others 2008), as does the weather (Jung and others 2010). 
Precipitation reduces visibility. Water that accumulates in ruts and potholes—
generally difficult to see when it is raining or dark—can cause hydroplaning. Slick 
pavements and adverse weather contribute to about one-fourth of all highway 
crashes in the United States (NRC 2008). Pavement-related road accidents 
increase by about 30 percent with rain (table 2.1; Huang and others 2008).
Nonroad transport sectors must also be properly operated and maintained. The 
lack of standard navigational aid systems in developing countries compromises 
the efficiency and safety of maritime operations. Many victims killed or injured 
Box 2.7 standards Updating: examples
Drainage systems in Denmark: extension of previous system: In Denmark increased precipita-
tion and flooding overwhelmed drainage. In response, a new policy required a 30 percent 
increase in drainage capacity.
Use of new technologies: pavement coated with solar reflective technology: The Japanese 
have developed the innovative “Heat-Shield Pavement,” a spray-on coating that increases 
reflectivity for near-infrared rays and lowers reflectivity for visible rays. A Heat-Shield surfacing 
albedo can be as high as 0.57, compared with 0.07 for conventional pavement. This technol-
ogy also addresses asphalt surface temperature, which can peak in the summer at about 60°C. 
Coated with Heat Shield, slabs reach a surface temperature of only about 40°C.
Source: PIARC 2012.
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in maritime accidents could have been saved had ordinary infrastructure and 
equipment been in place. In the Philippines physical damage or poor mainte-
nance shut down 112 of 419 lighthouses and lighted buoys before a  maritime safe 
project was launched (JICA 2007). In Europe and Central Asia in the last two 
decades the extensive agrometeorological station networks developed during 
Figure 2.4 Africa: roads in poor condition (cross-country Average Based on latest Data)
Source: AICD database.
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Figure 2.5 road roughness and maintenance Frequency over time
Source: Simulation based on HDM-4.
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the Soviet era have deteriorated dramatically. While drought-prone Georgia once 
had 150 stations, today virtually all have ceased to function (Hancock, Tsirkunov, 
and Smetanina 2008).
The importance of maintaining infrastructure in developing countries rises 
with the demand for transport. In the Philippines, which consists of more than 
7,100 islands, marine transportation is the second most important mode after 
roads. Although the number of vessels entering the country’s ports increased 
about 10 percent between 1999 and 2005 (figure 2.6), maintenance of the 
 country’s navigational facilities has long been neglected.
Regulations, Traffic Rules, and Climate Change
Transport regulations must also adapt to climate change. Limiting speed is one 
way. Many countries already reduce speed limits when weather is severe, as in 
heavy rain or strong winds. Traffic accidents typically increase with speed limits 
table 2.1 effects of pavement and weather on road Accidents
Weather condition Estimated coefficient a Implied effect of doubled rut depth (percent)b
Rainy 5.209*** 29.8
Dry 0.050 0.3
Both 1.015 5.2
Source: Based on Huang and others 2008.
a. For each weather condition, a negative binomial regression is performed on average daily traffic and rut depth. 
The coefficient is associated with the rut depth.
b. It is assumed that rut depth increases from 0.05 inch, the sample average, to 0.1 inch.
Significance level: *** = 1 percent.
Figure 2.6 the philippines: vessels entering and maritime Accidents 
Source: JICA 2007.
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(Jung and others 2010), and precipitation substantially increases the risk of 
road collision and injury—in Canada risk by an estimated 45 percent (Andrey 
and others 2003). Lower speed limits also help preserve pavement. In Sweden, 
for example, estimates for pavement lifetime derive from speed limits and 
other traffic and road characteristics; the elasticity of pavement lifetime in 
Sweden is –0.001, a small but statistically significant number (Haraldsson 2007).
In general, good traffic regulations can prevent road deterioration. As noted 
earlier, in Kazakhstan, truck operations are restricted during the summer 
period to reduce road deterioration when the asphalt is soft (Nakat 2008). 
Controlling overload, a widespread problem, is also important in developing 
countries. In Eastern and Southern Africa, for instance, an estimated 10–50 
percent of trucks are overloaded (table 2.2). Overloading damages road sur-
faces significantly because the equivalent standard axle load factor (ESALF)16 
is typically assumed to follow the fourth or higher power rule (Pinard 2010). 
In other words, if a truck is overloaded by 20 percent, its axle load factor 
approximately doubles using an increased load factor of 1.2 (Schneider and 
Kuntz-Duriseti 2002).
Overloading thus increases the axle load factor on roads exponentially, accel-
erating deterioration (figure 2.7). Overloading by 20 percent shortens the life of 
roads by several years. The baseline maintenance strategy is to “do the minimum,” 
meaning pothole patching and edge treatment, but more frequent road mainte-
nance, including major structural overlays, is needed to maintain road surfaces at 
a reasonable level, for example, at the international roughness index of 4.5 m/km.
Regulations and operational procedures in other transport areas also need to 
adapt to climate conditions. Weather is a contributing factor in the approxi-
mately 10 yearly train derailments in Canada (Andrey and others 2003). About 
40 percent of flights cancelled in the United States are weather-related, a per-
centage that has been increasing in recent years (figure 2.8). Operational regula-
tions need to be updated because new equipment and advanced technologies are 
inefficient if they cannot be used in real-time operations. While more weather 
table 2.2 reported overloading, southern 
African Development community, 2004
Country Percent of all vehicles
Botswana 10–25
Lesotho 20–35
Malawi 30–40
Mozambique 50
Namibia 20
South Africa 15–20
Swaziland 20–40
Tanzania 20–30
Zambia 40
Zimbabwe 5–10
Source: Pinard 2010.
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Figure 2.7 effect of overloading on road roughness
Source: Simulation based on HDM-4.
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Figure 2.8 reasons for Flight cancellations, United states
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information is becoming available, there is no guarantee that it will be used 
promptly. A survey in three European and Central Asian countries found that 
25–50 percent of respondents did not find out about severe weather until the 
day it occurred; the comparable figure for the United Kingdom was 6  percent. 
Equipment to convey station data to headquarters for analysis is often unreliable, 
labor-intensive, and expensive (Hancock, Tsirkunov, and Smetanina 2008). 
Integrating weather information and operations could make railway,  maritime, 
and aviation operations more reliable.
Climate Resilience of the Economy as a Whole
An infrastructure network has to be considered as an integrated whole. “Network 
effects” (Economides 1996) involve both potential benefits from 
 interconnectedness—as between trade, local development, and transportation 
speed—and critical interdependences that, if broken, could dramatically disrupt 
a regional economy. For example, if a crucial node or strategic link (Meyer 2007), 
such as a highway or a pipeline, were cut, there would be significant economic 
consequences for that region.
Box 2.8 monitoring corruption
Illegal side payments—often observed but not easy to verify—pad many contractors’  budgets. 
When the contractor who offers the largest kickback wins the contract, competition on the 
basis of quality, price, and reliability is eliminated. In turn, poor quality means the project must 
be repaired or even redone, wasting time, money, and resources.
A remarkable experiment in reducing corruption in more than 600 Indonesian village road 
projects produced the following findings:
•	 By increasing the probability that it would audit a village from 4 to 100 percent, the central 
government audit agency reduced missing expenditures from 27.7 to 19.2 percent. If 
heavier punishment conditional on prosecution were to complement higher audit 
probabilities, this percentage could improve.
•	 Giving audit results to the public, who can then use them in making electoral choices, may 
be a useful complement to formal punishment.
•	 Grassroots monitoring is most effective with the distribution of private goods, such as 
subsidized food, education, or medical care, where individual citizens have a personal stake 
in ensuring that theft is minimized. When incentives to monitor are weaker, such as for 
public infrastructure projects, using professional auditors may be more effective.
•	 Grassroots monitoring programs must ensure that they are not captured by local elites.
•	 Auditors should be rotated often to avoid susceptibility to bribery. The best option may be 
to combine lower audit probability with heavier punishments.
Even if improved audits can reduce rent capture or bribery, this experiment suggests that 
there is no single, simple solution to this common problem.
Source: Olken 2007.
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This suggests that such institutional aspects as land-use policies, procurement 
rules, disaster and emergency planning systems, hydrometeorological data collec-
tion and management, and circulation of information among transport sector 
ministries and administration services matter as much as technical issues. Close 
correlations between the maps of hazard (the exogenous probability of a poten-
tially damaging phenomenon) and vulnerability (the controllable degree of loss 
resulting from such a phenomenon) disclose more institutional problems than 
technical or financial ones.
Creating Redundancy in Infrastructure and Logistic: Designing redundancies 
into a network means creating alternatives to key bridges or highway seg-
ments. Redundancy can diminish disruption to the population and the econ-
omy (GTZ 2009). Disaster risk management must also ensure accessibility to 
hospitals to avoid human loss and efficient rubble evacuation. There is much 
greater potential for creating redundancies in dense urban environments than 
in rural areas, which may require targeted preventive investments. Public 
transport could be considered a redundancy; for instance, during the floods in 
Manila in September 2009, elevated rail and metro transit proved more 
 reliable than cars (box 2.9).
Creating redundancy in logistics, namely through inventory, could also 
increase the resilience of the economy to extreme events. Inventory costs 
represent a significant share of total logistics costs. For Japan, macrologistics 
costs represent some 10 percent of GDP, and inventory costs account for 
about 3 percent (table 2.3; OECD 2002). Obviously, holding more stock is 
costly enough that it could reduce an economy’s competitiveness. Yet  without 
Box 2.9 manila: public transport resilience to extreme events
In September 2009 flash floods rendered major metro thoroughfares in Manila impassable. 
The Light Rail Transit (LRT) and the Metro Rail Transit (MRT) were alternatives for thousands of 
commuters. LRT Authority administrators were proud that their maintenance personnel kept 
LRT Lines 1 and 2 running efficiently and without disruption. The main problem was unavoid-
able congestion at LRT stations, but as a form of relief passenger fares were reduced. To accom-
modate the surge of passengers the number of trains was increased from 9 to 16.
Source: Philippine Star, September 28, 2009, http://www.philstar.com/metro/508853/stranded-commuters-turn-elevated-rails.
table 2.3 Japan: macro logistics costs
Trillion JPY Percentage of GDP
Logistics costs 47.1 9.5
 Transport 30.5 6.2
 Stock 14.5 2.9
 Other (managerial) 2.1 0.4
Source: OECD 2002.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
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some inventory an economy would suffer severely if its logistics were 
 disrupted. There is thus a tradeoff between logistics efficiency and reliability.
Urban and Land-use Planning: The sensible principle of not building in harm’s 
way could come up against politically sensitive land-use policies. These policies 
drive land prices and require cooperation among different, often opposing, inter-
ests: government and public decision makers, real estate developers, and the 
many people building informal settlements.17 Transportation planning seldom 
considers likely climate change when locating facilities and developing land. The 
vulnerability of rapidly growing cities in developing countries increases without 
climate-proofing regulations.
Urban and land-use planning must answer questions like where to locate or 
relocate infrastructure at risk, and how to enhance the resilience of existing 
 networks to climate. There are two main cases:
Construction of new transport infrastructure: That many developing countries 
do not currently have much transport infrastructure allows them, at least in 
theory, to locate new infrastructure out of harm’s way. Climate-smart zoning, 
limited only by a country’s ability to comply with it, would increase infrastruc-
ture resilience.
Relocation, rehabilitation, and retrofitting of infrastructure: Existing transport 
infrastructure, with marginal retrofits, might work with climate evolution but it 
might also be totally inadequate. In any case, “path dependency” prevents updat-
ing or relocating infrastructure overnight (see Dealing with Infrastructure Inertia 
in chapter 1). If relocation turns out to be impossible or too costly (as when a 
whole city is exposed to major climate risks), planners should focus on creating 
redundancies within the infrastructure that exists.
Although the strategic framework for urban and land-use policies is straight-
forward, institutional dysfunction and failure to enforce regulations are hurdles 
in many developing countries.
Disaster and Emergency Planning Systems: This section deals with setting up a 
strategic agenda to cope with emergency situations following disasters. Each 
phase of the disaster cycle—response, recovery, and reconstruction18—has a dif-
ferent set of priorities. The preventive building of redundancy into networks as 
part of a consistent disaster management plan is one option.
Response to the emergency: In this phase, which can last hours to weeks, the 
priority is to restore basic connectivity and communications and remove all bar-
riers to relief. Redundancy is critical if main roads are impassible. The efficiency 
of response depends on the preparedness of local authorities.
Recovery: As most roads should be opened by this phase, recovery focuses not 
on transport infrastructure but on providing temporary housing and vital social 
and commercial activities.
Reconstruction: Transport networks are crucial here. If they have been dam-
aged, the first emergency fix must be complemented by restoration that takes 
into account prior infrastructure vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, given resource 
shortages, decision makers in developing countries often choose what seems 
the cheapest solution, one that in fact benefits private companies at the expense 
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of the public. The regulatory aspects are central here: Regulation deals with 
(i) upgrading building quality standards in the context of possible climate change; 
(ii) defining sound land-use regulation and urban codes; and (iii)  modernizing 
procurement rules so that perverse incentives to favor cheap short-term infra-
structure are translated into efficient incentives that result in long-lasting and 
robust works. The main goal of the reconstruction phase is to avoid creating new 
vulnerabilities.
An indefinite period of preparedness should follow reconstruction. Among 
other things, a consistent strategy should include early warning, relief supply, and 
emergency circulation plans that make the best use of existing networks.
Linking with other sectors: Ideally, transport adaptation should take into 
account the environment—the broader system that includes forestry, drainage, 
farming, and water management. For instance, bridge design should take into 
account both climate model predictions for increased precipitation and sedimen-
tation from erosion amplified by land use.19
Good forestry practices—for example, no clear-cutting around  infrastructure—
can help prevent or soften the impact of extreme events. By contrast, upstream 
deforestation or informal irrigation channels that turn rainfall into flooding could 
worsen conditions. Deforestation combined with increased precipitation could 
shorten the recurrence of flooding, for instance, from an average of every 50 years 
to every 20 years. An integrated approach, however, battles the usual public 
policy sectoral focus and would require close coordination between very distinct 
actors and administrations.
Fundamentals of transport Adaptation
A comprehensive approach to building resilience means that different stakehold-
ers cooperate to define responsibilities, monitor building standards, enforce land-
use regulations, manage uncertainties about climate information, and devise 
decision tools. Although strategic frameworks are well established, that is less 
true of practical mechanisms for achieving adaptation. The following  section 
offers guidance in assessing climate information and decision-making tools.
information
The robustness of transportation infrastructure has typically been calibrated 
using statistics for such climate variables as precipitation, wind speed, and tem-
perature. Since climate change disturbs trends, past records are no longer reliable 
indicators. What is needed are updated information from cutting-edge climate 
modeling and new ways of thinking.
Unlike other sectors, such as agriculture, where stakeholders have long 
engaged with climate scientists to build mutual understanding, transport and 
climate specialists must still learn to communicate about how climate  information 
might affect a specific project and what actions to take as a result. Further, local 
authorities must decide what variables are most important locally. Sometimes 
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this will be obvious: land-locked countries need not consider sea-level rise, nor 
need low-elevation, low-latitude areas be concerned with changes in freeze/thaw 
cycles. But because the key variables are not always this obvious, there should be 
an initial general understanding about which variables need to be examined in 
detailed quantitative terms.20
Given the limits on the information available, a risk assessment approach 
should be both qualitative and quantitative to minimize the costs of engineering-
based adaptation strategies and loss (box 2.10).
Besides raw climate information, sound strategy should map critical infrastruc-
ture links—kilometers of railroad tracks or roads, percentage of roads paved or 
gravel-surfaced, number of bridges or length of subway lines—as well as the 
physical and institutional context. (This has begun for Ethiopia.21) What is the 
landscape surrounding the asset? Who has jurisdiction over operations, mainte-
nance, and design—both the original design and future retrofits? Are drainage 
systems integral? Are they managed by the roads authority or by the urban water 
and sanitation authority? What standards and manuals provide technical specifi-
cations? What is the intended design life? Has it already been, or is it likely to be, 
exceeded? What climate-related problems have already arisen? What non- 
climate-related problems?
Knowing the internal state of a structure is also important. Innovative 
 technologies, such as nano-sensors, can monitor how during extreme events 
infrastructure reacts to water levels and currents, wave action, winds, and exces-
sive temperatures.
Box 2.10 A Five-step risk-Assessment Approach to infrastructure Design
 1.  Focus on infrastructure that has a long life (more than 40–50 years); infrastructure designed 
for a shorter life already has flexibility incorporated into the facility replacement schedule.
 2.  Identify geographic areas that are particularly sensitive to climate change, such as coastal 
or low-lying areas.
 3.  Assign a likely probability of environmental change to these sensitive areas to determine 
if such changes are likely over the useful life of the facility.
 4.  Create several designs based on different standards to account as needed for a changing 
environment. For each design estimate the cost, both replacement and economic, of any 
disruption.
 5.  Apply the hazard probability to design components that will be affected by a changing 
environment. Estimate the likely costs of each in current dollars. Choose the design with 
the lowest net value cost.
The third step is particularly critical. The accuracy of the predicted probability of  environmental 
change will depend on the reliability of the climate projections. Hence, planners must inter-
pret results with caution, using corridors of values rather than single optimal values.
Source: Adapted from Meyer 2007.
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Decision-making tools
Coping with a less predictable climate requires new decision-making tools 
 tailored to manage deep uncertainty and reduce risks. Adaptive management 
should acknowledge the limitations of the information available and incorporate 
learning feedback loops.
Decision makers should be open to revising an investment or policy if new 
information becomes available. A key adaptive strategy therefore is to avoid 
locked-in technologies or land-use and siting decisions that can be costly to 
reverse if poorly adapted to future conditions, both climate and nonclimate (such 
as population growth).
Adaptive decision making means assessing the additional benefits of decisions 
that allow for fine-tuning or switching to an altogether different option. 
Additional benefits also accrue from decisions that incorporate options contin-
gent on future states of nature (for example, building roads that can withstand 
temperature increases, or enacting climate-smart land-use policies for locating 
new infrastructure). Preserving future choices thus has a value per se, in addition 
to increasing the ability to adapt to new economic and climate contexts.
There are several practical approaches to increasing robustness and flexibility 
(Hallegatte 2009; World Bank 2010b):
•	 Pursuing no-regret investment and policy options, which provide benefits 
regardless of future climate changes
•	 Promoting reversible strategies, from easy-to-retrofit designs to structured 
application of an option-value framework that measures the costs associated 
with halting operations or making further investments while awaiting new 
information
•	 Incorporating safety margins that reduce vulnerabilities at manageable cost, 
which can include buying insurance, building redundancy into systems, or 
marginal design changes that can have a big impact at low or even no cost
•	 Identifying soft strategies when vulnerabilities are mainly caused by institu-
tional failures
•	 Giving preference to strategies that reduce decision-making time by formalizing 
inclusion of feedback loops and periodic reassessment of initial policy and 
investment design
•	 Taking into account conflicts and synergies between isolated investments that 
should be covered by an integrated strategy; this is particularly important in 
the transport sector given barriers between modes and the very strong inertia 
of transport infrastructure (see chapter 1).
A structured tool for increasing adaptiveness and resilience is robust decision 
making. The Robust Decision-Making (RDM) framework22 is a formalized 
approach to evaluating options that recognizes that traditional decision-making 
tools, such as the expected utility framework,23 cannot cope with deep uncer-
tainty. The expected utility framework requires that decision makers know the 
probability distribution of various climate phenomena and the likely losses 
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or benefits from each—information fundamentally unknowable with a changing 
climate regime.
RDM, by contrast, is designed to cope with deep uncertainty where probabil-
ity distributions of outcomes are unknown, when low-probability, high-impact 
events such as climate extremes are projected to increase at unknown speeds, 
intensities, and precise geographical distributions. Rather than asking the usual 
“What is the future likely to bring?” decision makers must ask “What actions 
should we take given that we do not know the future?”
RDM suggests a balancing not of expected utility and immunity to  uncertainty 
under budget constraints but of various levels of “coverage” against uncertainty 
(analogous to insurance) given a society’s threshold for acceptable versus unac-
ceptable risk and its budget constraints. RDM may not offer complete protection 
from climate risks, but it does prepare decision makers to face uncertainty and 
helps them weigh the inevitable tradeoffs between cost of coverage and 
 acceptable risks. Thus, rather than helping decision makers predict what will 
 happen, RDM helps them to better define and select from available choices. 
In fact, RDM both reduces policy vulnerability and increases policy flexibility.
For transport, RDM could be most useful in guiding long-lived capital invest-
ments in new transport infrastructure when decision makers are confronted with 
both deep uncertainty and a wide array of options for location, capacity, and 
other design features.24 The aim would be to select not the traditionally “optimal” 
option but the option best suited to generate consensus among stakeholders, 
some with divergent views about the probability of various impacts, as well as to 
minimize the impact of adverse climate surprises.
notes
 1. The range published by the IPCC in the Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC 2007) is 
18–59 cm. Because the IPCC strictly limits any claims that contributors consider 
too uncertain, the range excluded a potentially very large factor: ice sheet melting. 
Even at the time of publication, the IPCC numbers were widely considered to be 
underestimates. Subsequent estimates put the plausible range as easily crossing 1 m. 
An informal summary of the debate can be found at http://www.realclimate.org/
index.php/archives/2010/03/ippc-sealevel-gate (accessed June 27, 2010). Major 
reports and peer-reviewed articles from the past few years include Allison and 
 others (2009); Copenhagen Climate Congress (2009); Deltacommissie (2008); 
Grinsted, Moore, and Jevrejeva (2010); Horton and others (2008); Pfeffer, Harper, 
and O’Neel (2008); Rahmstorf (2007); Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research 
(2009).
 2. Kjellstrom, Holmer, and Lemke (2009); Nag and others (2009); NRC (2008); Dubai 
Municipality government news releases; ArabianBusiness.com various articles, for 
example http://www.arabianbusiness.com/press_releases/detail/19527.
 3. Frost heave—cracking and uplift of portions of earth or pavement—occurs when 
water in the subgrade (or in the earth below) freezes and expands upward toward the 
surface.
 4. There are many sources on this, including http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/
asiapcf/10/29/india.train/.
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 5. When cold-season temperatures are still below snow-versus-rain thresholds, moderate 
warming can actually intensify snowfalls by increasing the rate of evaporation and thus 
the concentration of water vapor in the air, setting up perfect conditions for a massive 
snowfall when the moist air collides with cold air. More detailed explanation of 
the potential for increased extreme snowfalls and evidence on the increased snows in 
the Great Lakes region of the United States are provided in Karl, Melillo, and Peterson 
(2009).
 6. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/11/
AR2010021103895.html (accessed June 29, 2010); http://www.wunderground.com/
blog/JeffMasters/comment.html?entrynum=1427 (accessed June 29, 2010).
 7. http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/snow-storm-economics-winter-weather-stimulate-
economy/story?id=9788401&page=3 (accessed June 29, 2010); http://voices 
.washingtonpost.com/federal-eye/2010/03/eye_opener_snow_days_cost_71m.
html (accessed June 29, 2010).
 8. Abidin and others (2009); Susandi and others (2007). Susandi PPT. http://www 
. eepsea.cc-sea.org/pages/ppt/C01_Susandi.pdf.
 9. Air Transport World, “Climate Change May Impact Aviation Safety, ICAO warns.” 
May 17, 2010. Accessed June 5, 2010. http://atwonline.com/eco-aviation/article/
climate-change-may-impact-aviation-safety-icao-warns-0517.
 10. For a review of the literature, good starting points are Füssel (2007); Janssen and 
Ostrom (2006).
 11. Average road upgrading cost is estimated to increase by $3,688/km based on the 
 original estimate of $18,173/km.
 12. Project appraisal document, Nepal Rural Access Improvement and Decentralization 
Project (No. 31624-NP).
 13. An interim survey of the project indicates that personal mobility increased by more 
than 20 percent and travel time plunged from 2.6 hours on average to 32 minutes 
(Project Paper on Nepal Rural Access Improvement and Decentralization Project, 
2009 [No. 50766-NP]).
 14. JBIC (2007); Ex-Post Evaluation Report on ODA Loan Projects FY2007.
 15. World Bank 2010.
 16. ESALF is defined by the number of applications of a standard 80kN dual-wheel single 
axle load that would cause the same amount of damage to a road as one application 
of the axle load being considered.
 17. In many countries, public decision makers still consider climate change to be too long-
term to be worthy of interest. Short-term political cycles do not match long-term 
climate policies, which only entail present costs
 18. GFDRR/World Bank.
 19. World Bank 2010, 62. 
 20. For example, see the variables chosen for Ethiopia (World Bank 2010, 30–31).
 21. World Bank 2010, 39.
 22. For a careful overview of RDM, see Lempert and McCollins (2007); Lempert and 
Schlessinger (2000).
 23. Expected utility theory elaborates on the basic expected value framework by incor-
porating individual or social preferences (or tolerance) for risk. In a process based on 
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expected value alone, for each option the decision maker considers the expected value 
(the probability of the outcome associated with that option multiplied by the value, 
in monetary terms, of the outcome being realized, minus the known cost of pursing 
the option) and chooses the one with the highest expected value. For example, pav-
ing a gravel road costs more than maintaining it; if a flash flood that would wash out 
the gravel but not the paved road is not very likely, it would not be worth the extra 
expense of paving. In expected utility theory, the calculation is the same, except that 
for each option the decision maker considers the expected utility value of each 
option—wherein the probability is multiplied by the value in terms utility, which 
captures the decision maker’s risk preferences. Decision makers who are risk-averse 
will be inclined to choose options that may have lower payoffs (or higher costs) but 
entail a lower probability of losses. (Monetary damages from a flood, once weighted 
by multiplying by the low probability of that flood, do not offset the additional cost 
of paving the road; however, the planner’s attitude toward risk may be such that even 
the slim possibility of disaster is unacceptable, warranting the extra expense of 
 paving.) It is essential to note that in both expected value and expected utility frame-
works, the decision maker must know the probability distribution of the outcomes 
of choosing various options to assign an expected value or utility to each option.
 24. So far, despite its promising new insights, this theoretical framework has yet to be 
applied to transport projects, though it has been used successfully for long-term water 
management decisions in California. See Groves, Wilkinson, and Lempert (2008) and 
Groves, Yates, and Tebaldi (2008).
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Transport accounts for 13 percent of total green house gas (GHG) emissions 
(IPCC 2007)1 and is one of the fastest-growing sources. Without significant 
policy action, the increased mobility, motorization, and urbanization that accom-
pany economic development will massively increase carbon emissions.
Some current policies could reduce energy intensity and curb transportation 
demand without compromising economic growth. But behavior and lifestyles are 
hard to change. Transport infrastructure is very long-lived. Success will require 
rapid intervention on many fronts.
Advances in engine fuel efficiency will, of course, pave the way, but new 
 technology is not enough. Economic measures, such as pricing, regulation, and 
the availability of multimodal transportation systems, are also essential. Soft 
 measures in infrastructure operations could also help—and rapidly. If they are to 
be effective, all these measures must be integrated into a coordinated sector-wide 
approach.
Urgent action is needed before economies become locked into  high-carbon 
growth. In the United States, urban settlement patterns and interurban 
 infrastructure established decades ago have led to today’s high transport 
intensity (figure 3.1), making it difficult to expand mass transit and change 
behavior despite fossil-fuel price increases (see, for instance, Lecocq and 
Shalizi 2009).
This chapter discusses how to reconcile development with the need to curb 
emissions, looking at three sets of instruments. We first discuss new technologies 
and alternative fuels, limits to their potential in the short term, and their high 
cost. We then turn to supply-side measures and their limitations: without alterna-
tive modes, people have no choice but to rely on road transport. Finally, we look 
at demand-side policies, such as incentives. Ultimately, we argue that fuel 
 taxation is the most effective and direct way to promote both energy efficiency 
and mass transportation.
c h A p t e r  3
Integrating Sector-Wide Reforms 
for Mitigation
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technology: necessary, promising, but still Far off
New technologies are necessary for low-carbon growth, but they vary in their 
commercial readiness. New road, rail, and aviation engine technologies and 
biofuels still have relatively little potential for deep emission cuts because of 
their high cost, even when carbon prices are high (World Bank 2010a). 
Significant and accelerated technological development and diffusion are still 
needed.
Engine Efficiency and New Engine Technologies
Improving the efficiency of internal combustion engines is critical because they 
are expected to dominate the market for the near future. Cars and trucks account 
for about 67 percent of total transport emissions (figure 3.2) (World Bank 
2008b). About 1 billion cars are now on the roads worldwide. Another 2.3 billion 
are likely to be added by 2050, mostly in developing countries (Chamon and 
others 2008) given the expected economic, motorization, and income growth 
there (World Bank 2010a), and most new cars will still rely on traditional internal 
combustion engines. Advanced low-carbon engine technologies, such as hybrids, 
comprise only a small percentage of the market in high-income countries and are 
very rare in developing countries.
Fuel Economy
Most improvements in fuel economy to date occurred before the mid-1980s 
(figure 3.3). U.S. fuel economy for passenger cars (sales volume weighted) 
dropped from 18 liters per 100 km (13 miles per gallon [mpg]) in 1978 to 
8.3 liters per 100 km (28.3 mpg) in 2009; in Europe, it decreased from 10 liters 
per 100 km to 5.7–6.8 between 1975 and 2008.
Figure 3.1 paths of Automobile Use
Source: World Bank 2010a.
Note: GDP = gross domestic product.
16
14
12
10
 V
eh
ic
le
-k
m
/c
ap
ita
 (t
ho
us
an
ds
)
8
6
4
2
0
10 15
GDP per capita (2000 $, thousands)
20 25 30 35 40
United States (cars and household light trucks) France JapanGermany
Integrating Sector-Wide Reforms for Mitigation 77
Turning the Right Corner • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9835-7 
The prevalence of diesel vehicles, which emit about 7 percent less carbon 
dioxide (CO2) than gasoline vehicles, partly accounts for Europe’s relatively high 
fuel efficiency.2
Some developing economies have therefore favored diesel over gasoline-
powered cars, with diesel representing up to 90 percent of domestic markets 
(figure 3.4).
Figure 3.2 world transport co2 emissions by vehicle type, 2000
Source: WBCSD 2004.
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide.
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Figure 3.3 Average Fuel consumption, United states and european Union, 1978–2008
Sources: U.S. Department of Transportation; European Commission Environment.
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Fuel economy standards also contribute to engine efficiency, although how 
much is debatable, especially relative to other interventions, such as fuel taxes. 
Standards differ by country (table 3.1). The U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) program introduced in 1975 requires automobile  manufacturers to meet 
average fuel consumption targets. In 1995 Japan introduced standards to reduce 
fuel consumption by 19 percent and achieved the target by 2004.
A new target set in 2006 aims for another 23.5 percent reduction (METI 
2006). In Europe improvements in fuel economy were largely a side effect of air 
pollutant regulations, although in 1998–99 car manufacturers agreed with the 
European Commission (EC) on a voluntary average emission target of 140 grams 
of CO2 /km for new cars—the 1995 average was 187 grams/ km (Zachariadis 2006).
Hybrids
Low-carbon hybrid engines have great potential to reduce fuel input per 
 vehicle-km but are still expensive (figure 3.5). For instance, the Toyota Prius, the 
best-selling of about 20 hybrid car models, uses 4.7 liters of fuel/100 km 
(50 mpg) but costs about $21,000. Hybrids have benefited from public  programs: 
Source: OECD 2002a.
Figure 3.4 Diesel share of total Gasoline and Diesel Fuel Use
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table 3.1 Fuel economy standards for passenger cars, United states and european Union, and Japan
Year United States European Union Japan
1995a 27.5 mpg (standard for 1995) 
(= 8.6 liter/100 km)
140 g/km (voluntary target by 2008) 
(= 6.1 liter/100 km)
6.4–21.2 km/liter (target by 2010) 
(= 4.7–15.6 liter/100 km)
2007a 27.5 mpg (standard for 2007) 
(= 8.6 liter/100 km)
120 g/km (expected by 2012) 
(= 5.2 liter/100 km)
7.4–22.5 km/liter (target by 2015) 
(= 4.4–13.5 liter/100 km)
Sources: Zachariadis 2006; U.S. Department of Transportation; European Commission Environment; METI 2006).
a. 1998 and 2009 for Europe.
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New York City aimed to replace all 13,000 taxis with hybrid cars by 2012, the 
equivalent of removing 32,000 cars from the road.3 Boston, San Francisco, and 
Seattle are also considering this approach.4 Tax credits and subsidies are often 
offered as incentives to taxi or bus operators. For instance, the U.S. government 
allows hybrid buyers tax credits of up to $3,000 (Gao and Kitirattragarn 2008), 
and since 2002 the Japanese government has subsidized half the price  differential 
between hybrids or electric cars and conventional vehicles.5
But hybrid vehicle use is still limited, especially in developing countries, and 
wider use will depend on lower prices. The 600,000 hybrid cars sold in 2009, 
mostly in the United States and Japan (table 3.2), are less than 2 percent of the 
51 million cars sold worldwide (Global Economic Research 2010). With the price 
differential between a hybrid and a conventional car at 30–60 percent, it would 
table 3.2 top Global hybrid vehicle markets, 2009
Hybrid sales Total car sales (millions) Hybrid share (percent)
United States 265,501 10.4 2.6
Japan 249,619 2.9 8.5
Canada 16,167 1.5 1.1
Netherlands 13,686 0.4 3.5
United Kingdom 13,661 2.0 0.7
Sources: hybridCARS 2010 (http://www.hybridcars.com/december-2009-dashboard/); Global Economic Research 2010; Japan 
Auto Dealers Association.
Figure 3.5 estimated emissions reduction by 2050 and costs by vehicle and Fuel type
Source: OECD/IEA 2009, figure ES-3, p. 37.
Note: The curves indicate the marginal costs of different technologies and fuels in contributing to carbon dioxide (CO2) 
reductions from light-duty vehicles in 2050. If low-carbon biofuels are used, the marginal costs could be negative, so that those 
technologies could generate net savings of CO2 over their lifetimes. The figure shows that most technologies would be 
developed if oil prices are $120 a barrel and the carbon price is $130 per tCO2eq, resulting in a savings of 5Gt CO2eq a year. But 
at an oil price of $60 a barrel, more advanced technologies would not be tapped and emissions savings would be 3 Gigatonnes 
CO2eq a year. BTL = biomass-to-liquids biodiesel, CI = compression ignition (diesel) vehicle, EV = electric vehicle, FC = fuel cell, 
“hybrid” refers to hybrid-electric vehicle, ICE = internal combustion engine vehicle, SI = spark ignition (gasoline) vehicle.
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take more than 10 years to pay back the additional cost of a hybrid if gas were $3 
a gallon and average yearly mileage 15,000 miles. Ten years is a rather long invest-
ment period, particularly given technology and fuel price uncertainties.
Electric and Fuel Cell Cars
In recent years several major car manufacturers have begun to mass-produce elec-
tric cars. Electric cars emit no CO2, but whether they reduce emissions depends 
on the carbon intensity of their electricity, which varies significantly and will con-
tinue to do so unless there is major intervention (figure 3.6). If their fuel  efficiency 
does not improve, the advantage of electric cars will remain limited or disappear.
If electricity is reasonably efficient, the emission intensity of electric cars is 
significantly lower than that of conventional vehicles. A recent experiment in 
California illustrates the promising environmental benefits of electric school 
buses: CO2 emissions were 3.5 kilograms (kg) per mile for a diesel bus and 0.8 kg 
for an electric bus. Replacing all 475,000 California school buses with electric 
buses could significantly reduce emissions.6 Electric buses also reduce pollutants, 
emitting 93 percent less nitrogen oxide than diesels.7
Figure 3.6 GhG intensity of electricity Generation, by region (ieA Baseline scenario)
Source: OECD/IEA 2009, figure 2.11, p. 81.
Note: IEA = International Energy Agency, GHG = greenhouse gas, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development.
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However, electric cars currently cost at least $50,000, up to four times more 
than gasoline-powered vehicles. In the school bus project, electric buses cost 
more than one and a half times diesel buses.8 The much lower operating costs—
maintenance costs are lower and electricity costs one-fourth to one-tenth as 
much as conventional fossil fuel per km (even less if a battery is charged during 
off-peak hours)—are not enough to offset the high purchase price.
Electric cars will also need a whole new recharging infrastructure. Although 
electric cars can be charged through a normal household outlet, given the limited 
driving distance per battery charge there must also be public charge points. 
Without a minimum network in place, electric vehicle use will be limited. Some 
developed countries, such as France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, have begun building recharging stations, but current networks account 
for less than 1 percent of domestic gas stations.9 Car manufacturers, power 
 companies, electrical industries, car dealers, and regulators must collaborate to set 
up a network of charging stations that use standardized charger plugs and 
 management systems.
Another constraint on electric vehicles is battery technology.10 Batteries are 
still expensive—$6,000 for plug-in electric hybrids and $16,000–$20,000 for a 
fully electric vehicle (OECD/IEA 2009). In addition, the mass and volume of 
battery packs are still too large, and driving distance is limited by battery capacity. 
Most electric cars can travel fewer than 160 km on a single battery charge. 
Battery charging also takes 7–14 hours, depending on voltage. Safety is another 
concern, particularly for high-speed charger technology. Finally, a finite battery 
life of 5–10 years will necessitate regulations for environmentally safe disposal.
Despite these challenges, in certain conditions electric vehicles have advan-
tages. School or public buses are one of the most promising examples. The 
driving distance of school buses is typically not long, and buses are usually only 
used for several hours a day. Thus, there would be time to charge batteries at 
school bus parking lots. Electric cars are also well suited for urbanites, who typi-
cally drive only short distances each day and could charge batteries at home at 
night. For longer distance travel, they could use mass transit, such as railways.
Fuel cells are attracting increasing attention. A number of materials, such as 
proton exchange membranes and solid oxide, can be used for fuel cells, though 
the focus has been on hydrogen (Transportation Research Board 2010) because 
it produces no atmospheric pollutants—water is its only byproduct. Although 
evolving, fuel-cell technology is still meeting commercial resistance because of its 
intensive use of expensive catalysts like platinum, the high cost of building 
hydrogen distribution networks, and the high temperatures and more-than-
atmospheric pressures needed to operate it. Finally, current fuel-cell volume and 
weight need to be downscaled (National Academies 2002).
In addition, a significant amount of hydrogen has to be produced for fuel cell 
cars. This is problematic for mitigation. In general, fuel-cell technologies may still 
be too carbon-intensive even in the long run (figure 3.5). Current production 
depends on natural gas, coal, or grid electricity, creating significant upstream 
emissions. Frontier technologies using biomass may be able to reduce lifecycle 
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emissions, but practical use still requires substantially more advanced technology 
(Transportation Research Board 2010).
Jet Engines
Air transport is fuel-intensive, accounting for 12 percent of total transport 
emissions. For example, a Boeing 747 flying at 900 km/hr uses one gallon of 
fuel every second. As with vehicle engines, aircraft technology is evolving. 
Over the past four decades, aviation fuel consumption has declined 
60–70 percent with the development of high-bypass ratio engines and aero-
dynamic efficiency  (figure 3.7) (IEA 2000; World Bank 2009a). The latest 
Boeing 747 is 20 percent more fuel efficient than the original model 
(table 3.3). Advanced materials such as aluminum alloys and composites that 
Figure 3.7 passenger Aircraft: co2 normalized energy efficiency 
megajoule/available seat km
Sources: IPCC 1999; reproduced in World Bank 2009a.
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide. For each type of airplane, the circles refer to energy efficiency improvements in the engines and the squares ton 
improvements in airframes, such as winglets. Thus, the fuel efficiency of aircraft decreased from 80–90 MJ per available seat kilometer in 1960 to 
30–40 MJ in the 1990s, about one-third from engine improvements and two-thirds from airframe improvements.
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table 3.3 Boeing 747 Average Fuel efficiency
Model Liters/hr
B747-100 14,645
B747-200/300 13,434
B747-400 11,865
Sources: U.S. Department of Transportation 2006; reproduced in World Bank 2009a.
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reduce airframe weight have also improved fuel efficiency. A 1 percent reduc-
tion in the gross weight of an empty aircraft can reduce fuel consumption 
25–75 percent.
Railway Technologies
Rail contributes as little as 2 percent of total transport emissions because railways 
are low-carbon emitters and rail networks are equivalent only to about 6 percent 
of global paved roads. In some major economies, however, railways account for 
about 9 percent of total passenger-km and 30 percent of total freight ton-km 
(figure 3.8; EC 2009).
Railways consume a significant amount of diesel fuel.11 The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change estimates that industrialized 
 countries consume 690,000 terajoule (TJ), 17,000 million liters for rail. This 
figure could double if developing countries, where diesel-powered locomotives 
are often outdated and highly polluting, are included (table 3.4) (UIC 2007). 
Developing countries may have more opportunities to reduce emissions 
through improved operations, which are often inefficient, than through new 
technologies.
Electrifying passenger railways within dense cities and between large cities 
could greatly reduce emissions. For instance, the EC has been tightening emission 
regulations for new railway engines since 2004. Railway electricity use could also 
be reduced through improved operations (see below) and less emission-intensive 
technologies (box 3.1).
Figure 3.8 railway traffic by region
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table 3.4 railway Diesel Fuel consumption, selected countries
Country Company/association Fuel use (million liters)
United States Association of American Railroads 16,655
Canada Railway Association of Canada 2,209
India Indian Railways 2,000
United Kingdom Association of Train Operating Companies 600
Germany DB 368
France SNCF 238
United Kingdom EWS (freight) 150
Latvia Latvijas Dzelzcels 77
Romania Romanian Railway Company for Freight Transportation 70
Switzerland SBB 10
Netherlands NS 6
Source: UIC 2007.
Box 3.1 rail companies: energy consumers but also electricity producers
JR East, a Japanese rail company serving 17 million passengers a day, can generate 3,500 GWh 
of electricity, 60 percent of the company’s electricity consumption. This is roughly equivalent 
to the total consumption of Albania’s 3 million people or Côte d’Ivoire’s 20 million. Although 
the company generates a quarter of its electricity from hydropower, it still generates 1.1  million 
tCO2 every year.
Figure 3.8 railway traffic by region (continued)
Source: Amos and Thompson 2007.
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Promise and Challenges of Biofuels
Biofuels could complement the modest technological advances in internal com-
bustion engines. Ethanol is produced from food crops, such as sugarcane and 
maize, and biodiesel can be made from vegetable oil and animal fat. Both have 
the potential to lower hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions. They are 
also sulfur-free. Higher octane biofuels allow ethanol-fueled vehicles to run on 
engines with a higher compression ratio, increasing engine efficiency.
However, the energy intensity of these first-generation biofuels may not be 
superior to pure gasoline. Ethanol contains about 33 percent less energy than 
gasoline and biodiesel up to 10 percent less. Total fuel economy, therefore, is 
expected to improve only a few percentage points (Kojima and Johnson 2005). 
Second, if accounting for lifecycle emissions, net emission savings from ethanol 
may not be large. Estimates differ substantially because of different assumptions 
and feedstock used (Croezen and others 2010). In Brazil the savings could reach 
about 90 percent, including fertilizer production and fuel manufacturing 
(Macedo and others 2004). But in general estimated CO2 emission savings range 
from 6 to 28 percent when indirect land use change is taken into account 
(Croezen and others 2010). This would include the cost of expansion to new 
land for crops that were on land diverted to biofuel crops (Searchinger 2009).
Box 3.1 rail companies: energy consumers but also electricity producers (continued)
Figure B.3.1 energy production trends in Japanese railways
Source: JR East 2009. http://www.jreast.co.jp/e/environment/pdf_2009/p26_31.pdf.
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide.
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Biofuel Market
The biofuel market is growing steadily. Many countries, among them Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, the European Union (EU), India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, and the United 
States, have set biofuel targets (Kojima, Bacon and Bhattacharya 2010). However, 
the commercial viability of biofuels is questionable. On one hand, with increas-
ing awareness of climate change, the public is more interested in biofuels. 
A recent survey shows that nearly half the respondents would pay at least 20 
cents more per gallon (5.3 cents per liter) for ethanol fuel (figure 3.9); however, 
another study found that their willingness would depend on the greenness of the 
biofuel. While the premium for E10 (90 percent gasoline, 10 percent ethanol) is 
estimated at 12 cents per gallon, for E85 (15 percent gasoline, 85 percent 
 ethanol) it would be 15 cents—30 percent more. In any case, the amounts people 
are willing to pay are far below the incremental cost of biofuel production, so 
that the government would have to give substantial support, both direct and 
indirect, for biofuels to become competitive with gasoline.
Biofuel Production Costs
Brazil and the United States are the world’s two largest biofuel producers, but 
currently only Brazil has achieved commercially viable production (figure 3.10). 
While Brazil produces ethanol mainly from sugarcane and accounts for 
42  percent of world ethanol fuel, the United States mainly uses maize to produce 
Figure 3.9 willingness to pay for ethanol, United states
Source: Solomon and Johnson 2009.
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46 percent of global ethanol fuel. The U.S. government subsidizes biofuel con-
sumers and producers at a rate of about $1.44–$1.85 per gallon (38–49 cents per 
liter) of petroleum equivalent (World Bank 2008a). Brazil has supported its 
sugarcane-based ethanol industry for 30 years with a wide range of incentives, 
from price subsidies and tax exemptions to promotion of flexible-fuel vehicles 
(Kojima and Johnson 2005).
Crop-Based Biofuel Weaknesses
Beyond cost, first-generation biofuels have inherent disadvantages. First, the 
food crops from which they come often require considerable water, meaning 
there must be efficient water use, including good irrigation, and close coordina-
tion with other water users. Second, biofuel production often has environmen-
tally adverse consequences, such as air emissions and waste water discharge. 
Finally, it increases feedstock prices, as was seen in the U.S. maize market in 
2006. Without significant growth in the agricultural sector, balancing food secu-
rity and crop-based biofuel production will be difficult (World Bank 2008a).
Potential and Challenges of Cellulosic Biofuels
Second-generation biofuels that use nonfood crops, such as agricultural residue 
(e.g., sugarcane waste) and timber and urban waste (e.g., waste paper and tree 
trimmings), are more compatible with food security and rarely compete for 
water resources. However, they are still in the initial stages of development, their 
Figure 3.10 sugar production costs as an input to ethanol production
Sources: Macedo 2005; Nastari 2005; reproduced in Kojima and Johnson 2006.
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commercial viability depends on significant economies of scale, and their use 
requires more efficient waste management systems.
Penetration of Compatible Vehicles
Biofuels require flexible-fuel vehicles that can run on any mixture of fuel ethanol 
and gasoline. But fleet turnover is generally slow, because vehicles last 10–15 
years. In Brazil more than 9 million flexible-fuel vehicles are on the road, repre-
senting some 20 percent of the country’s registered vehicles (Brazil Institute 
2007). But it took 15 years after the launch of the National Alcohol Program in 
1975 for 50 percent of the fuels used in flexible-fuel vehicles use to be biofuels. 
In the United States, where the government introduced CAFE credit incentives 
for the manufacture of alternative fuel vehicles in 1998, about 4 million flexible-
fuel vehicles capable of using E85 are on the road (Kojima and Johnson 2005)—
just 5 percent of the country’s vehicles.
Biofuel-Related Infrastructure
Biofuel vehicles require a new network of refueling stations, hybrid mill and 
distillery complexes, and significant investment in feedstock delivery 
(Transportation Research Board 2010). Currently, there is a critical shortage of 
fuel stations. In Brazil 33,000 gas stations are selling ethanol alongside gasoline 
(Brazil Institute 2007), but in the United States there are only about 6,500 alter-
native refueling sites, of which only about 2,700 offer ethanol or biodiesel; in 
comparison, there are about 161,000 conventional refueling stations (U.S. 
Department of Energy 2010; NPN 2008). Incentives for flexible fuel cars have 
thus not been particularly effective. Potoglou and Kanaroglou found that 
Canadian consumers would not choose alternative-fuel vehicles unless fuels were 
available at more than 50 percent of existing stations.
Flexibility and Uncertainty
Technical flexibility is a robust strategy for dealing with climate change and com-
modity price uncertainty. Hybrid mills and distilleries could allow for easy 
switching between food and ethanol production. Fuel flexibility allows both 
producers and consumers to respond to a wider range of economic and climate 
conditions. For instance, in Brazil an ethanol mandate allows the fuel blending 
proportion to vary between 20 and 25 percent. In March 2006 after world sugar 
prices reached a historic high the government reduced the proportion from 25 to 
20 percent; raised it several months later to 23 percent; raised it to 25 percent in 
July 2007; and reduced it back to 20 percent in February 2010 (Kojima, Bacon, 
and Bhattacharya 2010).
Transforming Infrastructure to Low-Carbon Assets
Given the considerable uncertainties related to engine and alternative fuel tech-
nologies, alternative transportation in the form of mass transit is needed. Once 
high-carbon transport infrastructure is in place, people adapt their lifestyles to it; 
travel patterns become locked in.
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A recent study in São Paulo shows that expanding road capacity by 20 percent 
would speed up car travel by 13 percent, which would improve vehicle fuel 
efficiency. But increased speeds could encourage more car use, so that fuel con-
sumption would increase 5 percent and CO2 emissions 3 percent (Anas 
and Timilsina 2009b). Similarly, road expansion in the periphery of Beijing 
would increase private car use; improvements in city mass transit would reduce 
it. But because more buses could worsen city congestion, total emissions in that 
case would decline by only a few percent.
Alternative modes alone do not guarantee emissions reduction. In principle, 
transport emissions, especially from cars, could be reduced by supply-side 
 measures such as increasing alternative transport options, improving current 
infrastructure energy efficiency, or connecting different transport modes more 
effectively. Using available transport assets more effectively is just as important, 
especially in developing countries where a number of measures could enhance 
efficiency. Finally, different transport modes should be connected so that people 
can use them flexibly and efficiently, without taking unnecessary detours. This 
demands a much broader city management approach, including land-use and 
transport planning policies.
Supplying Alternative Transport Modes
The modal structure of transport plays an important role in determining carbon 
emissions, particularly when car ownership is relatively low (box 3.2). Shifting 
from passenger vehicles to mass transit can significantly reduce emissions 
(table 3.5). An average public bus emits only half as much CO2 equivalent per 
passenger-km as a small petrol-fueled car. Railways, especially between cities that 
are far apart, are even more ecofriendly. Light-rail emissions are less than or at 
most equal to average bus emissions. Subways also seem to be less polluting, though 
this depends on passenger occupancy. For large vehicles, such as public buses, 
compressed natural gas (CNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) have an 
advantage over diesel (Defra 2009). Since the late 1990s, 30 major cities in China 
have implemented the National Clean Vehicle Action program to use more CNG and 
LPG for public transportation. More than 80 percent of taxis in Shanghai and 
50 percent of buses in Beijing use CNG or LPG (Hou and others 2002; Zhao 2006).
The relevance of particular transport modes depends on city size, density, and 
other geographic factors. For rapidly growing, densely populated large cities, rapid 
transit and light rail transit can be best. In Bangkok, for instance, an elevated 23.5-km 
rapid mass transit system, Skytrain, was constructed in 1999 to relieve congestion. 
As of 2008 the system was transporting 460,000 passengers a day (Mandri-Perrott 
2010). Another mass transit system, MRT (mass rapid transit) Blue Line, that 
went into service in 2004 was used in 2007 by more than 170,000 customers a 
day. Road traffic was reduced along the Blue Line, although only marginally for 
several reasons (JBIC 2008). Manila’s LRT1 has been a major public transporta-
tion mode since it was commissioned in 1985. LRT1 carries about 300,000 people 
a day. In Tunis, the 32-kilometer LRT (Light Rail Transit), in operation since 1985, 
was carrying some 294,000 people per day in 2002 (Godard 2007).
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An increase in the number of rapid transit or LRT passengers can reduce 
 emissions, though of course not all passengers are former users of more polluting 
transport, such as cars and taxis. The majority of passengers in the Bangkok MRT 
Blue Line, for example, were former bus users (table 3.6). Nevertheless, over the 
next 30 years, increased passenger rail use could save some 1.7 million tons of 
CO2, as well as reduce such other pollutants as sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrous 
oxide (NO2) (table 3.7).
Box 3.2 how multimodality Affects emissions: AsiF Decomposition
ASIF decomposition, defined below, is useful for analyzing the links between transport, fuel 
consumption, and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. In this approach, A stands for CO2 emissions 
(CO2 tons) equal to the product of transport activity (passenger-km or ton-km); S for modal 
structure (the share of each activity by transport mode); I for modal energy intensity (energy 
use per unit of passenger or freight travel by mode); and F for emission rate (CO2 emissions per 
unit of energy consumed).
Emission Passenger km
VMT
Passenger km
Fuel consumption
VTM
Emissions
Fuel Consumption
(Activity) (Structure) (Intensity) (Fuel carbon intensity)
=
In developed countries, ASIF is an important determinant of emissions (table B3.2.1). 
In  Australia, for instance, passenger transport emissions increased by about 61 percent 
between 1973 and 1995. Even in Japan, which has extensive mass transit, the modal shift to 
road increased passenger transport emissions by 25 percent, though much of this could be 
attributed to the country’s rapid economic growth and increased travel. Meanwhile, in most 
countries the energy intensity effect, which measures a change in carbon emitted per 
passenger-km, has been insignificant.
There has been a significant modal switch from rail and marine shipment to road in recent 
decades, reflecting a demand for flexibility and frequency in freight transport and the poor 
quality of rail services. In developed countries the shift significantly increased transport 
emissions. However, rail still offers a comparative advantage for long-distance freight and bulk 
cargo. Coordinating intermodal transportation systems can enhance competitiveness and 
reduce emissions.
table B3.2.1 AsiF Decomposition, selected Developed countries, 1973–95 (1973 = 100)
Travel Freight
United States Japan Australia Sweden United States Japan Australia Sweden
Emissions 119 226 174 136 163 157 172 105
Activity effect 148 189 190 124 162 137 166 106
Structure effect 101 125 161 101 124 140 116 104
Intensity effect 78 97 93 110 89 85 61 95
Fuel mix effect 100 101 99 99 101 105 103 100
Source: OECD/IEA 2000.
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table 3.5 Average co2 emission Factors by vehicle type, United Kingdom
Vehicle type gCO2 equivalent per kilometer gCO2 equivalent per passenger-km
Petrol car
Small 151.8 —
Medium 187.7 —
Large 260.6 —
Diesel car
Small 127.1 —
Medium 158.0 —
Large 215.4 —
LPG or CNG car
Medium 188.3 —
Large 260.7 —
Average bus
Local 1,014.7 111.5
London 1,122.9 83.9
Railway
International — 17.8
National — 61.1
Light rail — 84.0
London metro — 78.6
Source: Defra 2009.
Note: — = not available, CO2 = carbon dioxide, CNG = compressed natural gas, LPG = liquefied petroleum gas. Average 
passenger occupancy is assumed to be 9.1 for local buses and 13.4 for London buses.
table 3.6 transport modes Used before the mrt Blue line opened in Bangkok
Mode Percent Mode Percent 
Bus 51.0 Motorcycle 5.5
Car 14.2 Van 3.7
Taxi 12.9 Walking 3.5
Mass transit system (BTS) 8.6 Boat 0.7
Source: JBIC 2008.
Note: MRT = mass rapid transit.
table 3.7 estimated emissions reduction by the mrt Blue line in Bangkok
tons
Fiscal year
Global benefits Local benefits
CO2 SO2 NO2 CO2 SO2 NO2
2004 28,600 27.3 60.5 23,100 0.4 25.6
2005 32,200 32.2 68.0 26,000 0.4 28.8
.
.
.
2033 74,700 71.1 158.0 60,200 0.9 66.6
Total 1,736,000 1,680 3,727 1,422,000 21.6 1,575
Source: JICA 2008.
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide, MRT = mass rapid transit, NO2 = nitrous dioxide, SO2 = sulfur dioxide.
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However, there are enormous costs associated with heavy rail systems. Very 
high passenger density is needed to justify the investment, and many projects 
have overestimated demand. For instance, the estimated ridership of the 
Skytrain in Bangkok was 600,000–700,000, but initial ridership was only 
150,000 (Mandri-Perrott 2010). Similarly, the original estimate for the Blue 
Line was 250,000–430,000 passengers (JBIC 2008). The LRT1 in Manila 
envisaged 560,000 passengers a day, but the actual number is about half. 
Reasons for this vary, from mispricing to lack of coordination with other trans-
port policies.
High-speed rail is another alternative. For instance, a Eurostar journey is 
 estimated to emit on average one-tenth the CO2 emissions of an equivalent 
airline flight.12 It also saves considerable time for long-distance travelers. In 
Sweden high-speed trains are the fastest mode of transportation for distances 
of 100–600 km. For shorter distances, cars are better, and for even longer 
distances, air has a comparative advantage (figure 3.11). As economies grow, 
so too does demand for high-speed transportation (box 3.3). High-speed rail 
technology has responded to this demand, increasing maximum speeds from 
200 km/hr to 515 over the past three decades (figure 3.12). However, 
because high-speed rail is extremely costly, it may be relevant for only a 
few developing countries with a critical mass of potential users, such as 
Figure 3.11 long Distance travel time, sweden
Source: Froidh 2008.
Note: The X2000 is a tilting train introduced in 1990 on the Stockholm-Gothenburg main line. HST = high-speed train.
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Figure 3.12 maximum speed of high-speed trains
Source: Free Encyclopedia Wikipedia: “Land Speed Record for Rail Vehicles.”
Max speed in operation Average speed
350
300
250
200
km
 p
er
 h
ou
r
Fliegender
Hamburger
Cheltenham
Spa Express
Le Mistral
Etendard
Hikari
Shinkansen
TGV
TGV
TGV
Nozomi
Shinkansen
150
100
50
0
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
China, Brazil, and the Russian Federation (figure 3.13). China is building a 
300-km/hr train from Beijing to Tianjin and planning a 1,300-km line 
between Beijing and Shanghai. Vietnam is also looking at high-speed rail 
between its two largest cities, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh, a  distance of about 
1,700 km.
Bus rapid transit may be a more attractive option in small and medium cities, 
especially where dense corridors are developing. Although it may generate 
slightly more emissions than rapid transit, it is much cheaper to build (table 3.5). 
Many cities now have exclusive or separate bus lanes in main corridors. Dublin, 
Ireland, established Quality Bus Corridors for city buses in peak hours, enabling 
buses to travel 20 percent faster than before and bringing about a 20 percent 
Box 3.3 Demand for high-speed rail
Demand for high-speed transportation rises with income as the perceived opportunity costs 
of travel time increase. Thus in Europe introduction of high-speed trains increases passenger 
rail demand by 8 percent (Couto and Graham 2008). In Spain the time elasticity of demand for 
intercity trains is estimated at 2.5, so that a 10 percent reduction in travel time would increase 
demand by 25  percent (Martin and Nombela 2007). People also appreciate the higher 
 frequency and shorter access time of rail compared to air, particularly for business travel 
(Gonzalez-Savignat 2004).
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increase in the share of bus transportation (OECD 2002b). Curitiba, Brazil, has 
successfully implemented an integrated transit and land-use strategy using high-
speed bus systems. Combined with land-use regulations, it has permitted 
Curitiba to boast one of the world’s highest rates of urban mass transit use: 
70 percent of the urban population, an increase of 62% since the transit 
 network’s inception in 1974.
In Bogota, Colombia, public bus fares had been set above competitive 
levels, leading to excess competition and inefficient, fragmented operations. 
Bus rapid transit, TransMilenio, was substituted for the old bus system and 
currently supplies 20 percent of daily trips in Bogota, serving 1 million pas-
sengers daily. Average public transit travel speeds increased from 15 km/hr 
to 27, and accidents on service corridors decreased 79 percent (NBRTI 
2006). With innovative pricing and land use measures, the system aims to 
carry 80  percent of the city’s population by 2015 (Echeverry and others 
2005).
Whether bus rapid transit actually reduces emissions depends on the 
number of passengers and how efficiently it is operated. Without high pas-
senger occupancy, exclusive bus lanes that crowd out other vehicles could 
increase congestion elsewhere. Proper route planning and other transport 
measures are important to achieving high occupancy (see below). Successful 
bus rapid transit systems also need to link with feeder transportation. In 
Bogota about 50 percent of TransMilenio passengers connect from other bus 
Figure 3.13 high-speed rail construction costs
Source: Hughes 2006. http://www.jreast.co.jp/e/development/tech/pdf_8/Tec-07-42-51eng.pdf.
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systems, and roughly half use the feeder system that belongs to TransMilenio. 
The rest use traditional bus systems, which are energy inefficient and 
 pollutive (NBRTI 2006). Without efficient and  coordinated operations, hard 
infrastructure development does not always reduce emissions.
Substituting rail for road freight holds great potential for reducing 
 emissions. Diesel rail, for instance, generates only one-third as many emissions 
per ton-km freight as a trailer truck, although the net effect depends on the 
load factor and the size and type of truck, trailer or rigid (table 3.8). In the 
United States, using rail rather than truck could reduce emissions by about 
two-thirds per ton-mile of freight transported (Transportation Research Board 
2010).
However, because freight demand is for more frequent and flexible transport, 
it may be difficult for rail to maintain its share of total freight transportation. In 
some countries privatization and other reforms have revitalized rail freight 
operations, but in many developing countries freight rail is marginalized. It may 
be worth reinvesting in freight rail infrastructure to take advantage of its capacity 
to significantly reduce not only emissions but also trade, transportation, and 
 logistics costs.
Wiser Use of Transport Infrastructure
Wiser use of existing infrastructure can reduce both emissions and trade and 
transportation costs. The efficiency gains are likely to be significant in develop-
ing countries where infrastructure tends to be poorly maintained and ineffi-
ciently operated. Soft measures are normally cheaper and quicker to 
implement than hard. Four examples relate to public buses, air, railways, and 
logistics.
Optimizing Public Bus Operations
Energy efficiency in public bus operations can be improved dramatically. In 
Mexico, for instance, bus system optimization could greatly abate emissions 
( figure 3.14). Restructuring redundant feeder routes and improving bus stops, 
traffic signals, public information, and the vehicles themselves could reduce 
emissions by 31.5 megatons (Mt) of CO2 equivalent/yr (Johnson and others 
2010). Switching from diesel to compressed CNG could complement such 
measures.
table 3.8 Average co2 emission Factors, road and rail Freight, United Kingdom
Transport mode gCO2 equivalent per passenger-km
Road freight 120.4
Rigid 234.3
Trailer 86.0
Rail freight 78.6
Source: Defra 2009.
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide.
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Optimizing Air Traffic
Jet fuel consumption could be reduced by shorter routes, better taxiing, and 
continuous descent of aircraft (OECD/IEA 2009). Several airlines have initi-
ated a pilot program to conserve jet fuel that includes single-engine taxiing 
on departure and arrival, continuous climb and descent, and a tailored arrival. 
Through this  program a B767 flight from Miami to Paris saved about 1,500 
lbs of fuel—about 2.5 percent of total fuel consumption between the two 
cities.13 A B747 flight from Paris to Miami could save two to three tons of 
fuel and six to nine tons of CO2 emissions. One company estimated that total 
savings on all transatlantic flights could add up to 43,000 tons of fuel a year 
(ATW Online 2010), reducing costs by about $40 million and CO2 emissions 
by about 135,000 tons. These measures not only reduce emissions but also 
improve air carrier competitiveness, particularly if international fuel 
prices remain high (figure 3.15). While cost concerns should motivate airlines 
to undertake these measures, governments can help by publicizing best 
practices.
Figure 3.14 marginal emissions Abatement costs in mexico
Source: Johnson and others 2010.
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide, I&M = inspection and maintenance.
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Modernization of Rail Assets and Operations
Despite the increasing importance of bulk freight, railways in developing coun-
tries are often poorly maintained. The expected life of locomotives is more 
than 40 years. Upgrading and modernizing locomotives and important lines 
would increase rail capacity and mitigate emissions by attracting more freight 
from roads and retaining more current rail users. In the Ukraine, transporting 
freight by road produces more than triple the amount of emissions as moving 
it by rail. A railway modernization project could facilitate a move toward this 
more fuel-efficient mode. For every million ton-km shifted from truck to rail 
or retained by rail, 53–55 million tons of CO2 could be saved (World Bank 
2010c).
Better rail operations could also improve national competitiveness and eco-
nomic growth. With high-quality services, freight rail could support bulk exports 
and imports. In Ghana, because of the poor quality of rail services, cacao beans 
travel by truck, where they are more likely to be damaged (JBIC 2006).
Subsidies may be needed for rail freight. Road transport is already heavily 
subsidized because roads are publicly financed and usually used without charge. 
The United Kingdom partially subsidizes capital investments in rail: since 1975 
the government has spent £185 million to support about 250 projects (OECD 
2002b). This not only improves railway operational efficiency but also reduces 
overall transportation costs.
Figure 3.15 Average Jet Fuel prices
Sources: Air Transport Association; reproduced by World Bank 2009a.
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Improvements in Logistics
An estimated 2,800 megatons of CO2, 5.5 percent of total emissions, are  produced 
by the logistics and transport sector (figure 3.16). Large-scale, consolidated freight 
transportation is often more efficient and generates fewer emissions than the frag-
mented small-volume operations that are dominant in developing countries. 
Trade-related transport costs for landlocked countries are 50 percent higher than 
for coastal countries (Arvis 2005). One of the reasons for high trade costs is inef-
ficiency in freight operations. Up to 60 percent of truck trips in developing coun-
tries are done while empty, compared with 26 percent in the United Kingdom 
(McKinnon and Ge 2006). Not surprisingly, the higher the empty rate, the higher 
the freight cost and emission intensity (figure 3.17; Londono-Kent 2009). More 
efficient routing and higher load factors should help reduce fuel intensity.14 
Transshipment load centers, multimodal facilities, and logistic services are critical.
A study in Odense, Denmark, showed that establishing a city logistics terminal 
could decrease total freight transport by 2 percent and energy consumption and 
CO2 emissions by 15 percent. Copenhagen has adopted a similar system (OECD 
2002b). In the United Kingdom the freight industry improved efficiency 
 markedly through better route planning and reducing empty-vehicle travel. 
Improved truck specifications reduced fuel consumption 20 percent for 1988–
1998. An added benefit is that manufacturers were able to reduce their stocks 
20 percent, and wholesale and retail sectors saved £11 billion.
Figure 3.16 emissions from logistics Activities
Source: World Economic Forum 2009.
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide, GHG = greenhouse gas.
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Better Connecting Transport Infrastructure
Having good intermodal connectivity and good integration between transport 
corridors and feeder systems is crucial to the success of alternative infrastructure. 
Connectivity is challenging because the demand for transport is dynamic and 
depends on numerous factors. Transport infrastructure must therefore be  analyzed 
within the broader context of urbanization and economic development.
Figure 3.17 Average Freight cost and empty trip rate
Source: Based on Londono-Kent 2009.
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Box 3.4 Building Greener transport infrastructure
Street lighting. Streetlights operate for 9–12 hours every day. Bulbs last a year, fixtures more 
than 10 years. In the City of Rizhao in China, most traffic signals and street and park lights are 
powered by solar cells (Suzuki and others 2009). Mexico aims to replace all street lights with 
energy-efficient high-pressure sodium lamps in the next two decades, which would reduce 
emissions by 0.9 Mt CO2 equivalent a year (Johnson and others 2010).
Greener rail stations. A commuter train station in Tokyo reduced its energy use 30 percent 
by introducing automatic on-off systems and LED displays and equalizing the levels of illumi-
nation on platforms (JR East 2009).
Greener and carbon-neutral airports. Although technically falling within the commercial 
building rather than transport sector, an airport can be made more carbon-neutral by combin-
ing energy-efficient building technologies, airport design, and air traffic operation. In Brazil, for 
instance, the first energy-efficiency contract was awarded to Tancredo Neves/Confins 
International Airport in Belo Horizonte in 1999. Contractor proposals had to include not only 
costs but also a technical work plan, including energy-saving measures. The price and techni-
cal proposals were weighted roughly equally in the evaluation (Poole 2008; Singh and others 
2010). A five-year contract will save 1 million Brazilian reals to the economy annually (INFRAERO 
2006). Other airports, among them Gander International Airport in Canada, are promoting the 
idea of carbon neutrality.
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Compact Cities
A compact city can be designed through complementary land-use and urban 
planning. Denser cities are generally more energy efficient and less polluting, 
with lower vehicle miles (figure 3.18). Thus, European and Japanese car drivers 
travel 30–50 percent fewer vehicle km than those in the United States (table 3.9; 
World Bank 2010a, 2010b).
Regulations can lead to more compact cities. In Curitiba, Brazil, land use and 
mobility planning were integrated, with the city’s radial (axial) layout designed 
to divert traffic from downtown. (Three-fourths of city residents use a highly 
efficient bus system.) The industrial center was built close to the city center to 
minimize commuting (World Bank 2010a). In Demark, Norway, and the United 
Figure 3.18 individual transport emissions and population Density
Source: World Bank 2010a.
Note: The figure does not correct for income because a regression of transport emissions on density and income reveals that density, not income, 
is a key factor. Data are for 1995.
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table 3.9 Average vehicle-km traveled, selected Urban Areas
Los Angelesa Londonb Tokyoc
Vehicle-km traveled (millions) 63,020 25,401 25,487
Population (millions) 9.85 7.62 6.45
Passenger cars registered (millions) 5.86 2.57 3.21
Passenger-km traveled per capita 6,399 3,334 3,954
Passenger-km traveled per vehicle 10,755 9,897 7,948
a. Los Angeles County.
b. Greater London.
c. Tokyo Prefecture.
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Kingdom to ensure that shopping can be done locally, large shopping centers 
cannot be built outside city centers (OECD 2002b).
Evidence indicates that people will go without cars if there are good transport 
connections to their homes. German data show that demand for cars decreases 
significantly with good access to shopping centers, cinemas, and theaters 
(Woldeamanuel and others 2009). In the United States, car ownership decreases 
with the distance to the nearest bus stop (Kim and Kim 2004). In Hamilton, 
Canada, the number of cars per household decreases as the number of bus stops 
within 500 meters of residences increases (Potoglou and Kanaroglou 2008). But 
if household members work more than 6 km from their dwelling, they are more 
likely to own one or more cars.
Intermodal Connections for Passengers. It is important to connect complemen-
tary mass transit systems because time spent in transit matters to people (Cervero, 
Golub, and Nee 2007; Holmgren 2007; Takeuchi, Cropper, and Bento 2007; Anas 
and Timilsina 2009a, 2009b). The lack of feeder transportation to the Bangkok 
Skytrain was a factor in its disappointing initial ridership (Mandri-Perrott 2010). 
The MRT Blue Line, on the other hand, had feeder buses and commercial facili-
ties around its stations. However, with the delay of other mass transit projects, 
such as the Red Line, the number of passengers remains stagnant (JBIC 2008).
Only 14 percent of Bangkok MRT Blue Line riders are former car users. The 
park-and-ride facilities at seven stations have been underused. Price incentives, 
such as discounts for park-and-ride and bus-train transfer passengers, could 
address this problem. However, a park-and-ride facility could also increase 
vehicle travel and emissions. For instance, driving distances increased in Osaka, 
Japan, when a park-and-ride system was built outside the city center, pushing 
down estimated net CO2 emissions reductions to only 1,400 kg/month (OECD 
2002a). A combination of policies should address the issue of intermodal 
 facilities for road users.
Nonmotorized Modes. Integrating walking and cycling with mass transit is 
essential to making a city compact. Such nonmotorized modes, along with low-
carbon two- or three-wheel motorized vehicles, have a clear advantage in 
 mitigating emissions, are an important alternative within cities, and are still domi-
nant in individual transportation in developing countries (table 3.10). In Dhaka, 
Jakarta, and Shanghai, nonmotorized modes account for more than 40 percent 
table 3.10 trip purpose by Bicycle
Percent
Trip purpose Accra Delhi Leon Lima
Commuting 31 72 44 46.2
Business/goods transport 4 10 — 4.5
School 8 14 Little 25.2
Shopping 24 2 High 10.5
Leisure 33 2 Little 6.8
Source: I-ce 2000.
Note: — = not available.
102 Integrating Sector-Wide Reforms for Mitigation
Turning the Right Corner • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9835-7
of total trips (figure 3.19). In Africa walking still predominates in urban areas; in 
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam half the trips are entirely on foot (I-ce 2000). The use 
of nonmotorized modes may decline with economic growth, but even in devel-
oped countries, they can still represent a significant share of travel if they are well 
integrated with other transport modes, as in the Netherlands and Denmark (IEA 
2000). In addition, new nonmotorized tools are being  developed. In China for 
instance, the electric bicycle (E-bike) is becoming more popular; the market has 
grown to 21 million in the past decade (World Bank 2009a).
Nonmotorized Modes and Pedestrian Safety
A particular challenge is ensuring the safety of pedestrians and bicyclists, who 
comprise the majority of road fatalities (table 3.11). Establishing and improving 
sidewalks and nonmotorized transport bridges can do so cost-effectively 
(table 3.12) (I-ce 2000).
Intermodal Freight Connections
Although rail freight can reduce emissions by two-thirds or more, the limited 
extent of railway networks constrain freight mobility. In Ghana, for example, 
demand for freight transit to neighboring countries, such as Burkina Faso, Niger, 
and Mali, jumped in 2002 because of political disorder in Côte d’Ivoire, but most 
freight was carried by truck because of the lack of  intermodal facilities, such as 
storage and handling equipment, at the north end of Ghana’s rail network in 
Kumasi (JBIC 2006). Thus a significant opportunity to take advantage of railways 
was missed. Combining more than one transport mode can increase rail attrac-
tiveness and improve freight energy efficiency. In Japan, for example, total energy 
expended for door-to-door 20-km freight transport was lowest when rail was 
Figure 3.19 modal share, selected cities in Asia
Sources: International Road Federation 1998; reproduced by I-ce 2000.
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combined with short-feeder road transport. Truck or rail alone would not be as 
energy-efficient (table 3.13; OECD 2002c).
Regional Integration of Transport Infrastructure
There can be both institutional and physical barriers to good transport connectiv-
ity between countries. Institutional barriers include excessive border tolls (legal or 
illegal) that induce travelers and freight to detour to roads that are longer but 
quicker to travel. For example, there are two corridors between Greece and Hungary: 
Corridor X is 405 km with 13 tolls; Corridor IV is 450 km but with only 7 tolls 
(table 3.14; map 3.1). Before the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia improved 
Corridor X, much freight was diverted to Corridor IV, which is 10 percent longer 
but does not require crossing non-EU borders and has fewer toll plazas.
table 3.11 road Users Killed, by transport mode, as a percentage of total Fatalities
City (year) Pedestrian Bicyclist Motor-cyclist Car driver Other
Delhi (1994) 42 14 27 12 5
Thailand (1987) 47 6 36 12 —
Kathmandu 43 9 13 36 —
Bandung (1990) 33 7 42 15 3
Source: I-ce 2000.
Note: — = not available.
table 3.12 costs and Benefits, selected nonmotorized modes
Test interventions
Total 
benefits
Benefit 
components Total cost Cost components
B/C 
ratio
Walk way 
improvement 
along corridor in 
Morogoro
14,400 USD 
(per year)
Saving travel 
time
18,000 USD 
4,200 USD 
(per year)
Repair culverts
Walkway construct
Build bridges
3.4
Raised zebra-crossing 
in Dar es Salaam 
and Morogoro
4,350 USD 
(per year)
Avoidance 
cost of 
accidents
4,500 USD per 
zebra-crossing 
1,000 USD 
(per year)
Raised zebra-
crossing
1.45
NMT bridge in Dar es 
Salaam
6,000 USD 
(per year)
Saving travel 
time
11,000 USD per 
bridge
1,500 USD 
(per year)
Bridge
Cost reduction 
because 
community 
participation
4
Source: SSATP 2005.
Note: B/C = benefit/cost.
table 3.13 energy consumption, Door-to-Door transportation
kilocalorie/km
Transport mode 100 km 200 km 500 km
Truck only 444 417 396
Intermodal: rail short feeder 398 363 305
Rail only 557 436 363
Source: OECD 2002c.
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Physical barriers include few or no border-crossing corridors, necessitating 
detours. For instance, in South East Europe, Corridor VIII could facilitate East-
West traffic (Corridor VIII Secretariat 2007) except that rail sections are missing 
(map 3.2). Sometimes institutional barriers are the problem. In South Africa and 
Mozambique, for example, the Maputo Development Corridor  created after 
table 3.14 corridors between thessaloniki, Greece, and nish, serbia, compared
  Length (km) Number of tolls Number of border crossings
Corridor X 405 13 2
Corridor IV 440 7 2
Sources: World Bank (2009a); Country Economic Memorandum for FYR Macedonia.
map 3.1 corridor iv (thessaloniki–sofia–hungary) and corridor X 
(thessaloniki–skopje–Belgrade–hungary)
Source: World Bank 2007.
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1995 extends from South Africa’s northern landlocked provinces to Maputo’s 
deepwater port, but border-crossing costs and delays divert freight to Durban 
through a corridor 25 percent longer (World Bank 2009b).15
Demand-side transport policies for mitigation
Pricing Incentives
In addition to technology and infrastructure, pricing is not only critical to 
 reducing emissions, it is more effective than regulations.
The price of car use relative to alternative mass transit is central. Price can be 
adjusted in various ways, for example through the cost of fuel and other aspects 
of car use and through mass transit fares. In developing countries the price of 
driving seems low compared with developed countries (table 3.15). Among 
selected major cities, Tokyo’s cost of driving is highest relative to mass transit use 
because of low rapid transit fares and high gas prices. New York also has high 
mass transit use because the cost of parking is high. By contrast, in three selected 
cities in developing countries, the the cost of driving is only 1.21–4.15 times 
higher than mass transit, and is much lower than in developed countries. In those 
cities parking rates are too generous and mass transit fares set relatively high to 
cover investment costs quickly.
Changing the relative price depends on institutional feasibility, consumer 
response, and political acceptability. There are a wide range of policy options, 
each with advantages and disadvantages (table 3.16).16 Fuel pricing is the best 
map 3.2 rail sections, Durres-skopje-sofia, along corridor viii
Source: World Bank reproduction based on Corridor VIII Secretariat (2007, figure 11, p. 46).
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option for reducing emissions. However, while less effective at reducing 
 emissions, other policies have other desirable outcomes. For instance, road use 
charges raise the marginal cost of car travel, thus reducing congestion by 
 discouraging people from driving.
Fuel Pricing: Best Policy Option
Fuel pricing is unique in its ability to both discourage people from using cars and 
increase fuel economy. First, higher fuel prices normally correlate with low car 
use over the long run (figure 3.20; OECD/IEA 2004). Second, high prices should 
table 3.15 relative costs of Driving and mass transit in selected cities
City Rapid transit Bus Parking
Gasoline 
(US$/liter)
Range of relative costs of 
driving to public transita
Washington, DC $1.75–$4.70 $1.45 $5–$10/hour, 
$15–$20/day
0.56 5.37–8.77 
New York $2.25 $2.25 $10/hour; $25–$30/day 0.56 6.75
London £4.00–£10.80 £2.00 £4–£5/hour; 
£25–£30/day
1.44 2.46–5.24
Tokyo ¥160–¥300 ¥200 ¥600/hour; ¥2,000–
¥2,500/day
1.42 5.19–7.20
Bangkok 16 Baht–41 Baht 7 Baht–8 Baht 40 Baht/hour 0.87 1.21–2.48
Manilab Php12–Php15 Php9 up to first 
5 km + Php1.85 
per additional km
Php100/day 0.91 3.87–4.25
New Delhi Rs. 8–Rs. 29 Rs. 2–Rs. 10 Rs. 20 up to 10 hours; 
Rs. 40 for 10 hours 
or more
1.09 1.91–4.13
Sources: Based on data from Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority; Metropolitan Transportation Authority; Transport for London; Tokyo 
Metro; Toei Bus; Bangkok Metro Public Company, Ltd.; Bangkok Mass Transit Authority; Light Rail Transit Authority; Land Transportation Franchising 
and Regulatory Board; Delhi Metro Rail Corporation, Ltd.; Delhi Transport Corporation; and GTZ International Fuel Prices (2009).
a. Public transit assumes a combination of rapid transit and bus. Driving cost is the sum of a daily parking rate and gasoline costs for 10 km of 
driving (or 0.7 liters of petrol).
b. For calculating the relative price, a bus ride of 10 km is assumed.
table 3.16 effectiveness of major price policies in reducing transport emissions
Policy Reducing vehicle miles traveled Increasing fuel economy
Best policy option
Fuel pricing Effective Effective
Alternative policies
If charging on mileage traveled
 Toll road pricing
Effective Not effective
If charging on individual car use
 Cordon pricing
 Parking prices
Partly effective Not effective
If charging on car ownership
 Registration/inspection fees
Not effective Partly effective
If subsidizing new car ownership
 Cash for clunkers program
Not effective Effective
If subsidizing alternatives
 Lower mass transit fares 
Effective Not effective 
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Figure 3.20 passenger car travel, Fuel economy, and Average Fuel prices, 1998
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induce people to buy more fuel-efficient vehicles, thus reducing vehicle-fuel 
intensity (figure 3.21).
Fuel taxes vary significantly by country (Delucchi 2007; Chamon, Mauro and 
Okawa 2008; figure 3.22). The 20 developing countries that most subsidize 
energy spent some $310 billion on subsidies in 2007 (World Bank 2010a). From 
an environmental standpoint, these subsidies should be replaced with a fuel tax, 
but that is politically difficult (OECD 2000; Clerides and Zachariadis 2008) 
because it could affect the economy negatively. Certainly, low fuel prices help 
domestic businesses and citizens in the short run, but they also are financially 
unsustainable, reduce competitiveness, and harm long-term growth.
How much and how quickly consumers respond to fuel price changes 
depends on the price elasticity of demand. Estimates of price elasticity vary 
Figure 3.21 passenger car Use and Average Fuel prices, 1998
Source: OECD/IEA 2004.
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Figure 3.22 Fuel taxation by country (percentage of retail Gasoline price)
Source: Chamon and others 2008.
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widely and depend on the functional form used, the estimation technique, the 
period of estimation, and the country. The literature indicates that the price 
 elasticity of automobile fuel demand would range from –0.03 to –0.4 in the short 
run and –0.6 to –1.1 in the long run (Chamon and others 2008; Hughes and 
others 2008; World Bank 2010). Highly volatile prices affect fuel consumption, 
as they did during the oil crises in the late 1980s (figure 3.23). Although price 
elasticity was surprisingly low in the United States in the early 2000s (Hughes 
and others 2008), it has increased since 2005 (Park and Zhao 2010). Expecting 
fuel prices to remain high, consumers have begun to change their behavior.
Low price elasticity may result from a strong “rebound effect,” in which as fuel 
economy improves and the cost of driving declines, people drive more. This can 
partly offset fuel reductions associated with higher prices. One study estimated 
the short-run rebound effects at 4.5 percent and the long-run effects at 
22.2  percent (Small and van Dender 2007); another reported even larger 
rebound effects of 58 percent (Frondel and others 2008).
Behavioral inertia also helps keep price elasticity low; it takes time to change 
people’s preferences and perceptions. Price elasticity has been particularly low 
in the United States, where fuel prices historically have been low (Hughes and 
 others 2008). There about half the passenger cars are sport-utility vehicles 
(SUVs), pick-up trucks, or four-wheel-drives, whereas in Europe nearly 
90  percent of passenger cars are four- or two-door sedans (OECD 2002a). 
Figure 3.23 Fuel taxation (percentage of retail Gasoline price), 1970–2009
Source: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/timeline/oil_chronology.cfm.
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In the United Kingdom and Germany, where fuel prices historically have been 
two to three times higher than the United States, price elasticities are also about 
twice as high (Frondel and others 2008; Bonilla and Foxon 2009; Frondel and 
Vance 2010). European economies also offer more transport options, meaning 
fuel prices can be more elastic because people can more easily switch to other 
means of travel. One popular option is to subsidize cleaner and renewable 
energy sources. In many countries, diesel fuel is consistently cheaper than gaso-
line (GTZ 2009). This encourages the use of diesel-powered vehicles, which 
with appropriate filters are less polluting. Biofuels need to be 20–30 percent 
cheaper than gasoline because their energy content is lower than that of gasoline 
(Kojima and Johnson 2005), but subsidizing biofuels simply adds to their devel-
opment cost.
Road User Pricing
Road user pricing is the second-best solution. Toll roads and cordon pricing are 
typical examples. Road pricing is less effective than fuel pricing because road 
charges do not affect consumer choice of vehicle unless charges are based on 
vehicle emission class. Road pricing is, however, more effective than other 
 vehicle-based charges because it closely—though not perfectly—relates to fuel 
consumption and thus emissions. This is distinct from car ownership charges, 
which are not linked to driving distances or the amount of fuel used.
Tolls, which are charged according to miles traveled, are more effective than 
cordon pricing, which charges for entry into an area and lacks the link between 
pricing and emissions. But cordon pricing can reduce congestion.
Although road pricing generates extra revenue, it is still not in wide use, 
although at least 46 countries do operate toll facilities. In the United States 
there are 277 toll roads, bridges, and tunnels. They total about 5,000 miles, but 
that is only 2 percent of total roads and 5 percent of federal-aid highways. Toll 
revenue accounts for less than 10 percent of total highway funding, though in 
some countries, such as Indonesia, Mexico, and Argentina, highways are nearly 
100 percent tolled (NSTIFC 2009). In general, however, there are still plenty of 
opportunities globally to charge road users, especially those driving on highways 
and at peak times.
Historically, road pricing—both tolls and cordon pricing—has been highly 
effective in urban areas in reducing not only congestion but also emissions. Road 
user charges discourage people from driving on toll roads or through toll zones. 
When the Republic of Korea introduced congestion charges at the southern edge 
of Seoul, traffic declined by 11 percent within two years, and speed increased by 
50 percent (OECD 2002a). In 1975 Singapore introduced the Area Licensing 
Scheme, the first comprehensive road pricing scheme anywhere. People had to 
pay an area license fee of $3 or $1.25 a day to enter the central business district 
during peak hours. The results: the number of vehicles entering the restricted 
zone declined by 73 percent, and average speed in that zone increased 
10–20  percent (World Bank 1978). The decreased traffic and congestion clearly 
mitigated emissions.
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Road pricing can target polluting vehicles specifically by differentiating tolls 
according to vehicle type. For cordon pricing, Milan, Italy, introduced Ecopass, 
which in 2008 began charging heavily polluting vehicles to reduce congestion 
and emissions. It was expected to reduce incoming traffic by 10 percent (Prasad 
and others 2009; Rotaris and others 2010). In 2008 London introduced the Low 
Emission Zone to deter old, polluting vehicles from driving in the area. Trucks 
over 12 tons were targeted first, with other vehicles to be restricted over time 
(Prasad and others 2009).
One disadvantage of road pricing is that it may divert traffic to toll-free or 
unrestricted roads. Narrowly targeted road pricing or poorly coordinated trans-
port policies can be a problem. In Singapore the number of vehicles entering the 
restricted zone did decline, but the ring road outside the city became more con-
gested (World Bank 1978). London’s cordon pricing—among other reasons—has 
increased passenger car congestion, though the speed of public transport has 
increased (NSTIFC 2009). In Bangkok poor coordination has increased emissions 
and pollutants in the expressway network development project. An 11.5-km, 
six-lane metropolitan highway from Ramindra to Rama IX IC commissioned in 
1996 is carrying less than half the forecast 108,000 vehicles a day. In this case, 
the government built another six-lane public side road in conjunction with the 
expressway that was toll-free. More and more people chose the toll-free road, 
thus limiting the positive effects of road pricing. Emissions and pollutants did not 
decline significantly (JBIC 2003).
Advanced technologies, such as electronic toll collection systems and the 
global positioning system, can make road pricing more effective.17 Singapore 
replaced the initial Area Licensing Scheme with a more advanced mechanism, 
Electric Road Pricing Scheme, which is an automatic toll collection system. The 
price to enter the central business district is optimized by a time-of-use system 
that varies price according to the time of day, thus better managing traffic flow 
and speed (OECD 2002b). Using a satellite global positioning system, Germany 
charges trucks heavier than 12 tons in certain mileage and vehicle emission 
classes. Initial evidence indicates that direct user charges increase efficiency in the 
heavy vehicle industry (NSTIFC 2009). Developing countries could adopt these 
advanced technologies if they become cheaper and more prevalent.
Parking Policies and Effective Urban Land Use
Initiating or raising parking rates in urban areas is another way to raise the cost 
of car use, although it has no bearing on the distance people drive. The experi-
ence of Perth, Australia, is interesting: in 1998 it replaced traditional license fees 
for residential car ownership with charges on all nonresidential parking in the 
Perth Parking Management Area. It used the revenues to provide free public 
transport in the city center (OECD 2002b).
Parking policies also help promote effective urban land use. Most urban streets 
have one or two parking lanes that typically take up 20–30 percent of their width. 
In developed countries roads account for about 20 percent of total  urbanized 
areas. Parking policies are not always enforceable, however, thus aggravating city 
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traffic congestion. Thus, a significant portion of urban areas is devoted to on-
street parking, with serious implications for urban planning (Litman 2005).
Parking charges help reduce car use. In Singapore’s city center, monthly 
 parking fees were increased by 30–50 percent, which, along with other measures, 
significantly reduced traffic (World Bank 1978). In Copenhagen in 1990 and 
1991 new parking fees were introduced in most of the city’s public parking areas. 
The number of cars parked dropped 25 percent, and traffic to and from the area 
declined 10 percent. The 1997 Lloyd District program in Portland, Oregon, that 
introduced on-street parking charges reduced drive-alone commuter traffic by 
7 percent (OECD 2002b).
Parking availability also affects household decisions about car ownership and 
use. Parking costs are the most important determinant of car use in the Seoul 
metropolitan area (Sohn and Yun 2009). Households are less likely to own cars 
if they have difficulty parking them (Woldeamanuel and others 2009). By 
 contrast, if parking spaces are provided at work, car use and demand for fuel 
increase (Cervero, Golub, and Nee 2007; Frondel and Vance 2010).
Successful parking policies need the participation of both the public and the 
private sector. In Singapore private operators were required to set the same fees 
as public parking areas (World Bank 1978). Parking cash-out is another option: 
in the United States this allows employees to exchange their parking space for 
its cash equivalent and use alternative transportation (OECD 2002b).
Charges on Individual Car Ownership and Car-Maker Competitiveness
Another option is charging taxes and fees, such as annual and one-off charges on 
car purchase, registration, and inspection. However, that may not be enough to 
reduce car use and emissions. Moreover, without other policy measures, these 
charges may motivate car owners to travel more in the belief that expensive 
ownership costs have already been sunk—especially when fuel demand is 
 inelastic. Higher sales taxes and new registration fees may also discourage people 
from replacing old cars with new fuel-efficient cars (OECD 2000).
Emission-based charges and car scrapping programs could lead to more low-
carbon vehicles and make the industry more competitive. If they do not adopt 
low-carbon technologies, car companies will eventually lose market share. In 
2009 about 600,000 hybrid cars were sold globally, most of them the Toyota 
Prius. More and more manufacturers have begun to produce hybrid and electric 
vehicles. Major vehicle industries are concentrated in developed countries and 
some emerging economies, such as Brazil, China, India, and South Africa. Since 
it is important that developing countries introduce low-carbon technologies 
quickly, multinationals should promote international technology transfers.
Emission-Based Vehicle Taxation
In 2001 the United Kingdom introduced an excise duty for new cars based on 
CO2 emissions. Cars are assigned to one of four categories, and the category 
determines the duty (OECD 2002a). Many countries already tax heavy vehicles 
and trucks more than light. In the United States a 12 percent federal sales tax on 
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trucks and trailers weighing more than 33,000 lbs generates more than 
$2.5  billion annual revenue (NSTIFC 2009).
Car Scrapping Programs
Subsidies for fuel-efficient vehicles, including a sales tax exemption, are another 
powerful tool (Potoglou and Kanaroglou 2007). As in other developed countries, 
such as France and Norway, the United States recently implemented the Car 
Allowance Rebate System (CARS) or “cash for clunkers” program, which paid up 
to $4,500 for each energy-inefficient car (18 or fewer mpg) that was replaced 
with a more efficient one. The price incentives worked; the number of consumers 
applying for the program was much higher than expected. In all, $3 billion was 
allocated for trade-ins of 690,000 vehicles. In France the 1994 vehicle retirement 
program offered a 5,000-franc subsidy, which shortened the average duration of 
car holding by 3.3 years (Yamamoto and others 2004). In Spain two cash-for-
clunker programs in 1994 and 1995 promoted diesel engines. The replacement 
of any vehicle more than 7 or 10 years old earned a600; in the 1990s the market 
share of diesel-powered cars gradually increased from 13 to 50 percent (Miravete 
and Moral 2009).
Car-scrapping programs, however, are limited by their high cost. In recent U.S. 
experience, only 30 percent of total passenger cars were traded in, at a cost of 
$3 billion. Car scrapping thus cannot be the only solution for fleet turnover.
Alternative Mass Transit Pricing
Lowering mass transit prices increases the relative price of car use and thus 
induces more people to use public transportation. The price elasticity of public 
transport demand is generally about –0.3 but can vary considerably from 
almost zero to more than one (Holmgren 2007). The price elasticity of bus 
rapid transit demand is estimated at –0.26 based on data from 44 bus systems 
around the world (Hensher and Golob 2008). In Spain price elasticity is –0.61 
for train and –0.49 for bus (Martin and Nombela 2007). In Bangkok it is much 
higher, –2.2 to –2.5, because buses are more popular, with 40 percent of house-
holds using buses only (Dissanayake and Morikawa 2010). In Beijing price 
elasticity is low, –0.01 to –0.12, and depends on income; in other words, the 
lower the income share of transport expenditure, the lower the price elasticity. 
The rich continue to use their cars regardless of public transit fare changes 
(Anas and Timilsina 2009a).
The relative prices of public transit systems also affect consumer choice. In 
Mumbai reducing bus fares had more impact on modal shift than reducing rail 
prices. The cost of traveling by rail is much cheaper than bus. While the one-way 
rail cost of commuting 20 km is Rs. 90 per month, less than Rs. 4 per day, the bus 
fare for 20 km is about Rs. 20 per day. Price elasticities are thus estimated at –0.35 
to –0.45 for bus and –0.07 to –0.08 for rail (Takeuchi and others 2007). In con-
trast, in São Paulo rapid transit and trains were found to be better able to attract 
passengers by lowering prices18; buses were price-inelastic because the majority of 
households had little alternative but to use public buses and trolleys at the time 
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Box 3.5 information and consumer vehicle choice
Reasons for vehicle choice are complex because they are affected by economic, social, cultural, 
and psychological factors. Car safety and fuel economy are important determinants (Dreyfus 
and Viscusi 1995), but people tend to discount future fuel prices and buy cars based on size, 
speed, and appearance rather than fuel economy (World Bank 2010a). It has been found that 
car ownership and use are closely related to “symbolic” and “convenience” motives (Sohn and 
Yun 2009) and may be affected by neighbors’ behavior. Thus, the more people use new vehicle 
technologies, the more others will follow (Mau and others 2008; Axsen and others 2009).
In addition to financial incentives, people need information Coad and others (2009). 
People are not always familiar with low-carbon vehicle options (figure B3.5.1; Anable and 
others 2006, prepared for the U.K. Department for Transport). To raise public awareness, 
Singapore launched the Climate Change Awareness Program in 2006, showing the public 
simple ways to save energy and money and reduce emissions. The Philippines has 
implemented similar programs (Prasad and others 2009). Eco-labeling can significantly affect 
consumer vehicle choice, although psychological factors and prior choices are also important. 
In 2005 the United Kingdom introduced a new green car label in connection with the Vehicle 
Excise Duty rating (Anable and others 2006). The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency also 
provides two emission ratings: the Air Pollution Score and the Greenhouse Gas Score (Teisl 
and others 2008).
Nonmonetary incentives can help. For instance, people in California—the largest hybrid 
car market in the United States—buy hybrid cars so that they can use high-occupancy vehicle 
(HOV) lanes when driving alone (Sangkapichai and Saphores 2009). Californians are twice as 
likely to purchase a hybrid car as are New Yorkers (table B3.5.1). While incentives clearly work, 
however, traffic conditions, local socioeconomic conditions, and consumer behavior can affect 
them. In Hamilton, Canada, the effect of HOV lanes is insignificant because such lanes are not 
common in that country (Potoglou and Kanaroglou 2007).
Figure B3.5.1 the United Kingdom respondents Familiar with new vehicle technologies
Source: United Kingdom Department of Transport 2006.
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of the survey in 1987 (Swait and Eskeland 1995). A later study in São Paulo found 
that public transit fares had more influence on people’s modal choice: a 1 percent 
reduction in public transit fares could reduce car use by 4–32 percent (Anas and 
Timilsina 2009b). In that case, the rich seemed more responsive because cars were 
not an option for the poor regardless of public transit fares.
An integrated transit and parking system may be especially effective. Bremen, 
Germany, achieved high public transit use by ensuring that transit prices were 
never greater than car use plus parking charges. Half of all trips into the city 
center are on mass transit and one-quarter on bikes (OECD 2002b). In develop-
ing countries mass transit is more expensive than in developed countries.
In addition to pricing, service is important. If passenger comfort level is low, 
the effect of pricing is limited. People prefer air-conditioned rapid transit over a 
crowded bus without air conditioning. Travel time is also part of service quality. 
In Gran Canaria, Spain, demand for buses is more sensitive for those who found 
the experience less comfortable (Espino 2007). People who are not satisfied with 
service are more likely to be price-sensitive; if prices go up, they shift to alterna-
tive modes.19 In the United States public transport demand is highly elastic to 
service quality—about 1.05 (Holmgren 2007). The German Mobility Panel data 
indicate that household car ownership would decrease significantly if there were 
access to good quality urban rail (Woldeamanuel and others 2009).
Importance of Regulations for Emissions Mitigation
Price incentives, though important, cannot predict emission reduction. People 
may not choose to purchase fuel-efficient vehicles or use alternative mass transit, 
regardless of supply and pricing. Fuel taxes and road pricing can be difficult to 
implement because of political sensitivities (OECD 2000; Clerides and 
Zachariadis 2008). In such cases, direct quantitative intervention may make 
more sense, although among other drawbacks it can be more expensive. 
Regulations should be considered complementary to pricing incentives.
There are at least four regulatory approaches to capping car emissions 
(table 3.17): (1) setting fuel economy standards at the production level; 
Box 3.5 information and consumer vehicle choice (continued)
table B3.5.1 hybrid markets in the United states
Top five U.S. hybrid 
markets
(a) New hybrids 
purchased 
(December 2009)
(b) 2008 Population 
(millions)
(a)/(b) 
(percent)
2008 median household 
income (US$)
California 55,553 37.0 0.150 61,021
New York 15,348 19.5 0.079 56,033
Florida 14,949 18.5 0.081 47,778
Texas 14,632 24.8 0.059 50,043
New Jersey 11,367 8.7 0.131 70,378
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; hybridCARS.
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a  corollary to this would be periodic emissions inspections, which would be espe-
cially important in developing countries; (2) restricting the number of cars on the 
road; while rare, this is obviously a very strong measure; (3) imposing road-use 
conditions to reduce traffic volume—high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes are 
an example; (4) change driving behavior.
Choice of Regulatory Interventions
Fuel Economy Standards for New Vehicles. The U.S. CAFE standards introduced 
in 1975 aim to reduce new vehicle fuel consumption. Over the past 30 years, fuel 
economy has improved from 20 mpg to 32 for passenger cars (figure 3.24). If 
they fail to achieve the standards, manufacturers pay a considerable penalty 
($50 per car for each mpg below the standard; OECD 2002a). In 1995 Japan 
introduced standards to reduce new car fuel consumption by 19 percent, which 
it had achieved by 2004; its new reduction goal is 23.5 percent (METI 2006; 
Clerides and Zachariadis 2008). In Europe there is no regulation of fuel 
 consumption, but in 1998 and 1999 car manufacturers agreed on a voluntary 
table 3.17 major Quantitative regulations for emissions mitigation
Vehicle energy intensity Number of vehicles Driving behavior
Fuel economy standards/used car 
import policy/inspection and 
maintenance programs
Effective
Private car ownership restriction Effective 
Conditioning on road use Partly effective
Road traffic rules and regulations Effective 
Figure 3.24 U.s. Fuel economy standards and Actual performance
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emission target of 140 grams of CO2 per km for new cars, compared with a 1995 
average of 187 grams. This was intended to be extended to 120 by 2012 
(Zachariadis 2006).20
Trade and Inspection Policies for Imported Used Cars
For most developing countries, trade policies and inspection of imported used 
cars are more important than regulating the fuel economy of new vehicles. The 
global used car market is huge, estimated at more than 5.5 million (OECD/IEA 
2009). Japan alone exported 380,000 used cars around the world, though the 
United States exported only 120,000 (Pelletiere and Reinert 2006). In addition, 
the global used-car component industry is significant, estimated at about $60 
billion. Some countries prohibit used cars for safety and environmental reasons. 
Others allow only old cars to avoid competition with domestic new car dealers 
(table 3.18). But imported used cars may be cleaner than a developing country’s 
fleet of older vehicles (OECD 2004; Timilsina and Dulal 2009). Because the 
average lifetimes of new vehicles may be short in some countries, such as Japan, 
trade liberalization could introduce more fuel-efficient vehicles into other 
domestic markets.
Border vehicle inspection is critical. In general, older cars emit more CO2 and 
other pollutants. In California 10-year-old vehicles emit about twice as many 
pollutants as the newest cars (figure 3.25). Until recently, Mexico imported more 
table 3.18 prohibitions on imported Used cars and tires
Motor vehicles Tires
Argentina X
Bolivia X
Brazil X
Brunei X
Canada X
Chile X
Dominican Republic X
Ecuador X X
Egypt, Arab Rep. X
Ghana X
India X
Maldives X
Mozambique X
Nicaragua X
Nigeria X
Peru X X
Salvador X
Thailand X
Venezuela, RB X X
Source: OECD 2004.
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than a million used cars annually, many of them 10–15 years old. In 2006 about 
20 percent of these cars exceeded the 2 percent CO2 threshold. Reinforcing 
border vehicle inspections could reduce 11.2 Mt of CO2 equivalent every year 
(Johnson and others 2010).
Inspection and Maintenance Programs
Most developing countries have yet to introduce fuel economy standards, 
although many have emission standards (Timilsina and Dulal 2009). China, for 
instance, adopted European emission standards in 1999 that required all new 
light-duty vehicles to meet Euro I standards by 2000 and Euro II standards by 
2004 (Zhao 2006).
It is debatable whether inspection and maintenance programs are effective in 
controlling emissions. They entail high compliance costs for car owners, including 
time spent on the inspection and for repairs (Merrell and  others 1999), but a 
well-designed inspection and monitoring program can be  effective (Yamamoto 
and others 2004; Ribeiro and Abreu 2008). Enhanced  inspection and 
Figure 3.25 total vehicle emissions by Base Year
Source: Parry and others 2007.
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide, HC = hydrocarbons, PM = particular matter, NOx = nitrogen oxide.
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maintenance in Southern California is expected to reduce  light-duty vehicle 
emissions by 14–28 percent (Eisinger 2005). Despite some disadvantages (see 
below), consumers should be motivated to switch to fuel-efficient cars, and 
 overall vehicle energy inefficiency should eventually improve.21
Restrictions on Private Car Ownership
This is a direct measure to control the number of vehicles on the road. In 1990 
Singapore introduced a vehicle registration quota; each year the government 
fixes the maximum number of vehicles to be newly registered. The right to 
 register is put out to tender among people who want to buy a new car. The initial 
quota system divided vehicles into seven categories (table 3.19). In 1999 catego-
ries one and two were merged, as were three and four. Each category has a 
 premium value determined by a sealed-bid, uniform-price auction (see Tan 2001 
for further detail). The system is thus a strong quantitative intervention with a 
quasi-market mechanism. Supply and demand determine the premium. Before 
the 1999 recategorization, premiums tended to be larger for luxury than for 
smaller cars, consistent with reducing emissions. However, after recategorization, 
the premiums of the two new categories, renamed A and B (figure 3.26), con-
verged. Nonetheless, the quota system has successfully controlled the growth of 
cars on the road.
Conditioning on Road Use
Automobile-restricted zones are a strong quantitative regulation, but public 
transport and bicycle paths must also be available. Aalborg, a city of 120,000 in 
northern Denmark, closed roads in the city center, introduced energy-efficient 
buses, and extended pedestrian areas and bicycle paths. Car traffic was reduced 
by an estimated 750,000 km annually (OECD 2002b).
Highway HOV lanes reserved for public buses, carpools, and vehicles with 
two or more occupants are common in North America and some European 
countries. On the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, four HOV lanes carry two-
thirds of travelers, with 18 mixed-flow lanes carrying the other third.22 About 
60 percent of respondents to a carpool survey cited the availability of HOV lanes 
as important to their decision to carpool (OECD 2002b). HOV lanes also have 
revenue potential. In recent years, excess capacity on HOV lanes has been 
sold to solo drivers who want to use the express lanes  (high-occupancy 
table 3.19 vehicle classification of singapore’s Quota system
Category 1: Small cars with engine capacity of 1,000 c.c. and below;
Category 2: Medium-sized cars with engine capacity of 1,001 to 1,600 
ex., and taxis;
Category 3: Large cars with engine capacity of 1,601 to 2,000 c.c;
Category 4: Luxury cars with engine capacity of 2,001 c.c. and above;
Category 5: Goods vehicles and buses;
Category 6: Motorcycles and scooters; and
Category 7: "Open."
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toll—HOT—lanes), as in the vehicle registration quota  system. A pilot project in 
San Diego, California, found that people were  willing to pay a fee of $0.50–
$8 per trip, possibly generating more than a  million  dollars a year. Several states 
have converted HOV lanes to HOT lanes (NSTIFC 2009).
Enforcement of Traffic Regulations
Regulations should be adopted and enforced that address certain driving activi-
ties, such as overloading, that increase emissions. In India the primary long- 
distance goods carrier is a two-axle, nine-ton truck, which is often overloaded 
with 14–20 tons, especially on outward-bound trips (World Bank/ESMAP 2002). 
Overloaded trucks not only emit more CO2 they also wear down road surfaces. 
In 2005 Albania eliminated a user charge for three-axle trucks because multi-
axle trucks damage pavements less than overloaded two-axle trucks do 
(World Bank 2006).
Emissions increase with traffic speeds (figure 3.27). In the United States, for 
every one mile-per-hour reduction, a heavy truck traveling at 60–65 miles per 
hour can improve fuel efficiency by 0.8 percent (OECD/IEA 2009). A study in 
Japan found that if environmental externalities are taken into account, current 
speed limits on national highways in rural areas are 10 km/hr higher than the 
socially optimal limit (Thanesuen and others 2006).
Speed limits are also conducive to safety. Traffic accidents are usually associ-
ated with speed limits (Houston and others 1995; Scuffham 2003; also see 
Figure 3.26 singapore: Quota premiums for passenger cars
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the next section for further details). The elasticity of total fatal accidents may 
exceed unity: a 1 percent increase in the speed limit increases fatal accidents by 
more than 1 percent (see the next section). Enforcing speed limits not only 
reduces emissions, it also saves lives.
Drawbacks of Hard Regulation
Regulatory measures can increase the certainty of emissions reduction because 
they impose emission ceilings regardless of consumer preferences. However, 
past approaches have faced four difficulties: mistargeting, misquantification, 
enforceability, and costs of implementation.
Mistargeting
Good regulations have to be targeted correctly, leaving no room for them to be 
bypassed. This is not always easy. An example is the U.S. dual CAFE standards, 
which have a fairly modest fuel standard for “light trucks.” The problem is that 
household cars, such as SUVs and minivans, also fall into this category. Although 
the standards were slightly tightened in 2004 and in 2006 (Transportation 
Research Board 2010), manufacturers’ efforts to improve fuel economy are 
diluted by consumer preference for large vehicles with greater acceleration and 
towing capacity (National Academies 2002)—half the U.S. passenger cars now 
fall in this category. In the next two decades, however, energy efficiency is 
expected to improve by 50 percent (NSTIFC 2009).
Figure 3.27 Fuel consumption and co2 emissions per vehicle-km
Source: Anas and Timilsina 2009a.
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide.
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Targeting also fails when traffic bypasses a regulated area. After Switzerland 
imposed a stringent limit of 28 tons on all trucks traveling through the country 
and required that heavy freight be carried by rail rather than road, much of the 
international road freight traffic simply went through neighboring countries 
instead (OECD 2002a). There is always the risk that regulations will be 
bypassed.
Misquantification
How stringent should a regulation be? The U.S. CAFE standard for light trucks 
may be too loose, but regulations that are too stringent can cause other business 
and efficiency problems. The U.S. CAFE experience, for example, raises the issue 
of safety. The uniform down-weighting of the fleet, including both heavy SUVs 
and smaller light trucks, means these vehicles are not required to have as much 
occupant protection as heavier vehicles. Aggressive downsizing in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s may have contributed to more traffic fatalities in the early 1990s 
(National Academies 2002).23 Mandating a nationwide uniform speed can result 
in higher than optimal speeds in some areas and lower than optimal in others 
(Lave and Elias 1997; Thanesuen and others 2006). In the United States, 
 underused HOV lanes can be seen as pushing solo-occupancy vehicles into 
mixed-flow lanes.
Enforceability
Having a regulation does not ensure that it will be enforced. Not all drivers 
obey speed limits and other traffic rules. Enforcement is particularly difficult 
when governance is poor and regulatory capacity minimal, as in developing 
countries. In Bogota, although operators are required to scrap old buses that 
were operating in TransMilenio corridors, some continue to use them on routes 
not served by TransMilenio (Echeverry and others 2005). Thus, allocating road 
space to dedicated bus lanes can aggravate congestion and air pollution in 
other corridors if too few car drivers are induced to switch to mass transit 
(World Bank 2010b).
Enforcing inspection and maintenance requirements can also be a problem. 
Emissions inspection for imported used cars in Mexico has been imperfect 
(Johnson and others 2010), and the Californian Smog Check program failed to 
lower emissions in the 1980s: about a third of cars tested roadside had excessive 
emissions, whether they drove within or outside the program region. It was 
thought that inspection stations may have been unreliable or corrupt (Glazer 
and others 1995). In Nepal 31–81 percent of gas-fueled vehicles failed the road-
side emissions test, and diesel cars failed at an even higher rate, 64–90 percent. 
Why? Because many drivers pass the formal emissions inspection by making 
temporary engine adjustments, reverting afterward to pre-inspection conditions 
(Faiz and others 2006; Timilsina and Dulal 2009). In India, where all vehicles 
must have a valid certificate of pollution-under-control, compliance has never 
exceeded 23 percent (Pandey 2006). Traffic violations are another common 
problem: In Albania it was estimated that about 40 percent of trucks were 
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overloaded before the heavy-user charges for multi-axle trucks were eliminated 
(World Bank 2006).
Of particular note, many environmental regulations related to land use, transit 
operations, nonmotorized facilities, and parking are local or regional. Thus, if 
government at these levels is not effective, regulation does not work well, par-
ticularly in developing countries.
Costs of Implementation
The regulatory approach can be more costly than other options, such as price 
incentives. For instance, the cost of imposing 10 percent lower CAFE standards 
is estimated at $3.6 billion, $228 per vehicle, raising prices for consumers and 
decreasing profits for producers (Austin and Dinan 2005). Inspection programs 
can also be costly. While fuel taxes are automatically collected at the gas pump, 
inspections also cost people time. The U.S. inspection program is estimated to 
cost $1,032 million a year, consisting of $479 million in drivers’ time and travel 
costs and $553 million in inspection costs (proxied by total inspection fees; 
Merrell and others 1999).
Enforcing traffic rules can also be costly. There is an argument that strict speed 
regulation uses up too much highway patrol resources and could compromise 
other aspects of traffic safety. In fact, a study shows that fatality rates dropped by 
3.4–5.1 percent when the U.S. government allowed states to increase speed lim-
its from 55 mph to 65 in 1987. This has been interpreted to mean that the 
nationwide 55 mph speed limit was too costly to implement and overused fiscal 
resources (Lave and Elias 1997). The costs cannot be ignored when regulations 
are being enacted.
Box 3.6 policy options compared
There is a wide range of policy options available, and the implementation cost of each varies, as 
does its enforceability. Also, any policy may change consumer behavior. This comparison is thus 
based on a complex set of factors.
In comparing fuel taxes with fuel economy standards, one study estimates that a 3-mpg 
improvement in U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards would impose wel-
fare losses of about $4 billion to save 5.2 billion gallons of gas annually (Kleit 2004). The 
implied carbon price for this is an estimated $317 per tCO2–far above the current market 
price, which means that the policy is too costly.a An 11 percent increase in fuel taxes, which 
would cost much less, could both achieve the same emissions reduction and increase reve-
nues (which could be used for mass transit and the like). The implied carbon price is more 
consistent with the market price. Another study similarly suggests that strengthening the 
CAFE standards would be too costly (Austin and Dinan 2005).
Comprehensive road user pricing, such as cordon pricing, also seems too expensive if only 
direct investment costs are considered. However, cordon pricing brought in $237 million in 
box continues next page
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Box 3.6 policy options compared (continued)
table B3.6.1 Fuel taxes and Fuel economy standards: cost and emissions Benefits 
Source Policy
Welfare losses or direct 
costs Savingsa
Author’s calculated 
carbon price
Kleit (2004) 3 mpg increase in 
CAFE standards in 
the United States
$4 billion a year 5.2 billion gallons of 
fuel (= 12.6 million 
tCO2 a year assuming 
emission intensity of 
2,421 gCO2/gallon
b)
$317 per tCO2
11 cents per gallon 
increase in fuel tax 
in the United States
$290 million a year Same $23 per tCO2
Austin and 
Dinan (2005)
10 percent (3.8 mpg) 
increase in CAFE 
standards in the 
United States
$3.6 billion a year 10 percent reduction 
in fuel consumption 
for new cars 
(= 101.5 million 
tCO2 on average 
annually assuming a 
emission intensity of 
2,421 gCO2/gallon,
b 
drives averaging 
12,000 miles ayear, 
annual new car sales 
of 13.3 millionc and 
a fleet turnover of 
14 years)
$282 per tCO2
OECD/IEA 
(2009)
Cordon pricing in 
London
€90 million in direct 
investment in the system
120,000 tCO2eq per year $1,979 per tCO2 
(assume €/$ = 0.8)
Cordon pricing in 
Stockholm
€5 million of direct 
investment in the system
43,000 tCO2eq per year $1,976 per tCO2 
(assume €/$ = 0.8)
JICA (2008) 20 km of rapid transit 
in Bangkok
121 billion bahts in capital 
investment and 2 billion 
in annual total expensesd
1,736,000 tCO2 for 30 
years, plus SO2 and 
NO2 reductions
$2,661 per tCO2 
(assume baht/$ = 40)
OECD/IEA 
(2009)
84 km of BRT in 
Bogota, Colombia
$554 million in capital 
cost and $7.8 million in 
annual operating costs
247,000 tCO2eq per year $144 per tCO2
20 km of BRT in 
Mexico City
$50 million in capital cost 
and $1.9 million in 
annual operating costs
18,000 tCO2eq per year $241 per tCO2
30 km of BRT in 
Pereira, Colombia
$72 million in capital cost 
and $2.8 million in 
annual operating costs
18,000 tCO2eq per year $237 per tCO2
82 km of BRT in 
Chongqing, China
$90 million in capital cost 
and $7.6 million in 
annual operating costs
18,000 tCO2eq per year $47 per tCO2
Note: BRT = bus rapid transit, CAFE = Corporate Average Fuel Economy, CO2 = carbon dioxide, NO2 = nitrogen dioxide, SO2 = sulfur dioxide.
a. Author’s assumptions are in parentheses.
b. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency assumption.
c. U.S. new vehicle sales in 2006.
d. Based on Bangkok Metro Public Company Limited 2010. 
box continues next page
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Designing transport projects from a Broader point of view
The Preceding Discussion Has Important Policy Implications
Although technology may be a foundation for significant emissions reduction 
over the long term, advances are not likely to be dramatic. A broader policy 
approach should promote and accumulate new technologies. For example, tech-
nological transfer and trade liberalization could accelerate adoption of advanced 
low-carbon engine technologies. New technologies will be needed to make 
inspections and car repair more effective and regulations more enforceable.
Although appropriate alternative mass transit systems should be provided in 
a timely manner, they do not guarantee emission mitigation. Infrastructure 
Figure B3.6.1 mexico: expected net mitigation Benefits, various transport intervention
Source: Johnson and others 2010.
Note: CO2 = carbon dioxide, I&M = inspection and maintenance.
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Box 3.6 policy options compared (continued)
revenue for London and $116 million for Stockholm (NSTIFC 2009), easily covering the costs of 
implementation.
From a cost/benefit perspective, rapid transit is more costly than a bus system. However, 
the feasibility and scope of these two options fundamentally differ, depending on customer 
density, geographic and environmental conditions, underlying assumptions, and how and 
whether other benefits are valued (such as whether the option raises additional revenues).
Since countries and cities have different cost structures, a country-specific evaluation may 
make more sense than a country-to-country comparison. For instance, in Mexico a 
comprehensive green-growth analysis found that fuel economy standards would not be most 
cost-effective (figure B3.6.1); optimizing bus and rail freight is preferable.
a. Another interpretation is that the current market price is too low, which is quite possible.
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should be used efficiently; operations and management can be improved with-
out significant capital investment. Connecting different transport modes can 
make a city compact, so that people do not have to travel long distances. A policy 
framework that integrates transport, urban planning, and land management is 
needed.
Supply-side measures must be coordinated with demand-side policies. 
Pricing can guide people toward a low-carbon economy, with fuel pricing the 
most important policy tool. Road user pricing and parking policies are less 
effective but can be useful. Adopting vehicle-related taxes and charges based on 
emissions or vehicle miles traveled should motivate heavier users to refrain 
from car use. Subsidies for mass transit and rail freight can mitigate road depen-
dency and emissions. Regulations can complement price incentives and increase 
the  certainty that emissions will be reduced. But implementation may be too 
costly.
Finally, the carbon market price may not be high enough to effect mitigation, 
especially through costly infrastructure investment for multimodality. However, 
there are other options for mitigation. Road user pricing can discourage people 
from driving and motivate them to use public transportation. Road pricing also 
helps reduce costly congestion. Parking policies can change car use and encourage 
effective urban land planning. A significant portion of urban areas devoted to 
on-street parking aggravates congestion. Regulating speed limits can reduce 
vehicle fuel consumption and contribute to safety. Any evaluation of projects to 
mitigate emissions must account for all these benefits.
notes
 1. The total includes emissions from land-use change and forestry.
 2. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies (2010). Until recently, 
diesel engines emitted more non-CO2 pollutants, such as particulates, nitrogen oxide, 
and methane, (Defra 2009). These negative environmental effects have become more 
manageable thanks to advanced technologies, such as diesel particulate filters. 
However, proper environmental regulations are critical to control these other air 
pollutants.
 3. New York Times, May 23, 2007.
 4. Seattle Times, March 8, 2010.
 5. Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan, 2010; http://www 
.mlit.go.jp/jidosha/jidosha_tk1_000003.html.
 6. Based on National Association for Pupil Transportation http://www.napt.org/ 
associations/3103/files/SBIC2007FactSheet.cfm.
 7. California ZEBRA Electric School Bus Project; California Air Resources Board (2004).
 8. This was a retrofitting project to repair malfunctioning electric buses. The incremental 
cost of replacing old batteries and other drive systems with new ones was $70,000 
more than for a conventional diesel.
 9. There are 535 electric recharging stations in the United States, compared to 161,000 
conventional gas stations (U.S. Department of Energy, http://www.afdc.energy.gov/
afdc/fuels/stations_counts.html).
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 10. The problems also apply to hybrid vehicles but are an especial concern for fully 
 electric cars.
 11. Once trains are electrified, the emission issues in the sector translate into the energy-
sector efficiency problem (see figure 3.6).
 12. http://www.eurostar.com.
 13. It is assumed that B767 consumes 4,700 liter of fuel per hour on average (World Bank 
2009a).
 14. Though overloading would generate more emissions because overloading requires 
more power (see later in this chapter).
 15. The distance from Johannesburg to Maputo is about 450 km; the distance to Durban 
is about 570 km.
 16. Some studies have more detailed classifications; see, for example, OECD (2002b); 
Timilsina and Dulal (2009); and NSTIFC (2009). However, these four areas are most 
important for emissions reduction, and other measures can be considered as variations 
on these.
 17. Advanced road or cordon pricing may also require the significant amount of costs to 
implement. For instance, the London system initially cost $275 million, and the 
annual operating costs are estimated at $158 million (NSTIFC 2009).
 18. The elasticity was considered to be small, however, because of its small modal share 
at that time.
 19. The price elasticities are –0.03 to –0.07 for those who are satisfied with the services 
and –0.26 to –0.37 for those who are not.
 20. http://www.dieselnet.com/standards/eu/ghg_acea.php.
 21. An inspection program may initially have a negative effect on emissions reduction, 
because it helps car owners to use their vehicles longer. Inspected cars are expected to 
generate fewer emissions than non-inspected cars but may generate more than brand-
new vehicles (Yamamoto and others 2004).
 22. This is a relatively successful case; most U.S. HOV lanes are underused, as will be 
discussed later.
 23. Another view, however, is that reductions in size may make a vehicle more 
 maneuverable, thereby reducing the potential for collision. The U.S. data contradict 
this hypothesis: smaller vehicles are actually involved in more collisions (National 
Academies 2002).
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Mitigating and adapting transport will require considerable financing. Individuals 
will pay a large part of the mitigation costs by buying energy-efficient vehicles, 
but governments must still cover incremental investment for adapting roads. And 
developing countries face large transport infrastructure deficits regardless of 
 climate change.
Available funding, such as carbon financing and international assistance, can-
not cover the adaptation and mitigation costs. Mitigation, including advanced 
technologies and electric and fuel cell cars, is particularly costly and will remain 
so for some time.
Factoring in all the benefits of mitigation measures dramatically alters the 
economics of transport investment. Accounting for negative externalities, such as 
congestion and pollution, could both reduce emissions and encourage policy-
makers to allocate more resources to transport.
Some measures, such as fuel taxation and road user charges, could bring in 
new resources relatively quickly. Minimizing harmful subsidies would also help. 
Immediate action is necessary; putting new institutions in place takes time, and 
change becomes more costly once an economy is locked into high-carbon transport.
Financing mitigation and Adaptation
Incremental costs for adaptation and mitigation are significant. Although future 
climate change, technology, and policy regimes may be uncertain, the costs are 
undoubtedly far beyond the resources of the developing world, even using 
the most conservative assumptions.
Investment in Mitigation
Few of the models that forecast future energy use and green house gas (GHG) 
emissions analyze the transport sector in detail. What role transport will play in 
emission reduction is therefore uncertain, as is the rate at which advanced 
 transport technologies can be diffused. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
c h A p t e r  4
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and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have markedly  different 
views. While IEA estimates that transport can reduce emissions by 30  percent, 
PNNL predicts a 47 percent increase (table 4.1). The IEA model assumes that 
fuel use and CO2 emissions/km by new vehicles could be cut 30 percent world-
wide by 2020 and 50 percent by 2050; it also assumes that 50 million plug-in 
hybrid and electric vehicles will be sold by 2050 and that hydrogen fuel cell cars 
will be commercialized by 2020 and will promptly be widely distributed 
(OECD/IEA 2009b). Given current progress, those assumptions are optimistic.
The PNNL model assumes more limited technology diffusion, with only the 
United States adopting advanced vehicle technologies (plug-in hybrids and 
 electric vehicles). Elsewhere, conventional internal combustion engines would 
remain dominant; their fuel efficiency is assumed to be 35–37 mpg. This model 
uses a discrete choice analysis (Clarke and Edmonds 1993) that reflects  people’s 
unwillingness to adopt vehicles that though more efficient are more expensive.
Depending on the model, mitigation costs vary substantially. Few models 
report sectoral emission reductions, including transport. The IEA estimates incre-
mental investment for transport mitigation at $237 billion annually (table 4.2). 
This assumes international policies that limit GHG gases to 450 parts per million 
of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent. It also accounts for about 45 percent of total 
additional mitigation investment needed in all sectors (buildings, power plants, 
industry, and biofuels supply).1
table 4.2 Average Annual incremental mitigation investment by 2030
OECD/IEA (2009)
World Bank (2010)
McKinsey & Company PNNL
$ billion % $ billion % $ billion %
Total 525 100.0 563 100.0 384 100.0
Of which, infrastructure 324 61.7 — — — —
Of which, transport 237 45.0 — — — —
Of which, passenger cars 168 31.9 — — — —
Sources: OECD/IEA 2009b; World Bank 2010a.
Note: — = not available, IEA = International Energy Agency, PNNL = Pacific Northwest National Laboratory.
table 4.1 reduction of energy-related emissions by 2050, by sector
Sector
Estimated carbon to be removed (percent)
IEA MiniCama
Power −71 −87
Building −41 −50
transport −30 47
Industry −21 −71
Total −50 −50
Source: World Bank 2010a. 
Note: IEA = International Energy Agency.
a. MiniCam is the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory model.
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The IEA model assumes that most mitigation investment (figure 4.1) will go 
into buying hybrid and electric cars. It focuses on changes in car technologies 
rather than behavior and modal shifts and may underestimate transport’s capac-
ity to reduce emissions (box 4.1). As the cost of low-carbon transport technology 
decreases and income increases, developing countries are expected to invest 
$52–$159 billion a year to reduce emissions (figure 4.2).2
Investment in Adaptation
Adaptation costs refer to the incremental investment needed to adapt to climate 
change. For infrastructure, the cost is calculated by multiplying baseline 
Box 4.1 ieA Assumptions in estimating mitigation investment needs
The International Energy Agency model, which emphasizes changes in car technologies, 
assumes that the cost of  buying more efficient vehicles represents most of the additional miti-
gation cost. Engine-fuel efficiency standards for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions or fuel con-
sumption per unit of service of passenger light-duty vehicles (fleet averages) for 2030 are 
assumed to be 80 grCO2/km for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
and other European Union countries, 90 grCO2/km for other major economies (Brazil, China, 
South Africa, the Russian Federation, and the Middle East), and 110 grCO2/km for other 
 countries. The scenario assumes that more efficient vehicles will increase their market share 
regardless of price: hybrid vehicles to 32 percent by 2020 and 29 percent by 2030, plug-in 
hybrids to 12 percent by 2020 and 21 percent by 2030, and electric vehicles to 12 percent by 
2020 and 17 percent by 2030.
This scenario assumes fuel prices will hold steady, so that increases in fuel taxes would com-
pensate for decreasing demand and downward pressure on fuel prices. It does not account for 
consumer reaction, regardless of fuel prices, except in terms of choices of vehicle type. Savings 
in transport CO2 emissions would be 18 percent compared with the baseline and could slightly 
increase over time.
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projections of investment needs by the share of new investment vulnerable to 
climate change.3 Because estimates of baseline infrastructure needs vary widely, 
particularly in developing countries, estimated adaptation costs also vary. With 
global warming of 2° C, total investment in transport adaptation for the world 
economy is an estimated $28–$100 billion a year (table 4.3). The World Bank’s 
Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change (EACC) study offers two estimates 
based the different scenarios of the National Center for Atmospheric Research 
(NCAR) and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization 
(CSIRO). Both estimates are higher than that of the UNFCCC (2007), which 
uses a narrower definition of adaptation needs (box 4.2).
Source: OECD/IEA 2009b.
Note: OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Figure 4.2 cumulative incremental transport investment by regions and sectors
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table 4.3 Average Annual incremental Adaptation cost through 2050
World Bank (2010c) 
Delta-p only
UNFCCC (2007)NCAR scenario CSIRO scenario
$ billion % $ billion % $ billion %
Total 89.6 100.0 77.7 100.0 28–67 100.0
Of which, infrastructure 29.5 32.9 13.5 17.4 2–41 —
Of which, transport 7.2 8.0  — — — —
Of which, roads 6.3 7.0 — — — —
Sources: UNFCCC 2007; World Bank 2010c.
Note: — = not available, CSIRO = Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, NCAR = National Center for 
Atmospheric Research, UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
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Infrastructure represents the largest share of adaptation costs. In the EACC 
model, infrastructure is 20–30 percent of the total, $14–$30 billion a year; 
this is consistent with the UNFCCC (2007). Infrastructure is also vulnerable to 
precipitation and humidity. The NCAR model assumes the wettest weather.
Adaptation needs for transport, mostly roads, are an estimated $7 billion a 
year for the next 40 years, 8 percent of total adaptation costs. Including mainte-
nance costs raises the number to $10 billion—still much lower than estimated 
mitigation costs of $237 billion a year.
Adaptation and Development Deficits
Many adaptation cost estimates, even in the EACC study, ignore the close 
link between adaptation and development. In theory it is correct to distin-
guish the incremental cost of new climate-proofing infrastructure invest-
ment (the development deficit)4 from the gap between current infrastructure 
and projected infrastructure needs to achieve a baseline (the adaptation 
 deficit; World Bank 2010c). In addition, in theory adaptation costs are incre-
mental and not directly related to development deficits. Therefore, most 
studies report only adaptation deficits.
Box 4.2 methods of estimating Adaptation investment needs
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2007) does not account 
for incremental operation and maintenance costs for existing infrastructure. It first estimates 
gross fixed infrastructure capital formation in 2030 at $22.27   trillion, three times the 2000 
investment, based on annual growth of 5–6 percent. It then estimates how much of the new 
investment is vulnerable to climate change using  insurance data on weather-related losses. 
Insurance company Munich Re counts 0.7 percent of all infrastructure as vulnerable, the 
Association of British Insurers (ABI) says 2.7 percent. Thus,  estimates of vulnerable new invest-
ment in 2030 range from $153 billion to $650 billion. The UNFCCC study assumes that climate-
proof infrastructure would cost 5–20 percent more, with incremental adaptation costs of 
$8–$31 billion using Munich Re data or $33–$130 billion using ABI data.
The Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change (EACC) study takes a different approach. 
It projects stocks of major types of infrastructure from 2010 to 2050, including roads, rail, and 
ports. Adaptation cost is computed as the additional cost of constructing, operating, and 
maintaining baseline infrastructure under the climate conditions projected by the National 
Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organization (CSIRO).
The EACC study focuses on price and cost changes for fixed quantities of infrastructure 
(referred to as a delta-P component) but also calculates costs based on the impact of climate 
change on infrastructure service demand (delta Q component), including operating and 
 maintenance costs. The NCAR model projects additional cost and maintenance expenditures 
for all sectors at $36.8 billion annually; the CSIRO model projects $28.6 billion.
Sources: Parry and Timilsina 2009; World Bank 2010c. 
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However, many developing countries still have large infrastructure deficits, 
especially inadequate roads (World Bank 2008). Developing countries have only 
5–30 percent of the paved roads per capita of high-income countries (figure 4.3). 
More than half their roads are unpaved, poorly maintained, and vulnerable to 
weather (ADB 2007).
Similarly, many railway assets, including locomotives, need to be upgraded to 
developed-country standards (World Bank 2005; JBIC 2006; World Bank 
2010d). In Africa nearly half the railways are in urgent need of rehabilitation 
(Briceno-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2008). Airports have not yet reached 
international standards; some countries lack airport infrastructure, facilities, and 
oversight to enforce compliance with international safety and security standards 
(World Bank 2010e). According to the U.S. Civil Aviation Safety Assessment, 
about one-third of developing countries do not meet international standards and 
practices recommended for aircraft operations and maintenance (table 4.4).5
If development deficits are not taken into account, estimates for transport will 
be unrealistically low—a major criticism of the current estimation approach 
table 4.4 U.s. civil Aviation safety Assessment, 2008
Countries assessed Countries meeting ICAO standards %
High-income countries 45 43 95.6
Developing countries 62 42 67.7
Upper middle-income countries 27 24 88.9
Lower middle-income countries 27 16 59.3
Low-income countries 8 2 25.0
Source: U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.
Note: ICAO = International Civil Aviation Organization.
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(Satterthwaite and Dodman 2009). This could be particularly problematic for 
poorer countries with enormous development deficits.
Estimates of infrastructure deficits are sensitive to models and assumed goals 
and vary significantly, from $316 billion a year to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals to annual baseline spending of $1,900 billion, which includes 
nonconventional infrastructure, such as health, education, and urban (table 4.5). 
For transport alone, including roads, estimated investment needs are $310 billion 
(World Bank 2010c). Estimated incremental adaptation costs are $7.2 billion 
a year, 2.3 percent of total investment.
Regardless of model, the incremental cost of adaptation is only a small fraction 
of total transport investment needs. A case study using highway development 
software found that in a “do the minimum” scenario the incremental road adap-
tation cost would be only 2 percent of total investment and maintenance costs 
(box 4.3). The case study also shows that regardless of climate change, more 
frequent road maintenance reduces not only maintenance costs but also eventual 
adaptation costs. Thus, timely building and maintenance of roads is a robust 
investment decision that should be a priority.
insufficient Financing Available
At present the most important mechanism for financing mitigation and adapta-
tion may be carbon markets. There are also a few other resources available 
 internationally, but these mostly go to areas other than transport.
Carbon Markets
The Kyoto Protocol created three market mechanisms: emissions trading, the 
clean development mechanism (CDM), and the joint implementation mecha-
nism. These offer developed countries an opportunity to buy carbon  credits and 
table 4.5 Annual Adaptation and infrastructure Deficits
Parry and Timilsina (2009) World Bank 2010ca
Infrastructureb Infrastructurec Transport only d
Annual average 
infrastructure 
deficit
Infrastructure 
adaptation 
cost
Baseline 
spending
Incremental 
adaptation 
investment
Baseline 
spending
Incremental 
adaptation 
investment
Asia 217.5 10.9–43.5 956.0 18.0 132.6 3.5
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 37.2 1.9–7.4 283.8 3.5 49.7 1.1
Africa 61.6 3.1–12.3 130.1 3.4 40.2 0.9
Others — — 531.3 4.6 89.3 1.7
Total 316.3 15.9–63.2 1,900.2 29.5 309.8 7.2
Sources: Parry and Timilsina 2009; World Bank 2010c.
Note: — = not available.
a. Based on the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) climate scenario.
b. Including housing and infrastructure.
c. Including health, education, power and wire, road, urban, water and sewage, and other transport infrastructure.
d. Including road and other transport.
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Box 4.3 A numerical example of road management: Applying hDm-4
The Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4) version 2 is software that evalu-
ates how climate affects highway development and maintenance. First, climate determines 
annual road deterioration. Humidity and low temperatures, for instance, quickly wear down 
road surfaces and shoulders. Second, seasonality and drainage affect road pavement strength, 
represented by the structural number of the pavement (SNP). SNP is calculated from the thick-
ness of the base or surfacing layer and the depth of each layer from the top of the sub-base. It 
is reduced by seasonality, which is measured by the length of the wet season: water infiltrates 
cracks and joints, fracturing the pavement and increasing road roughness. Drainage, deter-
mined by the shape and type of drain, functions to reduce the length of the wet season. SNP is 
therefore a function of not only average temperature and precipitation but also seasonality 
and drainage.
In the case of a 10-km two-lane primary bituminous road in a tropical area, project life is 
assumed to be 20 years. The discount rate is 12 percent. There are two strategies. One is to do 
the minimum with routine pothole patching and edge treatment without major surface treat-
ment until the International Roughness Index (IRI) reaches 10 m/km. The other is to do main-
tenance more often—before the surface is severely damaged—and assumes structural 
overlay at a lower IRI of 4.5 m/km, with routine pothole patching and edge treatment.
There are also two climate scenarios. One is the actual tropical condition; the other assumes 
more precipitation and humidity, which would increase the roughness environmental 
coefficient (road deterioration rate) from 2 to 2.5 percent.
In either scenario frequent maintenance is more cost-effective. Under actual weather con-
ditions, total maintenance savings would be about 4 percent if maintenance were more 
Figure B4.3.1 road maintenance costs, Actual maintenance, and climate change: 
An example
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avoid more costly mitigation measures to meet their emission reduction commit-
ments. They offer developing countries incentives for mitigation, can facilitate 
funding, and give access to emerging clean technologies. From 2000 to 2005 the 
CDM, one of the most promising mechanisms,6 had more than 4,200 projects in 
the pipeline, with 2,246 of these approved.
However, CDM has only three registered transport projects: the Bogotá 
TransMilenio (BRT); installation of low-GHG rolling stock in rapid transit sys-
tems in Delhi; and the Cable Cars Metro in Medellin. These are expected to 
reduce emissions respectively by 246,563, 41,160, and 1,729 tons of CO2eq. 
Even with fairly high carbon prices, it is unlikely that the private sector will be 
induced to adopt sufficient low-carbon transport technologies, which are expen-
sive and difficult to commercialize (World Bank 2010a; figure 4.4). The limited 
impact of carbon markets may also be attributable to the current rigid 
Box 4.3 A numerical example of road management: Applying hDm-4 (continued)
 frequent. Over a longer period, the savings could be even greater. With the alternative weather 
scenario, savings would be 6 percent (figure B4.3.1).
Climate change would increase road maintenance costs only minimally, especially if the 
road were maintained properly. In the “do the minimum” scenario, the cost would increase by 
2 percent. If the road were more frequently maintained, the cost would increase by only 
1  percent. Thus, adaptation costs for roads would likely remain small relative to total invest-
ment needs, and additional costs could be minimized by appropriate maintenance.
Figure 4.4 potential Annual emission reduction (Gt co2eq)
Source: World Bank 2010a.
Note: The ranges for global economic potentials as assessed in each sector are shown by black vertical lines. It’s not just about energy: At high 
carbon prices the combined mitigation potential of agriculture and forestry is greater than that of other individual sectors of the economy. 
EIT = economies in transition, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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framework for calculating emissions savings.7 While mitigation intervention 
could help the carbon market mechanism, institutional reforms are needed if 
mitigation is to be significant.
Other International Funding Sources
Transport claims only a small share of other international funding. The Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), established in 1991 at the Rio Convention on 
Sustainable Development, commits about $250 million a year—largely in the 
form of grants to developing countries that are parties to the UNFCCC—in sup-
port of energy efficiency, renewable energy, new clean energy technology, and 
sustainable transport projects (table 4.6). In the past 20 years, the GEF has 
approved only 28 transport projects, 3.4 percent of the total; funding has been 
slightly higher at about 6.4 percent. On average, the GEF grant mechanism has 
mobilized about $120 million a year for transport, including cofinancing, but the 
sector needs $240 billion for mitigation8 and $7–$10 billion for adaptation and 
it also needs to make up a transport development deficit of $310 billion.
Climate Investment Funds (CIF) is a family of funds devoted to climate change 
initiatives. Established in 2008, it is hosted by the World Bank and implemented 
by the Multilateral Development Bank. The Clean Technology Fund (CTF) is one 
of the most important funds, providing some grants, concessional loans, and partial 
risk guarantees of as much as $200 million per project to help countries scale up 
clean technology initiatives (table 4.7).9 On average, 16 percent of CTF funding 
has been allocated to transport, although this varies significantly by country; the 
Colombia investment plan alone accounts for more than 77 percent. Transport is 
among the priority sectors in half the CTF investment plans.
table 4.6 Global environment Facility Funding, 1991–2010
Projects approved GEF grant Cofinancing Total
Number Share (%) $ Million Share (%) $ Million Share (%) $ Million Share (%)
Transport 28 3.4 182.4 6.4 2,186.1 12.1 2,368.5 11.3
Other sectors 792 96.6 2,654.7 93.6 15,846.6 87.9 18,501.2 88.7
Total 820 100.0 2,837.1 100.0 18,032.6 100.0 20,869.7 100.0
Source: GEF project database.
Note: GEF = Global Environment Facility.
table 4.7 ctF-endorsed country investment plans
Total Transport
$ Million $ Million Share (%)
Total investment 36,835 8,458 23.0
CTF funding 3,500 570 16.3
Private investment 7,329 1,983 27.1
Government and MDB 26,006 5,905 22.7
Source: CTF Country Investment Plans.
Note: CTF = Clean Technology Fund, MDB = multilateral development bank.
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Although the sum of this fragmented funding is small compared with total 
investment needs, the combination of resources may create synergies sufficient 
to finance mitigation and adaptation, as in the case of Mexico City (box 4.4; 
World Bank 2010b). Early in the market’s transformation, the GEF piloted inno-
vative approaches and helped countries to create effective policies and regula-
tions. CTF resources support low-carbon infrastructure investment on favorable 
terms, helping the market to scale up or move innovation toward maturity. 
Carbon revenues improve investment profitability and strengthen the financial 
viability of projects that do not depend on carbon finance.
Different financial sources have different comparative advantages  (figure 4.5). 
Since the GEF’s mandate is to innovate and remove barriers, its limited funds 
focus on early stages in technology adoption. These are often risk-prone, and 
resources are rarely sufficient to transform markets completely. CTF funds, by 
contrast, are technologically conservative and figure relatively little in early 
phases. They contribute to demonstration, deployment, and transfer of 
 low-carbon technologies. Carbon finance can significantly affect the second 
stage, improving investment return on relatively new, initially marginal tech-
nologies. To initiate a shift to low-carbon development and avoid high-carbon 
technology lock-in, concessional funding and revenue enhancement are needed. 
Box 4.4 Blending carbon Finance resources in transport: An example
Bringing together the agendas of local urban transport, national poverty reduction, and global 
climate change, the Mexico Municipal Transport Project (UTTP) aims to move urban transport 
to a lower carbon path. In many cities private cars account for 80 percent of all motor vehicles 
but just 30 percent of daily passenger trips. The goal is to reduce private trips despite high 
levels of motorization. The first UTTP phase focuses on improving transport policies and 
strengthening public transit institutions. The second addresses integrating transit systems, 
including mass transit corridors and other public transport. The third looks at stimulating the 
market for low-carbon buses and scrapping inefficient older buses.
Early Global Environment Facility support of the Climate Measures in the Transport Sector 
of Mexico City project, the Insurgentes bus corridor, and the testing of bus types helped dem-
onstrate the importance of bus rapid transit systems and the clean development mechanism 
methodology. The UTTP experience in Mexico City can be transferred to other urban areas. The 
program builds on an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Sector 
Investment Loan of $200 million and a Clean Technology Fund concessional loan of $200 mil-
lion. The Banco Nacional de Obras channels resources, serves as financial intermediary, and 
lends the funds to participating municipalities. These loans will be combined with up to $900 
million from the National Trust for Infrastructure. The private sector is expected to contribute 
up to $2.3 billion and municipalities up to $150 million. Estimated carbon  revenue is another 
$50 million. Cities that submit Integral Transport Plans are eligible for funding.
Source: GEF webpage, http://www.thegef.org/gef/gef_projects_funding.
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At the mature stage, when carbon finance provides the most significant push 
into maturing markets, the CTF may still have an important role but GEF 
resources will be phased out.
Domestic Spending on Transport
In theory, domestic sources could address development deficits. Routine trans-
port infrastructure maintenance, for instance, is financed domestically rather than 
through international funding.10 Meeting development deficits with domestic 
resources could substantially reduce additional investment.
In reality, however, securing internal resources has long been difficult for 
developing countries. Spending on infrastructure is easily marginalized under 
 fiscal pressures, as in Latin American countries during the 1990s (Calderón and 
Servén 2004b). Although developing countries spend hundreds of millions of 
dollars annually on transport development and maintenance, accounting for 
 several percent of gross domestic product (GDP), the amounts are still insuffi-
cient. In Africa, for example, most countries have underinvested in transport, 
with a total of 22 countries together spending only about $11 billion annually on 
transport investment and maintenance (figure 4.6). About $4 billion was spent 
on transport projects (Briceno-Garmendia, Smits, and Foster 2008), although an 
estimated $8 billion is needed (this is exclusive of South Africa; Carruthers and 
others 2009).11,12 Thus, at only half of what is needed, fiscal resources cannot 
close development deficits, let alone respond to adaptation or mitigation needs.
economics of climate-resilient transport Financing and mitigation
A narrow view of the costs and benefits of transport helps to keep funding low. 
If local externalities, such as congestion, local pollution, and safety, are factored 
into policy evaluations, however, the economics of transport investment change 
dramatically, supporting more resources for the sector.
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Figure 4.6 Actual transport spending and estimated requirements, sub-saharan Africa
Sources: Briceno-Garmendia Smits, and Foster 2008; Carruthers and others 2009.
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table 4.8 estimated costs external to transport, United states 
Externality Cents/gallon Cents/mile
Central values of marginal external costs
Greenhouse warming 6 0.3
Oil dependency 12 0.6
Local pollution 42 2.0
Congestion, cents/mile 105 5.0
Accidents 63 3.0
Total 228 10.9
Source: Parry, Walls, and Harrington 2007.
The Magnitude of Transport Externalities
Externalities in transport are estimated at 11 cents a mile (Parry, Walls, and 
Harrington 2007), about the same as the cost of fuel for a standard passenger car 
in the United States (table 4.8).13 In aggregate the cost of externalities would 
exceed 10–11 percent of GDP in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries (table 4.9).14 Removing these externalities 
would thus be beneficial.
Traffic congestion is a major externality. The estimated cost of congestion is 
5 cents a mile and adds up to 8.5 percent of GDP. Road congestion is particularly 
costly in urban areas. In the United States, urban congestion delays increased 
from 16 hours a year to 47 between 1980 and 2003, pushing up the annual 
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national time loss cost from $12.5 to $63 billion (Schrank and Lomax 2005). 
Congestion will increasingly be a problem for developing countries that are 
urbanizing rapidly. Road congestion that reduces mobility for freight and indi-
vidual travel undermines city productivity—traditionally the most important 
growth center in any economy (World Bank 2009).
Benefits of Coping with Transport Social Costs
Policies to internalize or mitigate transport externalities could also help mitigate 
emissions. For instance, traffic congestion clearly increases emissions: cars emit 
more CO2 when traffic is moving slowly (Davis and Diegel 2004; Anas, Timilsina, 
and Zheng 2009), and congestion and idling increase local pollutants and noise. 
Optimizing traffic signals not only alleviates congestion and saves travel time but 
also increases fuel efficiency. In California, synchronizing traffic signals at 3,172 
intersections reduced congestion and lowered fuel consumption by 8.6 percent 
(OECD 2002a). Realigning intersections can also reduce congestion. In Tokyo 
improving an intersection of rail tracks and trunk roads doubled traffic speed, 
reducing CO2 by an estimated 12,000 tons per year.
These supply-side measures may be enough to alleviate congestion and some 
emissions, but demand-side interventions are also needed. For instance, improv-
ing traffic flow alone could motivate people to drive more. In Niort, France, 
 traffic signal synchronization improved average speeds, but traffic volume also 
increased 7 percent and emissions 6 percent. Fuel taxation, road user pricing, 
parking policies, and vehicle-related charges can all discourage individual car use, 
thus alleviating traffic congestion and lowering emissions. Particularly promising 
are high congestion charges during peak periods.
There are also safety benefits. Mass transportation is usually much safer than 
car travel. In Japan the road fatality rate is eight times that of rail (table 4.10). 
Road fatality rates are also noticeably different between developed and develop-
ing countries. The road injury/fatality rate in high-income countries is 
10.3/100,000 a year; in low-income countries it is 21.5/100,000 (table 4.11). 
Promoting mass transit in large cities could reduce both fatalities and emissions.
Similarly, lower speed limits can reduce fatalities and mitigate emissions. 
Accidents typically increase with open road speed limits. In New Zealand 
the elasticity of total fatal accidents is estimated at 1.2 (Scuffham 2003). 
table 4.9 estimated costs external to transport, oecD Averages
% of GDP
Externalities Road Other modes Total
Travel time 6.8 0.07 8.5
Local pollution 0.4 — 0.4
Global pollution — — 1.0–10.0
Accidents 2.0 — 1.5–2.0
Noise 0.1 0.01 0.3
Sources: Banister 1998; reproduced in OECD 2002b.
Note: — = not available, GDP = gross domestic product, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
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In the United States, the fatality rate—defined as the number of fatalities per 
billion vehicle miles travelled—would decrease by 5 percent if the speed limit 
were 55 mph (88 km/h) instead of 65 (110 km/h; Houston and others 1995). 
Emissions would also decrease.
Vehicle inspection and maintenance increase safety and reduce emissions. 
Spending for vehicle maintenance would reduce fatal accidents (Houston and 
others 1995), and inspections encourage the scrapping of old cars that do not 
meet safety standards. Fleet transition to newer vehicles would decrease fatalities 
(Fowles and Loeb 1995). In Rio de Janeiro the state light-vehicle inspection and 
maintenance program is expected to reduce carbon monoxide by 16–44 percent 
and hydrocarbons by 9–37 percent (Ribeiro and Abreu 2008).
Potential health benefits from local pollution policies, such as diesel particu-
late filter regulation, are significant. In sunlight, air pollutants react to form ozone 
(smog), which affects pulmonary function in children and asthmatics and 
reduces visibility. Fine particles are small enough to reach lung tissue, and par-
ticulate exposure can cause death (Schwartz 1994). Lower-middle-income and 
low-income countries are exposed to 50 percent more particulate pollution than 
high-income countries (figure 4.7).
Other antipollution policies also have health benefits and reduce emissions. 
For instance, converting diesel buses to CNG is a common pollution control 
table 4.10 transport Fatality and injury, Japan, FY2008/09
Fatalities
Injured 
persons
Fatality rate per 
million 
passenger-km
Injury rate per 
million 
passenger-km
Passenger-km 
(millions)
Road 5,155 945,504 5.7 1,043.7 905,907
Railway 300 397 0.7 1.0 404,585
Air 7 10 0.1 0.1 80,931
Waterbornea 2,414 n.a. 687.7 n.a. 3,510
Total 7,876 945,911 5.6 678.1 1,394,933
Sources: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 2008.
Note: FY = fiscal year, n.a. = not applicable.
a. Including all marine perils.
table 4.11 road traffic injury and Fatality rates 
per 100,000 people
Region High-income Middle-income Low-income Total
Africa — 32.2 32.3 32.2
The Americas 13.4 17.3 — 15.8
South East Asia — 16.7 16.5 16.6
Eastern Mediterranean 28.5 35.8 27.5 32.2
Europe 7.9 19.3 12.2 13.4
Western Pacific 7.2 16.9 15.6 15.6
Global 10.3 19.5 21.5 18.8
Source: WHO 2009.
Note: — = not available.
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measure that has proved effective in Mumbai. Based on observation of  passengers, 
a 5–10 percent increase in bus fares could cover the cost of converting all 3,400 
Mumbai buses, which travel 240 million km a year. It would reduce PM10 by 
662 tons a year (Takeuchi and others 2007), as well as reduce CO2 emissions. In 
Madrid, one of the most polluted cities in the European Union (EU), a new 
metro line, Arganda, that came into service in 1999 has reduced a number of 
pollutants (CO, NOx, SO2, and particulates) by more than 20 percent and also 
reduced emission intensity. Although the number of vehicles on alternative roads 
has increased, that increment is smaller, and the slowdown is 2–16  percent less 
than it would have been without the Arganda (Zamorano and others 2006).
Generating new resources
Addressing negative externalities like congestion and local pollution is good for 
economies and helps justify funding of transport, but it does not create the addi-
tional fiscal space needed for mitigation and adaptation.
Reducing Harmful Subsidies
Removing fuel subsidies can create significant financial resources (Nash and 
 others 2002) and be accomplished at fairly low cost. The IEA estimates 2008 
fossil fuel subsidies at $557 billion, where the implicit subsidy is the difference 
between a reference price and the actual end-user price. Oil products received 
$312 billion in subsidies and natural gas $204 billion, with the rest going to coal 
(IEA, OECD, and World Bank 2010).
Figure 4.7 Average particulate matter emissions, 10 micrometers or less, 2006
Source: World Bank 2011. 
Note: PM = particulate matter.
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Thirty-seven developing countries subsidize gasoline and diesel fuel at more 
than a million dollars a year (figure 4.8), an amount calculated using a price-gap 
approach where U.S. fuel prices are assumed to be subsidy-free.15 In many 
 countries, diesel prices are more heavily subsidized not because its carbon 
 content is lower but because diesel affects the movement of goods. Iran could 
increase revenues by more than $20 billion and Saudi Arabia by more than 
$17 billion if they abolished all gasoline and diesel subsidies. Many other 
 countries could gain more than a billion dollars a year.
Mobilizing Revenues from Mitigation Measures
A fuel tax is the best way to create fiscal space fairly quickly and motivate 
people to reduce energy intensity (table 4.12). Fuel tax rates vary considerably 
by country (see figure 3.22). While many European countries, as well as such 
countries as Malawi, Mongolia, and Zambia, tax fuels heavily, many developing 
countries do so at relatively low rates (GTZ 2009). The transaction costs of fuel 
taxation are relatively low (Kleit 2004) and applying the carbon price to pump 
prices can generate significant revenue. A gallon of gasoline contains 0.0024 tons 
of carbon. Thus a market carbon price of $20, $30, and $300 per ton would 
translate into 5, 12, and 72 cents per gallon, respectively. While these numbers 
appear small, carbon pricing could increase annual revenues by about $10  billion, 
$24 billion, and $145 billion a year, based on U.S. fuel consumption.
Other economic measures, such as road user pricing and parking policies, 
can generate revenue, but particularly in developing countries initial transac-
tion costs can be high. In London, cordon pricing generates $237  million 
Figure 4.8 implicit subsidies to Gasoline and Diesel, 2007–08
Source: Based on GTZ 2009 and World Bank 2010f.
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annually at an operating cost of $158 million (NSTFC 2009). The initial 
investment of $275 million will thus be paid back relatively quickly (see 
box 3.6).
The revenue potential of vehicle-related charges, such as registration fees and 
customs duties, is subject to political acceptability and may not be particularly 
effective in mitigating emissions. Parking policies are less likely to create fiscal 
space; violations are widespread, and the cost of enforcement is high in develop-
ing countries.
Subsidies to new vehicle buyers and mass transit passengers can help alleviate 
transport emissions, but the costs may be too high for the expected benefits. 
They may still, however, be an appropriate counterpoint to huge implicit road 
subsidies.
As long as car users pay transaction costs, regulatory measures are generally 
fiscally neutral. Of course, inspection fees can be too high, and traffic tickets can 
also be set very high. Even when they are, though, revenues are relatively small. 
Regulatory measures are in general very costly (Austin and Dinan 2005; Merrell, 
Poitras, and Sutter 1999). Therefore, while these measures can help mitigation, 
they cannot be relied on to generate revenue.
conclusion
Measures to reduce GHG emissions will reduce the costs of congestion, local air 
 pollution, and safety risks. Policies to reduce these social impacts of transport also 
reduce GHG emissions. They have the potential to make transition to a  low-carbon 
transport sector largely self-financing. Policies to convey all  environmental, safety, 
and congestion costs to users will reduce the social costs of transport. To give an 
example, without such policies transport users have no opportunity to learn 
about the health costs of local air pollution and no incentives to change their 
behavior to reduce them. The policy deficit in making such costs felt is enor-
mous. The highest social costs are due to
table 4.12 emission reduction: effect, Benefits, and Fiscal potential of various interventions
Measure Primary benefits Impact on fiscal balances
Economic
Fuel taxation Congestion mitigation + +
Road user charges Congestion mitigation + 
Parking policies Efficient urban land use +
Vehicle-related charges +
Cash for clunker programs Competitiveness of auto industry –
Low mass transit fares Congestion mitigation; safety –
Regulatory
Fuel economy standards Competitiveness of auto industry –/+
Inspection and maintenance Safety –/+
Traffic rules Safety –/+
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•	 congestion,
•	 local air pollution,
•	 road accidents, and, last but not least,
•	 GHG emissions.
Efforts to reduce these costs do more to reduce GHG emissions than a narrow 
climate change agenda (Parry 2007). Moreover, removal of these deficits would 
create revenues to finance the transition to a low-carbon environment. In addi-
tion to the global public good of reducing damages from climate change, this 
would also provide local political motivation because it  creates local benefits in 
terms of reduced time losses and health costs.
An obvious reform—one that reduces the social costs of transport and creates fiscal 
opportunities—is to remove subsidies that give the wrong signals. Most important in 
this respect are subsidies for gasoline and diesel. U.S. pump prices for gasoline and 
diesel are taken to be a good approximation for tax- and subsidy-free  consumer 
prices (GTZ 2009). In addition to countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, poorer 
countries could also have important savings: Myanmar, for instance, could save 
more than $300 million in transport fuel subsidies. Iran, Colombia, and other 
countries are now making major strides toward reducing transport subsidies.
The most direct way to convey the costs of transport’s contribution to climate 
change is by setting a price for carbon. A gallon of gasoline contains 0.0024 tons of 
carbon (Parry, Walls, and Harrington 2007). As already discussed, setting a car-
bon price of, say, $20 per ton would lead to only a moderate change of 12 cents 
in consumer prices. If there were no changes in travel behavior, a  carbon charge 
that small could bring in revenues of $10 billion a year in the United States.
The fiscal consequences of charges for local air pollution differ substantially. In 
some cases they can be very high. For the Los Angeles area, Small and Kazimi 
(1995) estimated charges to contain the health costs of local pollution of 
1–8 cents per mile for 2000. Given the number of vehicle miles driven in the 
area, they would bring in revenues of $40 million to $3.26 billion. Willingness to 
pay to avoid the health costs will depend on the local context. Functions for how 
willingness varies with income and household characteristics remove the need to 
collect primary data in each locality. Applying such functions shows that valua-
tions differ much less than income differences suggest (For example, Loehmann 
and others 1997). The health costs for Beijing, for instance, were estimated at 
$3.5 billion in 2007, equivalent to 3.5 percent of local GDP (Creutzig and He 
2009). Similar estimates can be done for congestion and accident costs. Signaling 
the true costs of transport to users should open considerable fiscal opportunities. 
These could be used to address the chronic underfinancing of transport and the 
incremental costs of climate-related transport policies.
The measures discussed above generate substantial income and welfare benefits. 
They are designed to maximize the development gains from limiting GHG emis-
sions, local air pollution, costs of congestion, and accidents.
They bring net benefits to both consumers (benefits from transport minus 
the costs of the charges) and revenue. Rough estimates of the revenue potential 
154 Climate-Resilient Investment in Transport
Turning the Right Corner • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9835-7
suggest that it could be even higher than the additional funding required for the 
low-carbon transition. If so, efforts to increase the efficiency of the transport 
sector could make it possible to reduce taxes that are harmful to growth and 
welfare. A broad agenda to make the sector more efficient provides far stronger 
incentives to reduce GHG emissions than a narrow climate policy program that 
implicitly assumes that all other inefficiencies have been removed. An efficient 
transport sector protects the environment and advances development.
Annex 4A city examples: how carbon pricing can produce Benefits
Studies have looked at measures to simultaneously address the environmental 
costs of transport, road safety, and congestion for Beijing, Mexico City, and 
Washington. The following gives an approximation of the fiscal space such 
 measures would earn.
Beijing
The most recent transport study for Beijing analyzes optimal policies for contain-
ing not only GHG emissions but also air pollution, congestion, and noise. The 
study assumes a price of $70 per ton of carbon, and an annual social cost of 
$205 million. It relates concentration levels of PM 10 to cases of chronic 
 bronchitis and asthma and premature death from lung cancer. These health 
effects are converted to monetary values using a willingness-to-pay function from 
a study by Deng (2000). The values are corrected for health cost increases, 
growth in motorization, and reduced emissions per vehicle-km if the fleet were 
modernized. Health costs were $3.5 billion for 2007, equivalent to 3.5 percent 
of local GDP. Motorized transport’s share in total emissions is a function of 
population density and vehicle emission standards.
Accident costs are based on the number of fatalities and severe injuries 
reported by the Beijing Transportation Research Center for 2005 and have been 
corrected for underreporting. The study assumes that 25 percent of accident 
costs are external and not covered by insurance. Values for a statistical life and 
severe insurance are from the EU handbook (Maibach and others 2008). Total 
external safety costs are valued at $147 million a year.
Time lost in traffic is valued at $3.35 billion a year for car drivers and 
$853 million for bus riders. By implementing all measures, the most important 
being those related to congestion and air pollution, the metropolitan area of 
Beijing could bring in $6.5–$13.56 billion a year in revenue.
Another study analyzed CO2 emission charges versus congestion charges. 
A congestion toll in Beijing would earn $5.5 million daily, reducing travel time 
by about 20 percent and CO2 emissions by 36 percent. A fuel tax would earn the 
same amount, reduce time loss even more, and reduce emissions by 45.3 percent. 
The toll reduces car fuel use by 34 percent and the fuel tax by 43 percent. The 
toll, however, would have less effect on transport user income. The lowest two 
income quintiles would benefit most and the highest three quintiles least from a 
congestion toll and the differential would be even larger with a fuel tax.
Climate-Resilient Investment in Transport 155
Turning the Right Corner • http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9835-7 
The study also compares fuel taxes versus technical standards. Regulations 
affect user income less because they affect car use less. However, that is without 
taking into account changes in the prices of fuel-efficient cars or that revenues could 
contribute to other benefits. It also does not include the combined effect of fuel 
taxes and per-km charges on government revenue and user well-being. Fuel taxes 
could lead to trips outside the high-price region to refuel vehicles and to even higher 
transport demand. National carbon pricing would not have this localized problem.
Mexico City
Fuel taxes and congestion tolls were similarly compared for Mexico City. Here 
the optimal gasoline tax to reduce negative externalities would be $2.72 a gallon, 
much higher than the current excise tax of 17 cents a gallon. Such a tax would 
increase the pump price by 215 percent, from $2.21 per gallon to $4.76. 
It would also reduce GHG emissions by 37 percent with high welfare gains, 
assuming high fuel costs could not be avoided. An optimal average toll on car 
mileage is 20.3 cents per vehicle mile. At current fuel standards, this is the 
equivalent of $3.50 a gallon. Current mass transit prices (50 percent of operating 
costs are subsidized) are roughly in line with  optimal prices.
High optimal fuel and congestion charges would increase transport revenue 
and help shift demand from cars to rail or other mass transit. Microbuses would 
become less attractive, with an optimal vehicle-mile tax of 34.2 cents a mile and 
a fuel tax equivalent of $2.67 a gallon. However, high taxes and tolls may not be 
politically feasible. A more modest fuel tax of $1 a gallon could achieve 60  percent 
of these benefits. There is still a strong bias toward individual car use: 600 cars are 
registered in Mexico City every day. Thus, increasing mass transit capacity without 
demand-side measures risks a mismatch between supply and demand (see chapter 2).
Washington
Correcting for the social costs of congestion, air pollution, and road safety is also 
relevant in developed countries. As an analysis of urban transport in Washington 
shows, congestion, accident, and local air pollution costs are of far greater 
 economic importance than a charge for GHG emissions (table 4A.1).
table 4A.1 external costs of passenger transport, washington, 2007
Cent/gallon Cents/mile
Fuel-related costs
Global warming 6 0.3
Oil dependency 12 0.6
Total 18 0.9
Distance-related costs
Local pollution 42 2
Congestion 105 5
Accidents 63 3
Total 210 10
Source: Parry, Walls, and Harrington 2007.
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notes
 1. The 20-year cumulative cost to the transport sector is about $4,700 billion, followed 
by buildings at $2,533 billion, and power generation at $1,745 billion.
 2. The requirements are exclusive of OECD member countries. 
 3. Normally, no retrofitting required for existing infrastructure assets is considered in 
estimating adaptation costs, but the World Bank EACC model includes incremental 
operation and costs of maintaining existing assets. 
 4. This is also referred to as infrastructure deficit (Parry and Timilsina 2009). 
 5. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s foreign assessment program looks at the 
ability of the country, not individual air carriers, to adhere to international standards 
and recommended practices for aircraft operations and maintenance established by 
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the United Nations technical 
agency for aviation. Data are as of December 2008. http://www.faa.gov/about/ 
initiatives/iasa/. 
 6. The EU Emissions Trading System is by far the most important carbon market. 
Others, including the Kyoto Protocol Joint Implementation and international emis-
sions trading Switzerland, New South Wales, the U.S. Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative, the Chicago Climate Exchange, and voluntary markets, are tiny by compari-
son and irrelevant for transport (Kossoy and Ambrosi 2010). 
 7. See, for example, the methodology UNFCCC, ACM 0016: Baseline Methodology for 
Mass Rapid Transport Projects—Version 1, Tool for the demonstration and assessment 
of additionality and Tool to calculate baseline, project and/or leakage emissions from 
electricity consumption. http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/
approved.html.
 8. $50–$150 billion for developing countries only. 
 9. In Indonesia and Kazakhstan transport components may be added later. 
 10. It is well known that there is a general bias toward new investment in the international 
donor community for various reasons. See, for instance, Briceno-Garmendia, Smits, 
and Foster (2008). 
 11. The financial requirements are calculated based on the assumptions that the levels of 
connectivity comparable to those in developed countries would be achieved with all 
transport assets maintained in good condition. See Carruthers and others (2009) for 
more details. 
 12. Other estimates for the whole of sub-Saharan Africa are even larger. For instance, the 
World Bank (2010c) estimates baseline transport spending at $40 billion a year for 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
 13. It is assumed that vehicle fuel economy is 30 mpg and gasoline costs $3 per gallon. 
 14. The external costs in tables 4.8 and 4.9 are evaluated based on shadow prices in the 
United States or OECD member countries, prices that are presumably higher than in 
developing countries. However, the relative costs to GDP, as in table 4.9, should apply 
in developing countries as well. 
 15. As discussed in chapter 3, it must depend on the price elasticity of fuel. For simplicity, 
fuel consumption would not change even if the pump price is increased by the aboli-
tion of subsidies.
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